UC-NRLF 


$B    51    523 


The  Concept  of  the  Human  Soul 

according  to 

Saint  Augustine 


DISSERTATION 

Submitted  to  the  Faculty  of  Philosophy  of  the  Catholic  University 

of  America  in  Partial  Fulfillment  af  the  Requirements  for 

the  Degree  of  Doctor  of  Philosophy^. 


•  -  »  » o   • 


BY 

REV.  WILLIAM  P.  O'CONNOR,  A.  B. 

Archdiocese  of  Milwaukee 

1921 


BXGH#^«*'p* 


/IS^3 


PREFACE. 

The  aim  of  this  dissertation  is  to  present  and  explain 
the  concept  of  the  human  soul  as  it  is  found  in  the  writ- 
ings of  Saint  Augustine. 

The  soul  of  man  was  for  Saint  Augustine  an  object  of 
life-long  study  and  investigation.  He  was  not  particu- 
larly concerned  about  the  soul  as  such,  the  plant  soul,  or 
the  irrational  soul  of  the  brute,  except  insofar  as  a  study 
of  these  might  serve  to  throw  some  light  on  the  nature 
and  activities  of  the  human  soul.  His  interest  in  the 
soul  of  man  was  not  actuated  by  mere  curiosity  to  know 
for  the  sake  of  knowing,  but  he  sought  to  know  the 
human  soul  as  a  means  whereby  he  might  arrive  at  a 
clearer  and  better  understanding  of  the  Supreme  Being. 

The  concept  of  the  human  soul  as  it  appears  in  the 
writings  of  Saint  Augustine  is  not  set  forth  in  a  sys- 
tematic manner,  but  the  elements  that  enter  into  its 
make-up  are  found  widely  scattered  through  his  various 
philosophical,  apologetical,  polemical,  exegetical,  and  dog- 
matical works.  He  wrote  a  few  special  treatises  on  the 
human  soul,  but  he  never  attempted  to  construct  an 
organized  philosophy  of  the  soul. 

The  present  thesis  proposes  to  collect  and  coordinate 
the  philosophical  fragments  of  Saint  Augustine's  doc- 
trine of  the  human  soul  and  to  interpret  these  in  the  light 
of  his  mental  progress.  There  is  a  tendency  on  the  part 
of  some  commentators  to  over-emphasize  the  Platonic 
character  of  Augustine's  doctrine  of  the  human  soul.  It 
is  true  that  those  works  which  were  published  during 
the  first  few  years  of  his  career  manifest  the  strong  in- 
fluence of  his  recent  study  of  Neo-Platonism.  The  trea- 
tises, however,  which  belong  to  that  period  when  he  was 
Bishop  of  Hippo  and  one  of  the  most  renowned  scholars 
of  his  day  stamp  him  unquestionably  as  a  Christian 
philospoher.  It  is  indispensable  to  the  correct  under- 
standing of  Augustine's  concept  of  the  human  soul  that 
due  regard  be  paid  to  the  development  which  charac- 
terizes his  doctrine.         . 

0 


PREFACE 

No  apology  seems  necessary  for  a  piece  of  work  such 
as  is  presented  here  when  one  considers  the  unique  posi- 
tion held  by  Saint  Augustine  in  the  world  of  Christian 
thought.  He  was  under  Providence  the  instrument  by 
which  the  philosophical  riches  of  the  past  were  trans- 
mitted to  the  new  world  which  rose  upon  the  ruins  of 
the  Roman  Empire.  Through  him  the  Christian  Schools 
of  the  Middle  Ages  were  to  meet  the  great  minds  of 
Pagan  antiquity  and  to  learn  what  they  had  achieved  in 
the  field  of  philosophical  endeavors.  The  debt  of  Scholas- 
ticism to  the  Bishop  of  Hippo  not  only  in  Theology  but 
also  in  Philosophy  is  inestimable.  His  influence  on  the 
entire  trend  of  Christian  philosophic  thought  since  his 
day  has  been  tremendous.  Any  effort,  therefore,  to  re- 
direct attention  to  the  work  of  a  great  scholar  and  thinker 
like  Saint  Augustine,  any  contribution,  however  meager 
it  may  be,  to  the  better  understanding  of  his  doctrine, 
deserves  the  consideration  at  least  of  all  those  who  are 
interested  in  the  promotion  of  what  is  best  in  the  history 
of  human  achievement. 


CONTENTS. 

Introduction,  The  Life  of  Saint  Augustine 7 

Chapter 

I.  Sources 10 

II.  His  Notion  of  Philosophy 21 

III.  The  Existence  and  Nature  of  the  Human  Soul . .  33  - 

IV.  The  Human  Soul  is  Incorporeal 48 

V.  The  Immortality  of  the  Human  Soul 57 ' 

VI.  The  Origin  of  the  Human  Soul 67  " 


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INTRODUCTION  7 

INTRODUCTION. 

THE  LIFE  OF  SAINT  AUGUSTINE. 

Aurelius  Augustine  was.  born  at  Tagaste,  in  Numidia, 
in  the  year  354.  His  parents,  Patritius,  an  Afro- 
Roman  pagan,  and  Monica,  an  ardent  Christian,  were 
of  the  patrician  class  but  in  reduced  circumstances.  He 
received  his  early  training  in  the  grammar  school  of  his 
native  town,  and  in  a  school  of  rhetoric  for  beginners  in 
nearby  Madaura.  Recognizing  the  marked  talents  of  the 
boy,  his  father  determined  at  any  cost  to  prepare  him  for 
the  forum.  With  this  end  in  view  Patritius  endeavored 
to  save  a  sufficient  sum  of  money  to  enable  him  to  send 
his  son  to  the  University  of  Carthage.  Unfortunately  for 
Augustine,  his  father's  efforts  did  not  meet  with  success, 
and  he  was  forced  to  spend  his  sixteenth  year  in  idleness. 
With  the  aid  of  Romanianus,  a  wealthy  friend,  the  nec- 
essary funds  were  finally  provided,  and  the  journey  to 
Carthage  was  made  towards  the  close  of  the  year  370. 
The  latent  genius  of  the  new  student  was  soon  recognized 
by  the  University,  and  ere  long  he  had  achieved  some 
reputation  as  a  rhetorician.  The  reading  of  Cicero's 
Hortensius  in  the  year  373,  gave  a  new  trend  to  his 
thoughts  and  aspirations,  and  enkindled  in  his  breast  a 
love  for  philosophy.  The  same  year  or  in  the  beginning 
of  the  following  year,  he  became  a  convert  to  Manicheism. 
Having  finished  his  studies  at  the  University,  he  aban- 
doned the  idea  of  becoming  a  lawyer  and  took  up  the 
teaching  of  rhetoric  as  a  profession.  He  returned  to 
Tagaste  in  374,  where  he  opened  a  school  of  grammar 
or  rhetoric.  After  a  few  tedious,  dragging  months,  the 
atmosphere  of  his  native  town  becoming  unbearable,  he 
closed  the  school  and  returned  to  Carthage,  where  for 
nine  years  he  taught  rhetoric.  This  was  a  period  of 
mental  unrest  and  incipient  religious  doubt  for  Augustine. 
He  had  embraced  Manicheism  chiefly  because  it  promised 
to  satisfy  his  strong  curiosity  regarding  the  mysteries  of 


..3    ,*.    ^*,.c»,. 


g  INTRODUCTION 

nature,  but  after  nine  long  years  of  painstaking  eifort 
on  his  part,  this  promise  remained  unfulfilled.  Finally, 
in  the  year  383,  Faustus,  the  most  renowned  exponent  of 
the  Manichean  doctrines,  came  to  Carthage.  Augustine 
had  been  assured  again  and  again  by  his  co-religionists 
that  this  learned  presbyter  would  be  able  to  remove  all 
his  doubts  and  to  solve  all  his  difficulties.  His  meeting 
with  Faustus,  however,  only  resulted  in  his  recognizing 
the  inconsistencies  of  Manicheism,  which  he  determined 
forthwith  to  abandon.  The  same  year  he  left  Carthage 
for  Rome,  where  he  resumed  the  teaching  of  rhetoric. 
During  his  sojourn  in  Rome,  although  he  no  longer  con- 
sidered himself  a  Manichean,  both  his  host  and  his 
friends  were  members  of  the  sect  with  which  he  had  but 
recently  severed  relations.  Through  the  influence  of 
these  friends  he  was  appointed  Master  of  Rhetoric  for 
Milan  by  Symmachus,  Prefect  of  Rome.  While  in  Rome 
he  had  been  favorably  impressed  for  a  time  by  the  skep- 
tical philosophy  of  the  New  Academy,  but  shortly  after 
his  arrival  in  Milan  he  discarded  this  for  the  study  of 
Neo-Platonism.  The  strong  Platonistic  tendencies  so 
manifest,  particularly  in  his  earlier  writings,  are  trace- 
able to  this  period.  At  Milan  he  met  the  saintly  Ambrose, 
who  was  directly  responsible  for  his  becoming  a  cate- 
chumen in  the  Catholic  Church.  At  the  close  of  the  fall 
school-term  in  the  year  386,  he  resigned  his  post  as 
Master  of  Rhetoric,  and  after  a  short  visit  to  Rome  went 
into  solitude  at  Cassiciacum,  a  country  place  near  Milan. 
Towards  the  beginning  of  Lent,  the  following  year,  he 
returned  to  the  city  to  prepare  for  Baptist.  He  was  bap- 
tized by  Ambrose  about  Easter  time  in  the  year  387. 

After  his  baptism,  he  probably  remained  in  Milan  for 
some  months  before  setting  out  for  Ostia,  whence  he  in- 
tended to  embark  for  Africa.  The  sudden  death  of 
Monica  at  Ostia,  however,  caused  him  to  change  his  plans 
and  he  returned  to  Rome.  The  voyage  to  Africa  was 
made  in  the  following  year,  388.  On  his  arrival  there, 
after  paying  a  hurried  visit  to  Carthage,  he  retired  to 
Tagaste,  where  he  spent  the  following  three  years  in 


INTRODUCTION  9 

monastic  seclusion,  devoting  his  time  to  prayer,  medita- 
tion, and  study.  About  the  year  391,  he  was  summoned 
to  Hippo  Regius,  where,  by  popular  request,  he  was  or- 
dained to  the  priesthood  by  Valerius,  the  Bishop  of  that 
place.  Five  years  later,  in  396,  he  was  consecrated  bishop. 
On  the  death  of  Valerius,  which  occurred  in  the  same 
year,  he  was  raised  to  the  see  of  Hippo,  which  he  filled 
with  great  honor  and  distinction  until  his  death  in  the 
year  430.^ 

1     There  are  two  chief  sources  of  the  life  of  Saint  Augustine: 

I,  Confessionum,  libri  xiii,  an  autobiography  which  records  the 
principal  events  in  his  life  up  to  the  time  of  his  conversion. 

II.  Vita  San€ti  Aurelii  Augustini  Hipponensis  Bpiscopi,  auctore 
Possidio,  a  biography  written  by  one  of  his  intimate  associates,  which 
chronicles  his  career  from  the  time  of  his  conversion  until  his  "death. 

The  following  texts  were  consulted : 

I.  Confessionum,  libri  xiii — Corpus  script,  eccl.  lat.  ed.  Acad. 
Vind.  t.  xxxiii,  sec.  I,  pars.  I — P.  Knoll,  1896;  Migne,  J-P — P.  L.  t. 
xxxii,  col.  659-868 ;  Watts,  W — St.  Augustine's  Confessions,  London, 
1631,  The  Loeb  Classical  Library,  1912. 

II.  Vita  Sancti  Aurelii  Augustini,  Hipponensis  Bpiscopi  auctore 
Possidio,  Migne,  J-P — P.  L.  t.  xxxii,  col.  33-578 ;  Sancti  Augustini  vita 
scripta  a  Possidio  episcopo,  edited  by,  Weiskotten,  H.  T. — Princeton 
University  Press,  1919. 


CHAPTER  I. 
SOURCES. 

The  purpose  of  this  chapter  is  to  indicate  and  sum- 
marize the  chief  sources  to  be  used  in  the  present  study. 
Augustine's  philosophy  of  the  soul  is  not  to  be  found  in 
any  one  work  or  in  any  particular  class  of  writings.  It 
is  not  only  in  his  Philosophical  Writings  that  his  doctrine 
is  to  be  looked  for,  but  also  his  Letters,  Apologetical,  Po- 
lemical, Dogmatical  and  Exegetical  Writings  must  be 
examined.  It  seems  hardly  necessary  to  advert  to  the 
fact  that  the  list  presented  below  is  far  from  being  a 
complete  list  of  all  the  works  in  which  Augustine  touches 
on  questions  pertaining  to  the  human  soul.  An  effort 
will  be  made  here  to  point  out  only  those  works  which 
have  a  more  direct  bearing  on  the  theme  at  hand. 

As  a  preamble  to  this  task,  it  is  necessary  to  make  the 
following  general  observation — in  order  to  determine  ac- 
curately or  to  interpret  intelligently  Augustine's  doc- 
trine on  any  subject  whatsoever,  the  investigator  must  be 
careful  to  consider  the  historical  order  of  his  writings. 
The  reason  for  this  becomes  obvious  when  one  remembers 
that  his  literary  career  extended  over  a  period  of  forty- 
four  years,  during  which  time  his  views  naturally  under- 
went considerable  change.  One  can  reasonably  look  for 
greater  accuracy  of  statement  and  maturer  thought  and 
judgment  in  the  learned  Bishop  of  Hippo  than  in  the 
struggling  catechumen  of  Milan.  He  himself  informs  us 
that  his  was  a  progressive  science.  He  wrote  as  his 
knowledge  increased,  and  his  knowledge  increased  as 
he  wrote,  Ego  proinde  fateor  me  ex  eorum  numero  esse 
conari,  qui  proficiendo  scribunt  et  scribendo  proficiunt.^ 
In  the  Prologus  of  the  Retractationes  which  was  written 
about  427,  he  tells  his  readers  that  in  order  to  under- 
stand the  development  of  his  doctrine  they  should  read 

2    Ep.  CXUII.  2. 


SOURCES  11 

his  works  in  the  order  in  which  they  were  written, 
Inueniet  enim  fortasse,  quomodo  scribendo  profecerim, 
quisquis  optoscula  mea  ordine,  quo  scripta  sunt  legerit. 
In  any  attempt,  therefore,  to  determine  the  true  doctrine 
of  Augustine,  one  must  be  careful  to  consider  the  chrono- 
logical order  of  his  writings. 

The  following  list  has  been  drawn  up  for  the  purpose 
of  acquainting  the  reader  with  the  principal  sources  of 
his  doctrine  on  the  human  soul,  and  in  order  that  thSir 
chronological  position  among  his  works  may  be  located. 

Contra  Academicos,  lihri  III,  the  earliest  of  this  extant 
works,  was  written  towards  the  close  of  the  year  386,  at 
Cassiciacum,  a  country  place  near  Milan.  These  dia- 
logues are  dedicated  to  his  friend  and  patron  Romanianus. 
They  contain  a  refutation  of  the  Academician  principle 
that  the  human  mind  in  its  search  for  truth  cannot  attain 
certitude,  but  only  a  high  degree  of  probability.  The 
chief  value  of  the  work  to  the  present  treatise  is  that  it 
furnishes  some  of  the  fundamental  notions  of  Augustine's 
philosophy. 

De  Ordine,  lihri  IL  These  two  books  were  also  com- 
posed towards  the  close  of  386  at  Cassiciacum.  They  are 
dedicated  to  Zenobius,  one  of  his  intimate  companions 
and  associates.  Divine  Providence  and  the  Order  of  the 
Universe  are  the  chief  topics  discussed.  In  the  Second 
Book  he  touches  upon  some  questions  that  enter  into  our 
study,  such  as  the  relation  of  philosophy  to  theology 
(c.  v)  ;  authority  and  reason  (c.  ix)  ;  quid  sit  Ratio? 
(c.  xi)  ;  quo  ordine  anima  provehitur  ad  cognitionem 
sui  et  ipsiu^  unitatis  (c.  xviii)  ;  homo  unde  hrutis  praes- 
tantior?  (c.  xix). 

Soliloquia,  lihri  II,  were  written  before  his  baptism  in 
the  year  387  at  Cassiciacum.  They  are  in  the  form  of  a 
dialogue  in  which  Augustine  represents  himself  as  dis- 
cussing certain  questions  with  his  own  Reason.  In  the 
First  Book  he  considers  the  qualities  of  mind  and  heart 
requisite  for  attaining  the  vision  of  God;  in  conclusion, 
he  touches  upon  the  immortal  character  of  Truth.  This 
last  consideration  leads  him  to  the  main  topic  to  be  dis- 


12  SOURCES 

cussed  in  the  Second  Book,  namely,  the  immortality  of 
the  human  soul.  He  introduces  the  meditations  on  im- 
mortality by  explaining  the  nature  of  Truth  and  Error. 
Having  discovered  Truth  to  be  immortal,  he  formulates 
the  argument,  undoubtedly  Platonic  in  origin,  that  the 
human  soul  is  immortal  because  it  is  the  dwelling  place 
of  immortal  Truth. 

De  Immortalitate  Animae  was  written  in  the  year 
387,  either  at  Milan  during  the  time  of  his  proximate 
preparation  for  Baptism,  or  at  Cassiciacum  shortly  after 
his  return  from  Milan.  It  is  a  continuation  of  the  medi- 
tations begun  in  the  Soliloquia,  The  arguments  employed 
in  this  work  are  neither  clear  nor  convincing.  Some 
forty  years  later  he  expressed  regret  that  the  book  had 
been  published  against  his  will,  and  confessed  that  the 
proofs  developed  therein  are  so  obscure  and  involved 
that  he  himself  could  scarcely  understand  them.^ 

De  Quantitate  Animae  was  begun  in  the  year  387  and 
finished  in  388  at  Rome.  This  book,  which  is  in  the 
form  of  a  dialogue  with  a  friend  named  Evodius,  con- 
tains an  account  of  several  discussions  on  the  following 
questions  pertaining  to  the  human  soul :  unde  sit,  qualis 
sit,  qitanta  sit,  cur  corpori  fuerit  data,  cum  ad  corpus 
uenerit  qvulis  efficiatur,  qualis  cum  abscesserit.^  The 
major  portion  of  the  work,  as  the  title  indicates,  is 
devoted  to  an  examination  of  the  question:  Quanta  sit 
anima?  According  to  Augustine,  the  human  soul  is  a 
simple  substance,  that  is  to  say,  it  is  inextended ;  it  does 
not  occupy  ^pace  like  material  objects,  so  that  different 
parts  of  the  soul  correspond  to  different  parts  of  space; 
but  it  is  present  in  the  body  which  it  animates  vi  ac  po- 
tentia  (c.  xxxii,  69).  The  last  four  chapters  deal  with 
the  seven  stages  in  the  progress  of  the  individual  soul 
towards  God,  an  idea  borrowed  from  Neo-Platonism. 

De  Libero  Arbitrio,  libri  III,  The  first  of  these  books 
was  written  about  the  year  388  while  Augustine  was 
sojourning  in  Rome;  the  second  and  third  books  were 

3  Ret.  I,  c.  V. 

4  Ret.  I.  c.  vil 


I 


SOURCES  13 

composed  about  395  in  Hippo.  They  contain  a  series  of 
dialogues  with  his  friend  Evodius  in  which  they  discuss 
the  problem  of  evil  and  its  relation  to  human  liberty. 
The  work  was  intended  primarily  as  a  refutation  of  the 
Manichean  tenet  that  God  is  the  author  of  evil  as  well  as 
of  good.  He  maintains  against  the  Manicheans  that  God 
is  not  the  author  of  evil,  but  that  evil  exists  in  conse- 
quence of  man's  exercise  of  free  will.  For  our  purpose 
Chapters  XX  and  XXI  of  the  Third  Book  are  important, 
because  they  give  a  concise  statement  of  his  difficulties 
regarding  the  origin  of  the  souls  of  the  descendants  of  the 
first  man.  Augustine  always  hesitated  about  taking  a 
definite  stand  on  this  question,  but  he  seems  to  have  been 
inclined  to  favor  Generationism  as  the  theory  most 
readily  reconcilable  with  the  orthodox  doctrine  of  origi- 
nal sin. 

De  Diversis  Quaestionibus  Octoginta  Tribus,  was  pub- 
lished at  Hippo  in  the  year  396.  This  work  is  a  com- 
pilation of  answers  given  by  Augustine  to  various  ques- 
tions proposed  by  his  companions  in  the  religious  life  at 
Tagaste  and  Hippo.  The  following  questions  are  of  im- 
portance in  the  present  study:  Qiiaestio  prima,  Utrum 
anima  a  se  ipsa  sit;  VH,  Quae  proprie  in  animante  anima 
dicitur;  VHI,  Utrum  per  se  anima  moveatur;  XXXVHI, 
De  conformatione  animae;  XL,  Cum  animarum  natura 
una  sit,  unde  hominum  diversae  voluntates. 

Confessionum,  libri  XIII.  This  work,  Augustine's  lit- 
erary masterpiece,  was  published  in  Hippo  in  the  year 
400.  The  first  ten  books  are  an  autobiography,  contain- 
ing an  intimate  description  of  the  author's  mental  and 
moral  experiences  from  his  infancy  up  to  the  time  of  his 
conversion.  The  last  three  books  are  exegetical  in  char- 
acter, being  chiefly  a  commentary  on  the  history  of  the 
Creation  as  recorded  in  the  Book  of  Genesis.  The  auto- 
biographical part  of  the  work  reveals  the  remarkable 
introspective  powers  of  its  author,  and  his  ability  to 
commit  to  writing  his  observations.  The  tenth  book  con- 
tains an  acute  analysis  of  Memory  and  Remembering — a 
splendid  piece  of  psychological  work.    This  study  is  of 


14  SOURCES 

value  because  he  builds  up  an  argument  for  the  spirit- 
uality of  the  soul  on  the  power  of  Memory.  It  is  the  work 
as  a  whole,  however,  rather  than  any  specific  part,  that 
furnishes  many  useful  items,  suggestions,  and  aids  in 
the  investigation  of  Augustine's  concept  of  the  human 
soul. 

De  Trinitate,  libri  XV,  was  begun  about  the  year  400 
and  completed  about  416  at  Hippo.  This  is,  perhaps,  his 
most  profound  dogmatic  treatise.  As  the  title  indicates, 
it  discusses  the  mystery  of  the  Most  Holy  Trinity.  His 
motive  in  writing  this  treatise  was  to  convince  those  who 
attempt  to  demonstrate  the  truth  of  this  great  mystery 
by  reason  alone  that  thej  human  mind  is  incapable  of 
fathoming  the  nature  of  God,  and  hence  that  the  Trinity 
is  a  matter  for  faith  and  not  for  reason.  From  the  Ninth 
to  the  Fifteenth  Book  inclusive,  he  skillfully  examines  the 
various  trinities  which  are  found  in  man.  These  seven 
books  in  particular  are  replete  with  much  that  is  of  value 
to  the  present  study. 

De  Genesi  ad  Litterarru,  libri  XII .  The  writing  of  this 
work  extended  over  a  period  of  fourteen  years  from  401 
to  415.  These  twelve  books  are  chiefly  exegetical  in  char- 
acter, being  a  defense  of  the  literal  interpretation  of  the 
first  three  chapters  of  the  Book  of  Genesis.  The  main 
purpose  of  the  work  is  to  prove  that  there  is  nothing  in 
the  history  recorded  in  these  chapters  which  cannot  be 
literally  true,  nothing  which  is  contrary  to  reason  or  to 
the  nature  of  things.  Two  of  these  twelve  books  have  a 
direct  bearing  on  our  problem — the  Seventh  which  dis- 
cusses the  nature  of  the  human  soul,  and  the  Tenth,  which 
deals  with  the  origin  of  the  human  soul. 

Epistola  CXVIII,  was  written  about  the  year  410  in 
reply  to  a  communication  forwarded  to  Augustine  by  a 
Greek  scholar  named  Dioscorus.  This  young  man  who 
was  studying  the  Latin  classics  evidently  had  encountered 
several  difficulties  which  he  was  unable  to  solve.  He 
submitted  these  to  the  Bishop  of  Hippo  in  the  hope  that 
he  would  take  the  trouble  to  answer  them.  His  chief 
motive  in  seeking  the  desired  information  was  one  of 


SOURCES  15 

vainglory.  After  severely  rebuking  his  correspondent 
for  imposing  so  great  a  task  upon  an  already  overbur- 
dened ecclesiastic,  and  from  such  a  blameworthy,  trivial 
motive,  Augustine  answers  his  difficulties  in  a  general 
way.  This  lengthy  epistle  interests  us  because  it  shows, 
among  other  things,  how  well  acquainted  its  writer  was 
with  the  current  philosophical  theories  of  his  day.  The 
third  and  fourth  chapters  especially  acquaint  us  with  his 
views  on  the  relation  of  philosophy  to  religion. 

Epistola  CXLIII,  was  written  about  the  year  412  in 
reply  to  a  letter  sent  him  by  a  friend  named  Marcellinus. 
In  this  short  letter  he  defends  the  attitude  he  had  as- 
sumed towards  the  problem  of  the  origin  of  the  soul. 

De  Civitate  Dei,  libri  XXII.  This  monumental  dis- 
sertation, probably  Augustine's  greatest  work,  was  begun 
about  the  year  413  and  completed  in  or  about  the  year 
426.  It  is  the  earliest  known  effort  to  formulate  a  phi- 
losophy of  history.  The  invasion  and  sack  of  Rome  by 
the  Goths  under  King  Alaric  in  the  year  410  had  aroused 
the  animosity  of  the  pagan  population  of  the  Empire 
against  the  Christian  religion.  The  great  disaster  which 
had  befallen  Rome  was  attributed  by  the  adherents  of 
polytheism  to  the  neglect  of  their  gods  consequent  upon 
the  introduction  of  Christianity.  Augustine  in  this  work 
undertakes  to  show  the  real  causes  of  the  fall  of  the 
earthly  city,  and  at  the  same  time  to  vindicate  the  King- 
dom of  God  on  earth  against  the  misrepresentations  and 
unjust  accusations  of  its  enemies.  According  to  the 
author  himself  the  first  ten  books  are  devoted  to  a  care- 
ful study  of  the  pagan  form  of  worship  and  its  relation 
to  human  welfare  both  in  the  present  life  and  in  the  life 
to  come.^  The  remaining  twelve  books  constitute  a  his- 
tory of  the  rise,  the  progress  and  the  destiny  of  the  two 
cities — the  City  of  God  and  the  City  of  the  World.^ 

It  does  not  fall  within  the  province  of  this  dissertation 
to  give  a  detailed  criticism  of  this  noteworthy  contribu- 
tion to  Christian  Apologetics,  suffice  it  to  say,  that  in  this 

5  Ret.  II,  c.  LXVIIII. 

6  Ibid. 


16  SOURCES 

work  Augustine  glimpses  the  whole  course  of  human  his- 
tory and  "from  the  beginning  to  the  end  he  interprets  it 
with  power  and  insight.  His  apology  for  Christianity 
rises  at  once  to  the  dignity  of  a  magnificent  philosophy  of 
history,  a  work  that  towers  'like  an  Alpine  peak'  over  all 
the  other  apologies  of  Christian  antiquity."  ^ 

The  value  of  the  work  for  the  present  purpose  con- 
sists in  this,  that  incidental  to  the  main  thesis,  much 
light  is  thrown  upon  the  philosophical  opinions  of  the 
eminent  thinkers  of  antiquity,  particularly  in  Books 
VIII  and  XVIIII,  and  side  by  side  with  these  are  found 
the  author's  views  on  the  various  problems  they  suggest. 
Although  it  is  true  that  here  as  elsewhere  we  do  not  find 
any  attempt  at  a  systematic  treatment  of  philosophical 
questions,  yet  there  is  a  wealth  of  material  scattered 
through  the  pages  of  this  work  which  the  student  of 
Augustine's  philosophy  cannot  afford  to  overlook.  More- 
over, in  line  with  the  general  observation  made  in  the 
beginning  of  this  chapter  apropos  of  Augustine's  mental 
progress,  it  is  useful  to  note  that  the  views  expressed  in 
this  work  represent  the  results  of  life-long  study  and 
investigation.  His  doctrine  of  the  human  soul,  as  one 
might  expect  in  a  work  of  this  kind,  is  diffused  through 
the  whole  dissertation.  It  is  only  as  occasion  may  de- 
mand that  he  digresses  from  the  main  theme  to  touch 
upon  this  or  that  particular  aspect  of  our  question.  Again 
as  in  the  case  of  the  Confessions  it  is  not  so  much  to  a 
particular  part  as  to  the  general  development  of  the 
thesis  that  one  must  look  for  his  doctrine. 

Epistola  CLXVI,  was  written  to  Saint  Jerome  about 
the  year  415.  Augustine  still  troubled  by  the  same  doubts 
regarding  the  origin  of  the  soul  which  had  disturbed  his 
mind  some  twenty  years  previously  when  he  wrote  De 
Libera  Arbitrio  decided  to  submit  his  diflficulty  to  Jerome. 
In  the  Retractationes,  we  are  informed  that  while  the 
latter  wrote  to  him  approving  the  course  he  had  taken 
in  asking  the  advice  of  another,  he  nevertheless  regretted 

7  Bardenhewer-Shahan,  Patrology,  p.  479-480.  Freiburg  im  Breis- 
gau  and  St.  Louis,  Mo.    1908. 


SOURCES  17 

that  he  did  not  have  sufficient  leisure  to  pen  a  fitting 
reply.^  This  epistle,  while  largely  given  over  to  a  dis- 
cussion of  the  origin  of  the  soul,  contains  in  the  second 
chapter  a  short  summary  of  what  Augustine  explicitly 
held  regarding  the  human  soul. 

De  Anima  et  ejus  Origine,  libri  IIII.  These  four  books 
were  written  about  the  year  420.  Vincentius  Victor,  a 
recent  convert  from  an  offshoot  of  the  Donatist  heresy, 
had  found  among  the  books  of  a  certain  Spanish  priest 
named  Peter,  an  account  of  Augustine's  indecision  in  the 
matter  of  the  souFs  origin.  Victor  wrote  two  books  on 
the  question  to  Peter.  These  books  fell  into  the  hands  of 
a  monk  named  Renatus  who  forwarded  them  to  Augus- 
tine. In  his  reply,  the  latter  pens  four  separate  books 
on  the  subject,  sending  one  to  Renatus,  one,  in  the  form 
of  a  letter,  to  Peter,  and  two  to  Victor.  The  main  argu- 
m!ent  in  all  four  books  is  the  same,  and  aims  at  justifying 
their  author's  hesitancy  in  expressing  himself  definitely 
upon  the  manner  of  the  souFs  origin. 
.  Retractationum,  libri  II.  This  work  appeared  about 
the  year  427,  and  contains  a  critical  review  of  the  lit- 
erary products  of  a  long  career.  The  author  takes  up 
each  one  of  his  works  in  the  order  of  its  composition,  and 
after  a  brief  statement  of  the  purpose  for  which  it  was 
written,  he  subjects  it  to  careful  revision,  and  correction. 
The  work  is  invaluable,  if  not  indispensable,  to  the  stu- 
dent of  Saint  Augustine.  It  makes  available  a  synopsis 
of  his  chief  works.  It  enables  one  to  study  the  develop- 
ment of  his  doctrine.  It  affords  the  opportunity  to  ex- 
amine the  author's  personal  criticism  of  his  own  writings. 

This  list,  as  was  remarked  in  the  beginning  of  the 
chapter,  is  by  no  means  complete ;  in  point  of  fact,  a  com- 
plete list  would  probably  include  a  large  part  of  the  vast 
library  of  Augustinian  literature  which  fortunately  has 
come  down  to  us.  No  further  claim  is  made  for  the  work 
presented  here,  other  than  that  both  from  the  standpoint 
of  chronology  and  content  it  is  sufficient  to  enable  one  to 

8    II.  c.  LXXL 


18 


SOURCES 


pursue  intelligently  the  work  that  has  been  undertaken. 
For  the  purpose  of  facilitating  reference  to  this  list, 
and  in  order  to  designate  the  texts  which  have  been  used 
in  this  study,  the  following  chronological  and  textual  list 
is  added.® 


386 — Contra     Academicos, 
L.  Ill 

(Contra  Acad.) 
386— De  Ordine,  L.  II 

387— Soliloquia,  L.  II 

(Solil.) 
387 — De  Immortalitate  An- 
imae,  L.  I 

(De  Immor.  An.) 
387-388— De        Quantitate 
Animae,  L.  I 
(De  Quan.  An.) 
388-395— De  Libero   Arbi- 
trio,  L.  Ill 

(De  Lib.  Arb.) 
396 — De    Diversis    Quaes- 
tionibus       LXXXIII, 
L.  I 

(De     Div.     Quaes. 
LXXXIII) 
400 — Confessionum,  L. 

XIII 
(Conf.) 


400-416— De    Trinitate,    L. 
XV 

(De  Trin.) 


Migne,  P.  L.  t.  xxxii,  905- 
958 ;  Ret.  I.  c.  I. 

Migne,  P.  L.  t.  xxxii,  977- 
1020 ;  Ret.  I.  c.  III. 

Migne,  P.  L.  t.  xxxii,  869- 
904 ;  Ret.  I.  c.  IIII. 

Migne,  P.  L.  t.  xxxii,  1021- 
1034 ;  Ret.  I.  c.  v. 

Migne,  P.  L.  t.  xxxii,  1035- 
1080 ;  Ret.  I.  c.  vii. 

Migne,  P.  L.  t.  xxxii,  1221- 
1310 ;  Ret.  I.  c.  viii. 

Migne,  P.  L.  t.  XL,  11-100; 
Ret.  I.  c.  XXV. 


Corpus   script,    eccles.    lat. 

ed.   Acad.    Vind.    sec.    I. 

pars.     I,     t.     xxxiii — P. 

Knoll,  1896. 
Migne,  P.  L.  t.  xxxii,  659- 

868,  Ret.  II,  c.  XXXII. 
Migne,  P.  L.  t.  XLII,  819- 

1098,  SS.  Patrum  opus- 

cula    selecta,    sec.    I.    t. 

XLII,  XLIII,  Hurter,  H. 

Innsbruck,  1868.  Ret.  II, 

c.  XLI. 


9  Wherever  possible  the  Corpus  scriptorum  ccclcsiasticorum  latin- 
orum  of  the  Vienna  Academy  of  Sciences  (Corpus  script,  eccles.  lat.  ed. 
Acad.  Vind.)  has  been  consulted;  in  all  other  cases  the  Opera  Omnia 
Sancti  Aurclii  Augustini  Hipponensis  Episcopi,  which  is  part  of  the 
Patrologiae  Cursus  Computus  of  J-P  Migne,  Vol.  XXXII-XLVIl— 
Paris,  1845-1849  (Migne,  P.  L.),  has  been  followed. 


SOURCES 


19 


401-415 — De  Genesi  ad  Lit-     Corpus    script,   eccles.    lat. 

teram,  L.  XII  ed.  Acad.  Vind.  sec.  Ill, 

(De  Gen.  ad.  Litt.)         pars  I.  t.  xxviii — J.  Zy- 

cha,  1894. 
Migne,  P.  L.  t.  xxxiv,  245- 
486,  Ret.  II,  c.  L. 
410 — Epistola   CXVIII,  ad     Corpus    script,    eccles.    lat. 


Dioscorum 
(Ep.  CXVIII) 


ed.  Acad.  Vind.  sec.  II, 
pars    II,    t.    xxxiiii,    Al 
Goldbacher,  1898. 
Migne,  P.  L.  t.  xxxiii,  432- 
449. 


412— Epistola   CXLIII,    ad 
Marcellinum 
(Ep.  CXLIII) 


413-426— De    Civitate    Dei 
L.  XXII 

(De  Civ.  Dei) 


415— Epistola    CLXVI,    ad 
Hieronymum 
(Ep.  CLXVI) 


420 — De    Anima    et    ejus 
Origine 

(De    An.    et    ejus 
Origine) 


427 — Retractationum,  L.  II 
(Ret.) 


In  preparing  this  list  the 
suited : 


Corpus    script,   eccles.   lat. 

ed.  Acad.  Vind.  sec.  II, 

pars   III,   t.   xxxiiii,   Al. 

Goldbacher,  1904. 
Migne,  P.  L.  t.  xxxiii,  585- 

590. 
Corpus   script,    eccles.   lat. 

ed.   Acad.   Vind.   sec.   v. 

pars    I-II,    t.    xxxx,    E. 

Hoffman,  1899-1900. 
Migne,  P.  L.  t.  XLI,  13-804, 

Ret.  II.  c.  LXVIIII. 
Corpus    script,    eccles.    lat. 

ed.  Acad.   Vind.   sec.   II, 

pars  III,  t.  xxxxiiii,  Al. 

Goldbacher,  1904. 
Migne,  P.  L.  t.  xxxiii,  720- 

733,  Ret.  II,  c.  LXXI. 
Corpus   script,    eccles.    lat. 

ed.  Acad.  Vind.  sec.  viii, 

pars  I,  t.  LX,  C.  Urba  et 

J.  Zycha,  1913. 
Migne,  P.  L.  t.  XLIV,  475- 

548,  Ret.  II,  c.  LXXXII. 
Corpus    script,    eccles.    lat. 

ed.    Acad.    Vind.    sec.    t, 

pars     II,     t.     xxxvi,     P. 

Knoll,  1902. 
Migne,  P.  L.  t.  xxxii,  583- 

656. 
following  works  were  con- 


20  SOURCES 

Notitia  Litteraria  in  vitis,  scriptis  et  editionihus  ope- 
rum  S.  Augiistini,  Schoenemanni  Bibliothecae,  Lipsiae, 
1794,  Migne,  P.  L.  t.  XLVII  (p.  26-34). 

Dictionnaire  de  Theologie  Catholique,  1,  2.  2311-2314. 
Vacant  et  Mangenot,  Art:  St,  Augustin,  E,  Portalie, 
(Numerical  References  are  not  always  accurate  and  must 
be  verified.) 

Bardenhewer-Shahan,  Patrology.  p.  477-498. 

Ueberweg-Heinze,  Grundriss  der  Geschichte  der  Philo- 
Sophie  II,  p.  125.  9  ed.  Berlin,  1905. 


HIS  NOTION  OF  PHILOSOPHY  21 

CHAPTER  II. 
HIS  NOTION  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

The  history  of  Christian  Philosophy  begins  with  the 
Fathers  of  the  Church.  These  early  champions  of  the 
Christian  philosophical  world-view  were  interested  in 
theology  rather  than  philosophy.  They  devoted  them- 
selves to  the  task  of  fixing,  developing,  explaining,  and 
defending  the  doctrines  of  Christianity.  The  pioneers 
among  them — those  who  labored  before  the  Council  of 
Nice  (A.  D.  325) — were  engaged  in  establishing  Christian 
Dogma  on  a  firm  foundation  of  revelation  and  reason, 
and  in  warding  off  the  sinister  influences  of  pagan,  Jew- 
ish, and  heretical,  philosophical  and  religious  ideas.  The 
writers  of  the  Post-Nicene  Period  had  their  work  mapped 
out  for  them  by  the  dogmatic  definitions  of  the  Council. 
It  fell  to  their  lot  to  explain  the  articles  of  faith  which 
had  been  defined,  and  to  combat  the  prevailing  heresies 
of  their  day. 

With  these  facts  in  mind,  it  is  not  difficult  to  under- 
stand why  the  Patristic  thinkers  have  not  left  any  purely 
philosophical  system  or  systems  such  as  were  created  and 
developed  by  the  great  thinkers  of  pagan  antiquity. 
They  were  not  ex  professo  philosophers  in  the  ordinary 
meaning  of  the  term.  They  did  not  attempt  to  formulate 
any  special  theory  of  causes  or  ultimate  explanations  to 
solve  the  riddle  of  the  cosmos  and  human  existence.  The 
philosophy  they  accepted  and  defended  was  not  of  their 
own  fashioning;  it  had  been  handed  down  to  them  em- 
bodied in  the  doctrines  of  Jesus  Christ. 

What  was  their  attitude  towards  Pagan  philosophy? 
We  must  not  think  that  they  ignored  entirely  the  achieve- 
ments of  the  great  pagan  minds  in  the  domain  of  human 
philosophy ;  on  the  contrary,  they  sought  to  learn  the  best 
that  pagan  thought  had  attained  in  order  that  they  might 
enlist  it  in  the  service  of  Christianity.     Like  the  Neo- 


22  HIS  NOTION  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Platonists,  they  looked  upon  human  philosophy  and  all 
secular  learning  as  existing  for  the  sole  purpose  of  un- 
folding the  impenetrable  mystery  surrounding  the  Su- 
preme Being.  Philosophy  was,  for  them,  merely  an  ad- 
junct to  Theology.  It  is  not  strange,  then,  that  we  find 
in  the  writings  of  these  early  Fathers  of  the  Church  so 
close  a  union  between  Philosophy  and  Theology  that  it  is 
difficult,  and  at  times  almost  impossible,  to  divorce  the 
one  from  the  other.  This  intimate  association  of  Phi- 
losophy with  Theology  is  noticeable  especially  in  the 
earlier  half  of  the  Patristic  Period,  and  although  the 
tendency  to  separate  the  two  sciences  appears  towards 
the  close  of  the  Period,  we  do  not  find  any  accurate  defini- 
tion of  their  respective  fields  until  the  thirteenth  century. 

The  outstanding  figure  among  the  Patristic  philoso- 
phers, and  one  of  the  really  profound  thinkers  of  all 
times,  was  Saint  Augustine.  What  has  been  observed 
above  regarding  all  the  Fathers  in  a  general  way,  may 
be  applied  to  Augustine  in  particular.  He  was  first  and 
foremost  a  theologian,  and  perhaps  the  greatest  of  them 
all.  His  chief  interest  centered  in  the  development,  ex- 
position, and  defense  of  Christian  Dogma.  Theology,  in 
his  opinion,  occupies  the  highest  rank  in  the  hierarchy  of 
the  sciences.  The  value  of  all  human  knowledge  is  to  be 
reckoned  in  term^  of  the  service  it  renders  the  science  of 
God.  To  know  God  is  the  most  desirable  good  in  life. 
It  is  in  this  knowledge  only  that  man  can  find  true  happi- 
ness. That  man  who  is  versed  in  all  the  human  sciences, 
but  does  not  know  God,  is  indeed  miserable;  but  if  he 
knows  God, — though  he  be  ignorant  of  all  else — he  is 
happy.^^  Referring  to  Philosophy  in  particular,  he  ob- 
serves that  the  unique  affair  of  true  and  genuine  phi- 
losophy is  to  aid  man  in  his  quest  for  knowledge  of  the 
Uncaused  Cause  of  all  things." 

The  relation  of  Philosophy  to  Theology  as  conceived  by 
Augustine  is  one  of  reciprocal  service.    This  is  brought 

10  Infelix  enim  homo,  qui  scit  ilia  omnia,  te  autem  nescit;  beatus 
autem,  qui  te  scit,  etiamsi  ilia  nesciat.  Conf,  v.  c.  iv. 

11  De  Ordine  II,  c.  v.  16. 


HIS   NOTION   OF  PHILOSOPHY  23 

out  clearly  in  his  exposition  of  the  relations  between 
Authority  and  Reason.  No  one  doubts  that  there  are  two 
means  by  which  we  acquire  knowledge,  Authority  and 
Reason.12  There  are  two  kinds  of  authority,  divine  and 
human.i^  Of  these  two,  divine  authority  is  the  highest 
because  it  is  infallible;  human  authority  is  less  reliable, 
because  it  is  subject  to  error.^*  The  authority  upon  which 
he  places  the  greatest  reliance,  and  from  which  he  is  ab- 
solutely certain  that  he  will  never  deviate,  is  Christ.^^ 
So  far  as  human  authority  is  concerned, — although,  gen- 
erally speaking,  it  is  not  trustworthy — those  men  are  to 
be  preferred  before  all  others  who  give  the  best  evidences 
of  greatest  learning,  and  who  carry  out  in  their  lives  the 
precepts  they  teach.^^  As  regards  Reason,  the  other 
means  by  which  we  acquire  knowledge,  he  writes :  "I  am 
influenced  also  by  whatever  has  been  attained  by  subtle 
reasoning,  since  I  am  eager  not  only  to  believe  but  also 
to  understand  the  truth."  ^^  What,  then,  are  the  rela- 
tions between  these  two, — Authority  and  Reason  ?  In  the 
order  of  time.  Authority  precedes  Reason,  but  in  the  order 
of  reality.  Reason  precedes  Authority.  (Tempore  aucto- 
ritas,  re  autem  ratio  prior  est.)  ^^  Reason  appears  to  be 
more  adapted  to  the  capabilities  of  the  learned  for  the 
acquisition  of  knowledge ;  but  Authority  is  necessary  for 
all,  both  the  cultured  and  the  ignorant.^®  Reason  pre- 
cedes Authority,  in  so  far  as  it  lies  within  its  province  to 
examine  the  warrants  of  credibility  of  this  or  that  author 
or  work.-°  In  a  certain  sense.  Reason  may  be  said  al- 
ways to  precede  Authority,  since  no  one  believes  anything 
until  he  has  determined  in  his  mind  that  it  ought  to  be 
believed.2^     Finally,    Authority    takes    precedence    over 


12  Contra  Acad.  Ill,  c.  xx,  43 :  Cf.  De  Ordine  II,  c.  ix,  26. 

13  De  Ordine  II,  c.  ix,  27. 

14  Ibid. 

15  Contra  Acad.  Ill,  c.  xx,  43. 

16  De  Ordine  II,  c.  ix,  27. 

17  Contra  Acad.  Ill,  c.  xx,  43. 

18  De  Ordine  II,  c.  ix,  26. 

19  Ibid. 

20  De  Vera  Rel.  c.  xxv,  46. 

21  De  Praed.  Sanct.  c.  II,  ,5. 


C 


24  HIS   NOTION  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Reason  in  matters  of  revealed  truth.^^  This  brief  sketch 
of  the  relations  between  Authority  and  Reason  helps  one 
to  understand  Augustine's  attitude  towards  Philosophy  in 
respect  to  Theology.  While  it  is  certain  that  he  appre- 
ciated the  great  service  which  the  former  renders  the  lat- 
ter, nevertheless  he  considered  Philosophy  as  occupying 
a  secondary  place  to  Theology.  It  would  be  an  unwar- 
ranted assumption  to  claim  for  the  Bishop  of  Hippo  the 
honor  of  having  defined  exactly  the  relations  between 
these  two  sciences.  It  is  not  overstating  the  case,  how- 
ever, to  maintain  that  he  seems  to  have  traced  at  least 
the  outline  of  that  system  of  relations  which  was  to  be 
completed  many  centuries  later  by  Saint  Thomas.^^ 

Philosophy,  according  to  Augustine,  may  be  defined  as 
the  "love  of  wisdom"  (amor  sapientiae)  .2*  Wisdom  seems 
to  be  not  only  the  knowledge,  but  also  the  diligent  inquiry 
into  those  human  and  divine  things  that  pertain  to  a 
happy  life.  (Sapientia  mihi  videtur  esse  rerum  human- 
arum  divinarumque,  quae  ad  beatam  vitam  pertineant, 
non  scientia  solum,  sed  etiam  diligens  inquisitio.)^^  The 
highest  object  of  all  knowledge  and  investigation  is  God, 
and  after  God,  comes  the  human  soul.  To  know  God  and 
the  human  soul  is  not  only  Augustine's  chief  aspiration, 
but  also  his  sole  concern  in  life:  Deum  et  animam  scire 
cupio.  Nihilne  plus?  Nihil  omnino.^^  ...  Animam 
te  certe  dicis  et  Deum  velle  cognoscere?  Hoc  est  totum 
negotium  meum.  Nihilne  ampliu^?  Nihil  prorsus,^'^ 
He  desires  to  know  God  because  He  is  the  Supreme 
Being.28  He  recognizes  within  himself,  moreover,  an  in- 
satiable longing  for  perfect  happiness;  but  reason  tells 
him  that  this  longing  will  be  satisfied  only  then  when  he 
possesses  God  who  is  the  Absolute  Good.^^    He  desires  to 

22  De  Trin  viii,  c.  v,  8 :  Cf.  Ep.  cxx,  c.  I. 

23  De  Wulf  Coffey— History  of  Medieval  Philosophy,  p.  91,  New 
York— 1909. 

24  Contra  Acad.  II,  c.  Ill,  7. 

25  Ibid.  I.  c.  viii,  23. 

26  Solil.  I.  c.  II.  7. 

27  Ibid.  c.  XV,  27. 

28  De  Civ.  Dei  xi.  c.  xx. 

29  Ibid  x.  c.  vi. 


HIS  NOTION  OF  PHILOSOPHY  25 

know  God,  therefore,  in  order  that  he  may  one  day  pos- 
sess Him,  and  so  attain  perfect  happiness.^^  He  aspires 
to  know  the  soul  both  because  it  bears  the  image  of  God, 
and  because  it  is  the  medium  through  which  he  acquires 
a  knowledge  of  God.^^  Here  we  have  the  key  to  the  un- 
derstanding of  his  whole  philosophy.  All  other  problems 
group  themselves  naturally  about  these  two  focal  points — 
God  and  the  human  soul.  The  study  of  that  which  per- 
tains to  the  first  gind  more  important  of  these  two  central 
ideas  belongs  to  Theology  rather  than  to  Philosophy.  The 
interest  of  the  student  of  Philosophy  fixes  itself  in  par- 
ticular upon  Augustine's  concept  of  the  human  soul. 

Before  entering  upon  the  study  proper  of  this  question, 
it  seems  advisable  to  emphasize  one  very  important  fact 
which  has  a  more  or  less  direct  bearing  on  the  correct 
interpretation  of  his  entire  philosophy.  He  did  not  con- 
struct an  organized  system  of  philosophy  which  is  set 
down  in  any  one  work  or  class  of  works ;  on  the  contrary, 
his  philosophy  is  fragmentary;  it  is  found  scattered  here 
and  there  through  his  voluminous  writings  emmeshed  in 
theological  themes.^^  Philosophical  problems  as  such 
command  his  attention  only  then  when  they  appear  to  be 
necessary  to  throw  light  on  some  obscure  dogma.  Even 
in  those  of  his  works  which  are  usually  included  under 
the  heading  Philosophical  Writings,  the  dogmatic  view- 
point is  evident.  What  is  true  of  his  philosophy  as  a 
whole  in  this  respect  is  true  also  of  that  portion  of  it 
which  pertains  to  the  soul.  A  systematically  developed, 
coherent  philosophy  of  the  soul  is  not  to  be  found  in  the 
writings  of  Saint  Augustine.  He  did  not  investigate  the 
soul  as  an  isolated  philosophical  problem,  but  in  conjunc- 
tion with  his  theological  studies.  Although  there  are  at 
least  four  special  treatises  on  the  soul  among  his  numer- 
ous writings,^De  Immortalitate  Animae,  De  Quantitate 
Animae,  Epistola  CLXVI  ad  Hieronymum,  De  Anima  et 
ejvs  Origine — it  is  evident  from  the  contents  of  these 

30  Ep.  cxviii,  c.  III.  Cf.  De  Trin.  viii,  c.  III. 

31  Conf.  X.  c.  xyii. 

32  Cf.  Bfdwnson's  Quarterly  Review.    Jan.  1859—1,  p.  420. 


26  HIS  NOTION  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

works  that  the  object  he  had  in  view  in  composing  them 
was  not  purely  philosophical.  De  Immortalitate  Animae 
was  written  not  merely  to  restate  the  metaphysical  proofs 
of  immjortality  formulated  by  Plato,  but  also  to  confirm 
the  Christian  tenet  that  man  is  destined  for  unending 
communion  with  God.  De  Quantitate  Animae  had  for  its 
principal  purpose  the  demonstrating  of  the  incorporeal 
nature  of  the  human  soul.  This  philosophical  investiga- 
tion, however,  is  only  a  means  by  which  the  author  ar- 
rives at  an  explanation  of  the  various  stages  through 
which  the  soul  must  pass  on  its  mystical  return  to  God. 
Epistola  CLXVI  ad  Hieronymum  and  De  Anima  et  ejus 
Origine  deal  with  the  problem  of  the  origin  of  the  souls 
of  the  descendants  of  the  first  man.  Augustine's  pro- 
longed interest  in  this  perplexing  difficulty  was  due  not  to 
mere  curiosity,  but  rather  to  its  important  bearing  on 
the  orthodox  doctrine  of  original  sin.  While  these  four 
works  furnish  much  valuable  information,  they  do  not 
by  any  means  afford  a  complete  and  systematic  exposi- 
tion of  Augustine's  philosophy  of  the  soul.  This  lack  of 
a  connected,  scientific  treatment  of  the  problem  about  to 
be  investigated,  renders  it  necessary  to  reach  out  in  many 
different  directions  to  gather  together  its  widely  scattered 
elements. 

Augustine — unlike  Aristotle  and  his  Christian  inter- 
preter. Saint  Thomas  Aquinas — did  not  begin  by  formu- 
lating a  general  theory  of  soul  from  which  he  passed  by 
stages  to  the  human  soul.  There  is  no  evidence  to  sup- 
port the  claim  of  Nourrisson  that  Augustine  in  the  first 
place  did  not  consider  the  human  soul,  but  commenced 
his  inquiry  into  this  problem  by  asking  himself,  what  is 
soul  in  general  ?  ^^  This  method  of  approach  to  the  study 
of  the  soul  is  evidently  Nourrisson's,  not  Augustine's. 


33  II  importe  de  le  remarquer.  Augustin  ne  considere  pas  tout 
d'abord  dans  I'ame  uniquement  I'ame  humaine.  Avant  d'etudier  d'une 
maniere  particuliere  Tame  de  rhomme,  il  commence  par  se  demander 
ce  qu'est  I'ame  en  general,  I'ame  principe  des  animaux.  L'ame  humaine 
reste  d'ailleurs  comme  le  type,  d'ou  il  part  pour  y  revenir,  et  sur  lequel 
il  ne  cesse  d'avoir  les  yeux  fixes.  (Philosophie  de  Saint  Augustin  I, 
p.  166,  Paris,  1865.) 


HIS  NOTION  OP  PHILOSOPHY  27 

The  French  savant  proffers  neither  direct  evidence  from 
the  writings  of  Saint  Augustine  nor  proofs  of  any  kind 
to  substantiate  his  claim.  Had  he  offered  the  statement 
in  question  as  an  expression  of  his  own  personal  opinion, 
this  lack  of  substantiating  proof  might  possibly  be  over- 
looked, but  when  he  presents  it  as  an  unqualified  fact, 
one  may  demand  to  know  at  least  upon  what  grounds  it 
is  based.  After  asserting  that  Augustine  at  the  outset 
did  not  consider  the  human  soul  in  particular,  the  French 
philosopher  admits  that  his  interest  centered  in  the  lat- 
ter. In  his  attempt,  moreover,  to  sketch  this  supposed 
general  scheme,  he  does  not  tell  us  how  Augustine  defined 
the  soul  as  such,  but  begins  his  explanation  by  quoting  a 
definition  of  the  human  soul.^*  After  presenting  a  few 
brief  statements  regarding  the  plant  soul,  the  World-soul, 
and  the  animal  soul,  he  asserts  that  one  must  presume 
that  these  considerations  lead  to  a  study  of  the  human 
soul  in  particular.^^^  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  noth- 
ing was  said  about  presuming  this  plan  in  the  first  in- 
stance, but  it  was  stated  as  a  fact  that  Augustine  followed 
this  mode  of  procedure.  In  another  passage  in  the  same 
work,  it  is  alleged  that  this  general  theory  of  soul  was 
formulated  in  imitation  of  Aristotle.^*^  Again,  it  may  be 
observed  that  the  author  is  not  venturing  an  opinion,  but 
stating  what  is  purported  to  be  a  fact.  He  makes  no 
attempt,  however,  to  prove  this  assertion,  and  proof  is 
necessary  in  this  case  as  in  every  other  where  there  is 
question  of  Aristotle's  influence  on  the  philosophy  of 
Saint  Augustine.  Aside  from  the  fact  that  he  himself 
records  that  he  read  the  Ten  Categories  when  he  was 
scarcely  twenty  years  of  age,"  it  is  not  known  for  certain 


34  Chap.  Ill,  p.  39. 

35  Ainsi  les  considerations  generales  d'Augustin,  sur  Tame,  aboutis- 
sent,  comme  on  devait  le  presumer,  a  une  etude  de  Tame  humaine 
en  particulier.     Op.  cit.  I.  p.   169. 

36  Ainsi,  c'est  a  I'imitation  d'Aristote,  qu'au  lieu  de  s'attacher  a 
I'etude  de  Tame  humaine  en  particulier.  Augustin  s'engage  dans  une 
theorie  generate  de  I'ame,  ou  il  s'enquiert  de  la  nature  de  toutes  les 
ames,  depuis  Tame  des  plantes  qu'il  nie,  jusq'ua  Tame  du  monde  sur 
laquelle  il  ne  se  prononce  pas.    II,  p.  308. 

37  Conf.  iv,  c.  xvi. 


28  HIS  NOTION  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

that  he  was  acquainted  with  any  other  work  of  the 
Stagirite.  There  are  exceedingly  few  references  to 
Aristotle  in  his  writings,  and  none  that  mentions  the 
general  theory  of  soul.^^  We  know,  moreover,  that  while 
he  refers  to  Aristotle  as  vir  excellentis  ingenii  et  eloquii, 
he  did  not  consider  him  the  equal  of  Plato,  (Platoni 
quidem  impar.)^^  There  has  been  considerable  contro- 
versy in  regard  to  Augustine's  knowledge  of  Greek,  and 
although  this  has  probably  been  underestimated  at  times, 
still  one  may  reasonably  presume  that  he  was  not  given 
to  reading  works  written  in  Greek,  since  he  preferred  to 
read  the  Neo-Platonist  writings  not  in  the  original,  but 
in  the  Latin  translations  of  Marius  Victorinus.*^  This 
latter  is  significant  in  the  present  discussion  because  in  all 
probability  Aristotle's  De  Anima  had  not  been  translated 
in  the  fifth  century.  What  is  suggested  by  these  few 
items  ?  We  do  not  know  for  certain  the  extent  of  Augus- 
tine's acquaintance  with  the  philosophy  of  Aristotle;  we 
do  not  know  whether  or  not  he  was  familiar  with  his 
^De  Anima,  We  do  know  that  there  is  no  direct  reference 
to  the  general  theory  of  soul  as  expounded  by  Aristotle; 
we  do  know  that  Augustine  was  by  preference  a  Pla- 
tonist  and  not  an  Aristotelian.  In  the  light  of  these 
facts,  and  in  the  absence  of  substantiating  proofs,  one  is 
fully  justified  in  rejecting  the  statement  that  Augustine 
formulated  a  general  theory  of  soul  in  imitation  of 
Aristotle.  Nourrisson  admits  that  the  Bishop  of  Hippo 
did  not  construct  an  organized  philosophy  of  the  soul,*^ 
but  is  it  not  causing  his  philosophy  to  appear  as  having 
been  organized,  to  assert  that  Augustine  first  considered 
the  soul  in  general,  and  then  proceeded  by  way  of  the 
plant  soul,  the  world  soul,  and  the  animal  soul  to  the 
soul  of  man?  To  interpret  Augustine  after  this  fashion 
causes  him  to  appear  as  having  been  interested  in  philoso- 
phizing about  the  soul  after  the  manner  of  Aristotle,  when 

38  "He  makes  mention  of  Aristotle  only  three  times,  and  seems  not 
to  have  known  his  system" — De  Wulf-Coflfey — op.  cit.  p.  90. 

39  De  Civ.  Dei  viii,  c.  xii. 

40  Conf.  viii,  c.  II. 

41  Op.  cit.  II,  p.  307. 


HIS  NOTION   OF  PHILOSOPHY  29 

as  a  matter  of  fact,  he  was  actuated  in  this  as  in  all  his 
philosophical  investigations  chiefly  by  religious  motives. 
All  the  evidence  that  we  have  been  able  to  gather 
points  in  the  opposite  direction  to  that  indicated  by  the 
French  savant.  The  human  soul  was  for  Augustine  the 
starting  point  as  well  as  the  finis  in  his  investigation  of 
the  soul  problem.  Whatever  he  may  have  had  to  say 
about  the  soul  in  general,  the  plant  soul,  the  World-soul, 
and  the  animal  soul  was  introduced  merely  to  better  ex- 
plain this  main  theme,  which,  was  for  him  second  in 
importance  only  to  the  understanding  of  all  that  pertains 
to  the  Supreme  Being.  In  the  Soliloquia,  De  Immor- 
talitate  Animae  and  De  Quantitate  Animae,  the  first 
three  works  in  which  he  treats  the  problem  of  the  soul 
at  any  length,  there  is  no  mention  of  a  general  theory. 
On  the  contrary,  in  the  first  book  of  the  Soliloquia  he 
declares  expressly  that  he  is  interested  only  in  the  human 
soul  (7).  There  can  be  no  doubt  about  the  object  of  his 
study  in  De  Immortalitate  Animae,  since  he  bases  his 
strongest  proof  for  immortality  on  the  reasoning  faculty 
which  he  conceives  as  belonging  to  man  alone  among  ter- 
restrial creatures  (c.  II).  In  De  Quantitate  Animae  he 
makes  the  following  explicit  statement  which  places  the 
matter  beyond  all  question  of  doubt:  In  primis  tamen 
tibi  amputem  latissimam  quamdam  et  infinitam  expecta- 
tionem,  ne  me  de  omni  anima  dicturum  putes,  sed  tantum 
de  humana,  quxim  solam  curare  debemus,  si  nobismetipsis 
curae  sumus  (c.  xxxiii,  70).  One  will  search  in  vain, 
moreover,  in  works  of  a  later  date  for  evidence  that  would 
iustify  him  in  presuming  that  Augustine  arrived  at  a 
study  of  the  human  soul  in  particular  through  a  general 
theory.  Finally,  when  we  view  his  doctrine  in  its  to- 
tality, and  recall  his  clear  statement  of  purpose  at  the 
outset  of  his  Christian  career,  Deum  et  animam  scire 
cupio,*^  we  cannot  fail  to  perceive  that  the  human  soul  as 
such,  and  not  the  soul  in  general  or  any  other  kind  of 
soul,  was  in  the  beginning  and  throughout  his  life  the 

42     Solil.  I,  c.  II,  7. 


30  HIS   NOTION   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

primary  object  of  whatever  study  he  devoted  to  this 
problem. 

What  has  been  said  thus  far  in  regard  to  Augustine's 
notion  of  philosophy  may  be  summed  up  in  the  following 
few  sentences :  There  is  a  philosophy  of  Saint  Augustine, 
but  it  is  a  religious  philosophy.  He  desires  to  know  only 
God  and  the  human  soul.  He  desires  to  know  God  for 
His  own  sake;  the  soul  for  the  sake  of  knowing  God. 
His  study  of  the  soul  is  not  a  purely  philosophical  or 
psychological  study ;  it  is  a  religious  study.  It  is  the  soul 
of  man,  and  not  the  soul  in  general  or  any  other  aspect 
of  the  soul  question,  that  chiefly  engages  his  attention. 

Like  the  other  early  Christian  thinkers,  Augustine  may 
be  said  to  have  been  an  eclectic  in  philosophy.  There  is 
no  doubt  but  that  he  was  acquainted  with  both  past  and 
contemporary  schools  of  philosophy,*^  and  that  he  wove 
into  his  own  philosophy  many  of  the  ideas  which  came 
to  him  through  these  channels.  The  philosophy,  however, 
which  dominated  and  influenced  his  thought  more  than 
any  other  was  Platonism.  He  had  become  familiar  with 
the  writings  of  Plotinus  and  Porphyry,  the  leading  ex- 
ponents of  Neo-Platonism,  through  reading  the  latin  ver- 
sions of  Marius  Victorinus,  a  well-known  Roman  rhet- 
orician.** While  it  is  quite  certain  that  Neo-Platonism 
influenced  him  more  immediately  and  directly  than  did 
Platonism  proper,  it  appears  that  the  ideas  which  made 
the  deeper  and  more  lasting  impression  upon  his  mind 
were  not  those  peculiar  to  Neo-Platonism,  but  those  of 
Plato.*^  His  preference  for  the  Platonists  can  be  ex- 
plained by  the  fact  that  he  considered  their  philosophy 
to  be  more  in  harmony  with  Christianity  than  that  of 
the  other  pagan  thinkers.  Unlike  other  philosophers  who 
spend  their  talents  in  seeking  to  learn  the  causes  of 
things,  and  the  manner  of  learning  and  of  living,  the 
Platonists  have  discovered  in  God  the  First  Cause  of  the 


43  De  Civ.  Dei  viii. 

44  Conf.  VIII,  c.  11. 

45  E.    Portalie.     Dictionnaire   de   Theologie   Catholique — Vacant   et 
Mangenot,  t.  1,  2,  col.  2268-2561.    Art :   St.  Augustin. 


HIS  NOTION  OF  PHILOSOPHY  31 

Universe,  the  light  by  which  we  preceive  truth,  and  the 
source  whence  we  quaff  happiness.*^  The  influence  of 
Plato  on  the  thought  of  Augustine  was  enduring,  and 
although  it  is  not  so  evident  in  his  later  writings  as  in 
those  composed  during  the  first  few  years  after  his  con- 
version, it  may  be  truthfully  stated  that  it  never  disap- 
peared entirely  from  his  life.  His  attitude  towards  Plato 
and  the  Platonists,  however,  underwent  a  change  in  the 
course  of  time,  as  may  be  learned  from  the  Retracta- 
tiones,  wherein  he  expresses  his  displeasure  at  having 
unduly  praised  these  philosophers  in  his  work  Contra 
Academicos  (386)  :  laus  quoque  ipsa,  qua  Platonem  uel 
Platonicos  seu  Academicos  philosophos  tantum  extuli, 
quantum  inpios  homines  non  oportuit,  non  immerito  mihi 
displicuit,  praesertim  contra  quorum  errores  magnos 
defendenda  est  Christiana  doctrina  (I,  c.  I).  The  prin- 
cipal errors  of  the  Platonists  which  the  Christian  must 
guard  against  so  far  as  the  soul  is  concerned  are  the 
following:  the  eternity  of  the  soul;  the  preexistence  of 
the  soul  in  an  imaginary  world  of  ideas  together  with  the 
theory  that  its  union  with  the  body  is  in  consequence  of 
a  previously  committed  crime ;  the  transmigration  theory 
whether  understood  in  the  sense  of  Plato  or  Porphyry, 
and  the  indirect  creation  of  the  soul  by  God  through  the 
agency  of  inferior  beings.  In  judging  the  influence  of 
Platonism  on  the  mind  of  Augustine  it  is  important  to 
remember  that  he  prefers  this  philosophy  to  the  other 
pagan  philosopohies,  but  not  to  the  Christian  philosophy.*^ 
Wherever  Platonism  and  Christian  philosophy  conflict, 
Augustine  unhesitatingly  chooses  the  latter. 

This  general  consideration  of  Augustine^s  notion  of 
Philosophy  has  shown  among  other  things  the  importance 
he  attached  to  the  study  of  the  human  soul.    The  under- 


46  Haec  itaque  causa  est  quur  istos  ceteris  praeferamus,  quia,  cum 
alii  philosophi  ingenia  sua  studiaque  contriuerint  in  requirendis  rerum 
causis.  et  quinam  esset  modus  discendi  adque  uiuendi,  isti  Deo  cognito 
reppererunt  ubi  esset  et  causa  constitutae  universitatis  et  lux  percipi- 
endae  ueritatis,  et  fons  bibendae  felicitatis,  De  Civ.  Dei  viii,  c.  x.  Cf. 
Ibid.  X.  c.  I. 

47  De  Civ.  Dei  viii.  C.  X. 


M 


HIS   NOTION   OF  PHILOSOPHY 


standing,  therefore,  of  his  concept  of  the  human  soul  is 
not  only  useful  but  even  indispensable  to  the  proper  ap- 
preciation of  his  whole  philosophy.*^ 

48  For  further  information  on  the  question  of  Platonism  and  its 
influence  on  Augustine,  one  may  consult  the  following  writers :  Grand- 
george  L.-S.  Augustin  et  le  neo-platonisme — Paris,  1896 ;  Dictionnaire 
de  Theologie  Catholique,  Vacant  et  Mangenot.  art :  St.  Augustin,  E. 
Portalie,  col.  2325-31 ;  Newmann,  A.  H.  Introduction  to  Anti-Manichean 
Writings,  The  Nicene  and  Post-Nicene  Fathers — Vol,  iv,  p.  27  flf  — ; 
Rainy,  R.  The  Ancient  Catholic  Church  c.  ix — Edinburgh,  1902 ; 
Nourrisson,  J.  F.  La  Philosophie  de  St.  Augustin,  II,  p.  101  ff,  Paris, 
1865.  Kiimpfe,  A — Augustinus  verhiiltniss,  Zu  Plato  in  genetischer 
entwicklung  Jena,  1897. 


EXISTENCE  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  HUMAN  SOUL        33 


CHAPTER  III. 

THE  EXISTENCE  AND  NATURE  OF  THE 
HUMAN  SOUL. 

The  present  day  champion  of  the  soul  theory,  who  finds 
himself  face  to  face  with  the  agnosticism  and  materialism 
so  evident  in  certain  quarters  of  the  academic  and  scien- 
tific world,  feels  constrained  before  all  else  to  formulate 
an  answer  to  the  question,  "Does  the  human  soul  exist?" 
Saint  Augustine  apparently  did  not  have  to  contend  with 
this  particular  aspect  of  the  soul  problem  since,  as  he. 
himself  assures  us,  there  is  no  one  who  questions  the 
existence  of  the  human  sgul^  Quasi  non  evidentior  sit  in 
hominibus  anima,  quae  utrum  sit,  nulla  fit  quaestio.^^ 
It  would  be  very  convenient  on  the  strength  of  this  state- 
ment to  pay  no  further  attention  to  this  question  but  to 
proceed  at  once  to  consider  the  nature  of  the  human  soul. 
To  do  this  however  would  be  to  follow  the  line  of  least 
resistance,  for  some  of  the  basic  arguments  employed 
today  in  demonstrating  the  existence  of  the  human  soul 
are  to  be  found  in  the  writings  of  Saint  Augustine. 

Harking  back  to  his  University  days,  perhaps,  Augus- 
tine recalls  that  there  are  three  essential  queries  to  be 
considered  in  anything  one  may  undertake  to  investigate, 
whether  the  thing  be?  what  it  is?  what  is  its  nature? 
(An  sit,  quid  sit,  quale  siti)''*'  Had  he  studied  the  human 
soul  as  a  special  problem  and  in  a  formal  manner,  there- 
fore, one  may  reasonably  conjecture  that  he  would  have 
begun  by  asking  himself  the  question.  Does  the  human 
soul  exist?  What  answer,  if  any,  could  he  give  to  this 
question,  and  how  would  be  go  about  the  framing  of 
this  answer? 

Every  one  who  has  even  a  casual  acquaintance  with 
the  principal  works  of  Saint  Augustine  knows  the  great 
value  he  attached  to  the  introspective  method  of  study- 

49  De  Civ.  Dei.  VII,  c.  xxiii. 

50  Conf.  X,  c.  X. 


34        EXISTENCE  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  HUMAN  SOUL 

(Noli  foras  ire  in  teipsum  redi;  in  interiore  homine  hab- 
itat Veritas.) ^^  It  is  not  necessary,  then,  to  search  for 
truth  elsewhere  than  within  ourselves  for  truth  dwells 
within  us.  His  writings  bear  witness  to  his  own  remark- 
able powers  of  introspection.  He  appears  to  have  been 
endowed  with  a  rare  faculty  for  keen  and  precise  interior 
observation,  combined  with  a  talent  for  analysis  and  the 
ability  to  record  in  expressive  terms  the  results  of  his 
self-examination.  His  account  of  some  of  the  more  subtle 
phenomena  of  the  inner  life  obtainable  only  by  intro- 
spection is  proof  sufficient  that  he  was  not  merely  ac- 
quainted with  the  introspective  method  but  even  a  master 
of  it.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  he  has  been  referred  to  as 
"the  founder  of  the  introspective  method."  ^^  It  would  be 
very  difficult,  if  at  all  possible,  to  prove  this  statement. 
As  every  student  of  the  History  of  Philosophy  knows, 
this  is  the  original  method  of  all  psychology,  and  there  is 
no  one  who  would  be  so  rash  as  to  maintain  that  Augus- 
tine was  the  first  psychologist.  There  were  at  least  three 
eminent  thinkers  among  the  Greeks — Socrates,  Plato  and 
Aristotle — who  were  familiar  with  this  method  centuries 
before  the  time  of  Augustine.^^  Many  of  the  early 
Christian  philosophers  who  antedate  the  Bishop  of  Hippo 
undoubtedly  employed  this  method  particularly  in  their 
study  of  the  affective  side  of  man's  life.  It  would  be 
more  in  conformity  with  fact  to  say  that  Augustine  was 
probably  the  first  Christian  philosopher  to  understand 
and  appreciate  the  scientific  value  of  facts  obtained  by 
this  method.^* 

From  what  has  just  been  said  regarding  Augustine's 
ability  as  an  introspectionist  and  his  appreciation  of  the 
introspective  method  of  study,  one  can  assume  that  had 
he  undertaken  a  formal  inquiry  into  the  problem  of  the 
existence  of  the  human  soul,  he  would  have  commenced 

51  De  Vera  Religione,  c.  xxxix,  72. 

52  Cath.  Ency.  Vol.  XIV,  p.  155.    Art :     Soul,  Maher-Boland. 

53  Cf:  Driscoll,  J.  Christian  Philosophy— The  Soul,  p.  4— New 
York,  1898;  Rand,  B.— The  Classical  Psychologists,  p.  10  ff.  Cam- 
bridge, 1912. 

54  Gonzalez-Pascal,  Histoire  de  la  Philosophic,  II,  p.  89,  Paris,  1890. 


EXISTENCE  AND  NATURE  OF  THE.  HUM  AN  SOUL        35 

with  an  examination  of  the  testimony  of  Consciousness. 
According  to  Augustine,  Consciousness  assures  me  that  I 
exist.  I  may  be  doubtful  and  uncertain  about  many  other 
things,  but  of  this  much  at  least  I  am  most  certain — I  am. 
This  is  an  intuitive  datum  implied  in  all  conscious  ac- 
tivity. So  positive  am  I  that  this  testimony  of  Con- 
sciousness is  to  be  relied  upon,  that  I  see  no  difficulty 
whatever  in  the  objection  of  those  who  say  to  me,  but 
what  if  you  are  deceived? — for,  if  I  am  deceived,  I  am; 
since,  I  could  not  be  deceived,  if  I  did  not  exist.  This  line 
of  reasoning  is  familiar  to  readers  of  Modern  Philosophy. 
Descartes,  the  distinguished  French  philosopher,  who  has 
influenced  so  powerfully  the  trend  of  modern  speculation, 
lived  at  a  time  when  Augustine  commanded  considerable 
attention  among  French  thinkers.  The  position  occupied 
by  Augustine  in  the  world  of  French  thought  at  the  be- 
ginning of  the  seventeenth  century  may  explain  in  part 
the  striking  similarity  between  the  direct  proof  or  dem- 
onstration embodied  by  Descartes  in  his  famous  axiom, 
Cogito,  ergo  sum,  and  the  indirect  argument,  Si  enim 
fallor,  sum,  of  the  Bishop  of  Hippo.^'^  I  am  aware,  more- 
over, that  I  am,  a  living  being  who  remembers,  under- 
stands, wills,  thinks,  knows,  and  judges.^^  There  is  a 
divergency  of  opinion  among  philosophers  regarding  the 
nature  of  the  force  by  which  we  live  and  exercise  these 
various  other  operations.  Some  have  thought  that  this 
force  is  of  the  nature  of  fire  or  air,  others  that  it  is  the 
brain  or  the  blood.  Some  have  held  that  it  is  nothing 
more  than  a  concursus  of  atoms  or  some  kind  of  a  fifth 
essence,  others  that  it  is  merely  a  combining  together  of 
the  bodily  elements."  However  much  the  opinions  of 
men  may  differ  respecting  the  nature  of  this  force,  there 
is  no  one  who  questions  its  existence ;  there  is  no  one  who 

55  mihi  esse  me.  idque  nosse  et  aiT<are  certissimum  est.  Nulla  in  his 
veris  Academicoriim  argiimenta  formido,  dicentium.  Quid,  si  falleris? 
Si  enim  fallor  sum.  Nam  qui  non  est,  utique  nee  falli  potest :  ac  per 
hoc  sum.  si  fallor.  De  Civ.  Dei,  XI.  c.  xxvi.  Ccf.  Tbid.  c.  xxvii ;  De 
Vera  Rel.  c.  xxxix,  73;  De  Lib.  Arb.  II,  c.  iii,  7;  De  Beata  Vita,  c.  ii,  7; 
De  Trin.  X.  c.  x.) 

56  De  Trin.  X,  c.  x. 

57  Ibid. 


36        EXISTENCE  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  HUMAN  SOUL 

doubts  that  he  lives,  and  remembers,  and  understands,  and 
wills,  and  thinks,  and  knows,  and  judges.  (Vivere  se 
tamen  et  meminisse  et  intelligere,  et  velle,  et  cogitare,  et 
scire,  et  judicare  quis  dubitet?)^^  According  to  Au- 
gustine the  principle  of  this  vital  force  is  the  soul,  an 
incorporeal  substance  which  cannot  be  perceived  by 
nieans  of  an  image,  ''but  which  is  apprehended  by  the 
understanding  and  discovered  to  our  consciousness  by  its 
living  energy."  ^^ 

Augustine  would  prove  the  existence  of  the  human  soul, 
then,  first  of  all  by  having  each  one  consult  his  own  inner 
experience.  This  argument  based  on  data  furnished  by 
Consciousness  was  a  noteworthy  achievement  for  a  phi- 
losopher of  the  fifth  century.  The  historian  of  philosophy 
who  cherishes  the  view  that  this  method  of  handling  the 
problem  is  a  modern  discovery  could  read  with  profit  both 
to  himself  and  others  the  writings  of  this  Christian 
Bishop  of  the  early  ages.^'' 

While  I  may  be  able  to  prove  the  existence  of  my  own 
soul  by  the  introspective  method,  it  is  obvious  that  I 
cannot  employ  the  same  method  in  establishing  the  ex- 
istence of  a  soul  in  other  men,  for  inner  experience  is 
something  personal  and  exclusive.  In  seeking  to  demon- 
strate the  existence  of  a  soul  in  other  men,  therefore,  it 
is  necessary  to  have  recourse  to  the  objective  method  of 
investigation.  We  are  surrounded  on  all  sides  by  human 
beings  like  ourselves.  We  observe  in  them  directly  not  a 
soul,  but  certain  activities  which  we  recognize  as  resem- 
bling those  which  we  experience  in  our  own  lives.^^ 
Reason  tells  us  that  similar  effects  demand  a  similar 
cause,  but  we  know  that  in  our  own  case  these  vital 
activities  proceed  from  a  soul.  We  infer,  therefore,  that 
these  other  beings  have  a  soul  like  our  own.^^ 


58  Ibid. 

59  Ep.  CLXVI,  ii,  4;  Cunningham,  J.  G.    Letters  of  St.  Augustine, 
vol.  ii,  p.  299-300,  Edinburgh,  1875. 

60.  Cf.  A.  Schuyler.   A  Critical  History  of  Philosophical  Theories,  p. 
114,  Boston,  1913. 

61  De  Trin.  VIII,  c.  vi. 

62  Ibid. 


EXISTENCE  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  HUMAN  SOUL        37 

For  the  sake  of  avoiding  possible  misunderstanding,  it 
may  be  well  to  stress  the  point  that  Augustine  did  not 
arrange  the  presentation  of  this  question  as  it  has  been 
given  here.  The  above  arrangement  is  my  own.  The 
various  items  which  have  been  brought  together  in  this 
short  sketch  are  not  found  in  any  single  treatise  composed 
for  the  express  purpose  of  demonstrating  the  existence 
of  the  human  soul.  On  the  contrary,  a  cursory  revision 
of  the  text  will  show  that  the  materials  used  were  drawn 
in  the  main  from  two  sources,  De  Civitate  Dei  and  De 
Trinitate,  where  they  appear  only  as  incidental  to  the 
discussion  of  the  doctrine  of  righteousness  in  the  first 
instance,  and  in  the  second,  in  connection  with  the  dis- 
sertation on  the  Trinity. 

By  way  of  introduction  to  the  problems  suggested  by 
the  questions,  what  is  the  human  soul?  and  what  is  its 
nature?  it  may  be  helpful  to  recall  what  has  been  said 
in  the  first  chapter  apropos  of  the  progressive  char- 
acter of  Augustine's  doctrine.  It  was  insinuated  there 
that  many  of  his  earlier  views  were  modified  and  even 
radically  changed  in  after  years.  This  point  must  be 
borne  in  mind  in  connection  with  the  statement  and  ex- 
planation of  the  subject-matter  of  the  present  section. 
To  be  more  specific,  the  answer  to  the  question,  what  is 
the  human  soul?  calls  for  a  definition.  It  would  evidently 
be  unfair  to  Augustine — not  to  say  anything  about  the 
utter  disregard  of  his  expressed  wish — to  take  up  his 
first  attempt  at  defining  the  human  soul  and  proceed  to 
construct  around  this  his  doctrine,  without  making  any 
allowances  whatsoever  for  the  changes  and  additions 
which  naturally  developed  in  the  course  of  time.  To  do 
this  would  be  to  merit  the  rebuke  he  directed  against  the 
Semi-Pelagians  when  he  wrote:  Non  sicut  legere  lihros 
meos,  ita  etiam  in  eis  curaverunt  proficere  mecum.^^  In 
the  present  study,  therefore,  not  only  those  works  which 
belong  to  the  so-called  Philosophical  Period  of  his  career 
will  be  examined,  but  also,  and  especially,  the  treatises 
composed  later  in  life. 

63     De  Praedestinatione  Sanctorum  c.  iv,  8. 


38        EXISTENCE  AND  NATURE  OF  THE   HUMAN  SOUL 

At  the  very  outset  of  this  investigation  one  is  con- 
fronted by  a  difficulty  arising  from  the  lack  of  a  fixed 
terminology.  By  what  term  did  Augustine  designate  the 
human  soul  ?  The  correct  answer  to  this  question  cannot 
be  given  in  a  single  term,  because,  as  he  himself  ac- 
knowledges, he  was  unable  to  discover  a  term  which 
would  properly  specify  the  soul  of  man.^^  At  least  three 
terms  appear  in  his  writings,  anima,  animus,  spirituSy 
any  one  of  which  may  mean  the  human  soul.  To  deter- 
mine the  exact  meaning  he  attached  to  these  terms  one 
must  examine  them  in  the  context.  Augustine  distin- 
guishes in  the  human  soul  a  pars  inferior  and  a  pars 
superior.  To  the  former  belong  the  vital  and  sensitive 
powers,  to  the  latter  the  rational  or  intellectual  powers. 
Anima  is  sometimes  used  to  include  both  pars  inferior 
and  pars  superior;  sometimes  it  is  employed  in  a  re- 
stricted senfee  to  designate  the  pars  inferior  and  to  ex- 
clude the  pars  superior:  Anima  aliquando  ita  dicitur, 
ut  cum  mente  intelligatur;  veluti  cum  dicimus  hominem 
ex  anima  et  corpore  constare;  aliquando  ita,  ut  excepta 
mente  dicatur.  Sed  cum  excepta  mente  dicitur,  ex  lis 
operihus  intelligitur  quae  hah  emus  cum  bestiis  communia, 
Bestiae  namque  carent  ratione,  quae  mentis  semper  est 
propria.^^ 

Concerning  the  use  of  animus  he  has  this  to  say: 
"There  are  some  Latin  writers  (he  does  not  say  that  he  is 
among  them)  who,  according  to  their  own  peculiar  mode 
of  speech,  distinguish  between  anima  and  animus,  so 
that  the  latter  signifies  that  which  excels  in  man,  and  is 
not  in  the  beast,  while  the  former  signifies  that  which  is 
also  in  the  beast."  *^^  In  other  words,  they  use  the  term 
anima  to  designate  the  principle  of  sensitive  life,  and 
animus,  the  principle  of  rational  life. 

As  regards  the  use  of  anima  and  spiritus,  which  are 
merely  relative  terms,  he  is  more  explicit.  In  his  reply 
to  Vincentius  Victor,  he  explains  that  if  one  distinguishes 

64  De  Gen.  ad  Litt.  VII,  21. 

65  De  Div.  Quaes.  LXXXIIL— VII.  Cf.  De  Agone  Christiano,  c. 
XVIIII. 

66  De  Trin.  XV.  c.  I. 


EXISTENCE  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  HUMAN  SOUL        39 

between  these  two  terms,  he  restricts  spiritics  to  the 
higher  life  of  man.  He  is  careful,  however,  to  point  out 
that  anima,  when  used  in  a  generic  sense,  also  includes 
spiritus,^'' 

What  has  been  said  in  regard  to  the  use  of  these  three 
terms  may  be  summed  up  briefly  in  the  following  manner : 
Anima  vel  animus  =  the  human  soul 
Anima  (in  a  limited  sense)  =  pars  inferior 
Animus  (in  a  limited  sense)  =  pars  superior 
Spiritus  =  pars  superior 
The  meaning  of  these  terms  will  become  clearer  in  the 
light  of  the  discussion  that  follows. 

In  seeking  after  an  exact  definition  of  the  human  soul 
in  the  writings  of  Saint  Augustine,  a  much-quoted  defini- 
tion found  in  De  Quantitate  Animae  may  be  taken  as  a 
starting  point.  In  the  course  of  a  dialogue  with  Evodius, 
he  says:  Si  autem  definiri  tibi  animum  vis,  et  ideo 
quaeris  quid  sit  animus;  facile  respondeo.  Nam  mihi 
videtur  esse  substantia  quxiedam  rationis  particeps,  re- 
gendo  corpori  accomodata.^^  The  human  soul,  therefore,^ 
is  a  certain  substance  participating  in  reason  and  adapted 
to. the  governing  of  the  body.  This  is  the  definition  re^ 
ferred  to  in  the  comment  on  Nourrisson's  statement  that 
Augustine  formulated  a  general  theory  of  soul.^^  From 
the  wording  of  the  definition  it  is  evident  that  it  was  not 
intended  to  apply  to  the  soul  as  such  but  to  the  human 
soul.  Concerning  this  definition  Nourrisson  writes  as 
follows:  Vame  peut  etre  exactement  definie,  suivant 
saint  Augu^tin,  une  substance  raisonnable,  preposee  au 
gouvernement  du  corps;  substantia  quaedam  rationis 
particeps,  regendo  corpori  accommodata.^°  In  view  of 
the  statement  immediately  preceding  this  passage  regard- 
ing a  general  theory  of  soul,  the  omission  of  the  qualifying 
attribute  humaine  is  misleading.  The  use  of  the  phrase 
rationis  particeps  shows  that  the  definition  is  applicable 
only  to  the  human  soul  and  not  to  the  soul  as  such.    The 

67  De  An.  et  ejus  Origine,  IV,  c.  xxii,  17 — xxiii,  19 

68  c.  XIII,  22. 

69  c.  II. 

70  Op.  cit.  I,  p.  166. 


40        EXISTENCE  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  HUMAN  SOUL 

use  of  the  adverb  exactement  is  entirely  unwarranted  as 
appears  at  once  from  the  phrases  mihi  videtur  and  sub- 
stantia quaedam.  Finally,  it  must  be  remembered  that 
this  definition  is  found  in  a  work  belonging  to  the  period 
of  beginnings  in  the  philosophical  life  of  Augustine,  and 
was  to  undergo  considerable  development  in  later  years. 
An  analysis  of  this  definition  will  furnish  the  occasion 
to  set  forth  the  various  elements  brought  out  in  the  course 
of  this  development. 

substantia.  The  human  soul  is  a  substance.  Augustine, 
following  Aristotle,^^  understands  by  the  term  "sub- 
stance" a  being  capable  of  subsisting  in  and  by  itself 
which  does  not  need  a  subject  in  which  to  inhere.^^  The 
soul  of  man,  therefore,  is  not  an  accident  of  the  body ;  it 
is  not  in  any  sense  qualitatively  related  to  it.^^ 

quaedam.  substantia  is  limited  by  this  indefinite  pro- 
noun because  at  the  time  this  definition  was  formulated 
Augustine  was  unable  to  specify  the  substance  of  the 
human  soul,  substantia  vero  ejus  nominare  non  possum."^^ 
Although  he  is  unable  to  say  what  the  substance  of  the 
soul  is,  he  is  careful  to  point  out  that  he  does  not  con- 
sider it  to  be  corporeal,  non  enim  earn  puto  esse  ex  its 
usitatis  notisque  naturis,  quas  istis  corporis  sensibus 
tangimus.'^^  Further  on  in  the  same  passage  he  explains 
that  the  human  soul  is  a  simple  entity  having  its  own 
proper  substance,  simplex  quiddam  et  propriae  substan- 
tiae.  He  apparently  assumes  that  everyone  understands 
that  the  human  soul  is  a  living  substance.  He  had  ex- 
plained this  notion  in  a  previous  work,  De  Immortalitate 
Animae  (c.  iii)  ;  it  is  also  frequently  referred  to  in  many 
later  works  such  as  De  Agone  Christiano  (c.  xx)  ;  De 
Trinitate  (X,  c.  vii)  ;  De  Genesi  ad  Litteram  (VH,  16, 
18,  21 ;  X  22-26) .     When  he  teaches  that  the  human  soul 


71  Conf.  IV,  c.  xvi. 

72  de  his  enim  rebus  recte  intelligitur,  in  quibus  subjectis  sunt  ea 
quae  in  aliquo  subjecto  esse  dicuntur,  sicut  color  aut  forma  in  corpora, 
De  Trin.  VII,  c,  v,  10.    Cf.  Conf.  IV.  c.  xvi. 

73  De  Trin.  IX,  c.  iv ;  X,  c.  x ;  De  Immor.  An.  c.  X,  17. 

74  De  Quan.  An.  c.  i,  2. 

75  Ibid. 


EXISTENCE  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  HUMAN  SOUL        41 

is  a  ''living  substance,"  he  means  that  it  is  capable  of 
imminent  and  spontaneous  motion;  it  is  not  moved  by 
being  acted  upon  from  without,  except  in  so  far  as  its 
activity  comes  ultimately  from  God,  but  its  motion  is 
intrinsic  to  itself,  it  belongs  to  the  very  nature  of  its 
being.  ^^  The  human  soul  is  not  only  a  living  substance 
but  it  is  also  a  vivifying  principle;  it  is  the  source  of 
bodily  vitality,  corpus  hoc  terrenum  atque  mortale  prae- 
sentia  sua  vivificat.'^'^  Augustine  distinguishes  three 
grades  of  life  in  man ;  vita  seminalis,  vita  sensualis,  and 
vita  intellectualis.'^^  The  soul  is  the  first  principle  of  life 
in  man.  It  is  the  source  of  bodily  unity;  it  prevents 
bodily  disintegration ;  it  presides  over  the  vital  functions 
of  nutrition,  growth,  and  genera tion.^^  The  vita  sensualis- 
embraces  the  activities  of  the  five  external  senses,  viz., 
sight,  hearing,  touch,  taste,  and  smell,  and  of  the  sensus 
interior,  ad  quern  ah  istis  quinque  notissimis  cuncta  ref- 
erantur.^^  It  includes  also  imagination,  sense  memory, 
and  sense  appetite.^^  The  functions  of  sense  require  a 
living  organism  (certe  sentire  homo  non  potest,  nisi 
uiuat)  ,^^  that  possesses  faculties  capable  of  receiving  im- 
pressions from  sensible  objects  and  of  vitally  reacting  to 
the  sam,e.  The  rational  soul  in  man  is  the  ultimate  prin- 
ciple and  guide  of  all  the  activities  of  the  vita  sensualis.^'^ 
Finally,  there  is  in  man  the  vita  intellectuxilis,  which  in- 
cludes the  three  principal  faculties  of  the  human  soul, 
Memoria,  Intelligentia,  and  Voluntas.  These  three  facul- 
ties are  not  separate  distinct  entities  but  they  are  func- 
tions of  the  soul  that  share  in  its  substantiality.^*.    There 

76  De  Div.  Quaes.  LXXXIII,  viii ;  De  Gen.  ad  Litt.  VII,  16. 

77  De  Quan.  An.  c.  xxxiii,  70.  Anima  totum  corpus  nostrum  animat 
et  uiuificat  .  ,  .  De  Agone  Christiano,  c.  xx,  22 — uiuit  autem  corpus 
ex  anima,  cum  anima  uiuit  in  corpore  .    .    .  De  Civ.  Dei,  XIII,  c.  ii. 

78  De  Civ.  Dei,  V,  c.  xi. 

79  De.  Quan.  An.  XXXIII,  70. 
■  80     De  Lib.  Arb.  II,  c.  iii,  8. 

81  De  Quan.  An.  c.  xxxiii,  71  ;  De  Civ.  Dei,  V,  c.  xi. 

82  Ep.  CXXXVII,  II,  5. 

83  De  Quan.  Atj.  c.  xxxiii,  71 ;  De  Civ.  Dei,  XXII,  c.  iv. 

84  Haec  igitur  tria,  memoria,  intelligentia,  voluntas,  quoniam  non 
sunt  tres  vitae,  sed  una  vita ;  nee  tres  mentes  sed  una  mens ;  consequen- 
ter  utique  nee  tres  substantiae  sunt,  sed  una  substantia.  De  Trin.  IX, 
c.  iv;  cf.  Ibid.  XV,  c.  xxii;  Conf.  XIII,  c.  xi. 


42        EXISTENCE  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  HUMAN  SOUL 

is  no  real  distinction  between  the  soul  and  these  faculties. 
They  are  essentially  one  but  relatively  three.^^  The  soul 
as  a  vivifying  principle,  therefore,  is  that  by  which  we 
live,  and  feel,  and  carry  on  the  operations  of  intellectual 
life. 

The  substance  of  the  soul  of  man  is  incorporeal,  that  is, 
it  is  not  a  body  but  a  spirit.  It  has  neither  length, 
breadth,  nor  thickness,  nor  is  it  extended  in  space.  The 
category  of  quantity  can  in  no  way  be  applied  to  it,  for 
it  is  a  simple,  inextended  substance.  Extension  is  the 
distinguishing  characteristic  of  matter  and  whatever  is 
not  extended  and  yet  has  real  existence  is  spirit.  The 
substance  of  the  human  soul  since  it  is  not  extended  and 
has  real  existence  is  spiritual.^® 

The  obscure  idea  expressed  by  the  complex  term  sub- 
stantia quaedam  evidently  was  gradually  clarified  and 
developed  by  Augustine  until  it  assumed  something  like 
the  following  form:  substantia  viva,  incorporea,  et 
spiritmilis, 

rationis  particeps.  The  human  soul  is  a  substance  en- 
dowed with  reason.  Augustine  defines  Reason  as  a 
movement  of  the  mind  by  which  it  is  able  to  distinguish 
and  connect  those  things  which  are  learned.  (Ratio  est 
mentis  motio,  ea  quae  discuntur  distinguendi  et  connec- 
tendi  potens.)"  The  influence  of  the  Neo-Platonist  idea 
of  Reason  appears  in  De  Quantitate  Animae  where  he 
distinguishes  between  Ratio  and  Ratiocinatio.  The  for- 
mer may  be  defined ;  quidam  aspectus  mentis  ^^ — it  is 
that  power  of  the  mind  by  which  it  is  able  to  see  truth 
immediately  without  any  bodily  concurrence.^^  Ratio- 
cinatio may  be  defined:  rationis  inquisitio,  id  est,  as- 
pectus illiu^,  per  ea  quae  aspicienda  sunt,  motio.^^  Ratio 
is  the  power  of  intuition,  while  Ratiocinatio  is  the  power 
of  discursive  reasoning ;  the  one  enables  the  mind  to  see, 

85  Ibid. 

86  De  Trin.  II,  c.  viii ;  Cf.  De  Gen.  ad  Litt.  VII,  28. 

87  De  Ordine,  II,  c.  xi,  30. 

88  c.  XXVII.  53. 

89  Cf.  De  Immor.  An.  c.  VI,  10. 

90  De  Quan.  An.  c.  XXVII,  53. 


EXISTENCE  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  HUMAN  SOUL        43 

the  other,  to  search  for  and  investigate  the  truth.  (Quare 
ista  opus  est  ad  quaerendum,  ilia  ad  videndum.)*^^  In 
De  THnitate  he  mentions  a  Ratio  inferior,  by  which  the 
mind  studies  temporal  things,  and  a  Ratio  superior,  by 
which  it  contemplates  eternal  things  (XII,  c.  iii-iv). 
When  he  distinguishes  between  Ratio  inferior  and  Rati) 
superior  he  does  not  mean  that  these  are  two  distinct 
entities  but  merely  that  they  are  two  functions  of  one 
and  the  same  subject  (c.  IV,  4).  Reason  is  character- 
istic of  the  human  soul.  It  sets  man  apart  from  and 
above  all  the  rest  of  terrestrial  creation.^-  Among  all 
the  creatures  of  earth,  sea,  and  sky,  man  alone  possesses 
a  rational  soul  that  enables  him  to  reach  out  beyond  the 
world  of  sense  and  to  penetrate  the  realm  of  eternal, 
universal,  and  necessaiy  truth.^^ 

regendo  corpori  accomodata.  The  human  soul  is  ai 
living,  vivifying,  incorporeal,  spiritual  substance  pos- 
sessing reason  and  adapted  to  the  governing  of  the  body  A 
This  last  phrase  suggests  one  of  the  most  difficult  prob- 
lems in  all  philosophy — the  union  of  soul  and  body.  The 
solution  of  this  difficulty  was  as  much  a  mystery  to 
Augustine  as  it  has  been  to  philosophers  since  his  time. 
He  states  frankly  that  the  mode  of  union  between  the 
corporeal  and  the  spiritual  creatures  in  man  is  beyond 
human  ken:  Quia  et  iste  alius  modu^,  quo  corporibus 
adhaerent  spiritus,  et  animalia  fiunt,  omnino  mirv^  est, 
nee  comprehendi  ab  homine  potest,  et  hoc  ipse  homo  est.^^ 
It  does  not  fall  within  the  scope  of  this  treatise  to  present 
an  exhaustive  account  of  Augustine's  teaching  on  this 
subject,  but  we  shall  try  to  indicate  its  more  salient 
features. 

Man  may  be  defined,  according  to  Augustine,  as  a 
rational  substance  consisting  of  soul  and  body.     (Homo 

91  Ibid. 

92  Fecit  ergo  Dcus  hominem  ad  imaginem  suam,  Talem  quippe  illi 
animam  creauit,  qua  per  rationem  adque  intelligentiam  omnibus  esset 
praestantior  animalibus  terrestribus  et  natatilibus  et  uolatilibus,  quae 
mentem  huiusmodi  non  haberent.     De  Civ.  Dei  XII,  c.  xxiii. 

93  Cf.  De  Trin.  Ill,  c.  ii.  8;  De  Gen.  ad  Litt.  VI,  12;  De  An.  et  ejus 
Origine,  IV,  xxiii,  37 ;  De  Genesi  contra  Manichaeos  I.  c.  xvii. 

94  De  Civ.  Dei  XXI,  c.  x. 


44        EXISTENCE  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  HUMAN  SOUL 

est  substantia  rationalis  constans  ex  anima  et  corpore.)^^ 
The  body  has  a  certain  quantity  of  flesh,  an  external 
form,  an  order  and  distinction  of  members,  and  a  consti- 
tution of  health.  (Est  certe  in  corpore  humano  quaedam 
moles  carnis  et  f  ormae  species,  et  ordo  distinctioque  mem- 
brorum  et  temperatio  valetudinis.)^^  The  body  is  gov- 
erned by  a  rational  soul  which  has  been  breathed  into  it. 
(Hoc  corpus  inspirata  anima  regit,  eademque  ration- 
alls.)^^  The  whole  corporeal  part  of  man  is  under  the 
dominion  of  the  soul  to  which  it  is  related  as  a  servant  or 
instrument.^^  This  relationship  is  not  to  be  understood 
in  the  sense  that  l:he  body  is  nothing  more  than  an  ex- 
ternal aid  or  trapping  of  the  soul,  for  the  body  is  some- 
thing that  pertains  to  the  very  nature  of  man.^^  On  the 
testimony  of  our  own  nature,  we  know  that  there  must 
be  a  union  of  soul  and  body  to  constitute  the  complete 
man,  corpus  uero  animae  cohaerere,  ut  homo  totus  et 
plemts  sit,  natura  nostra  ipsa  teste  cognoscimus.^^^  It  is 
folly  for  any  one  to  try  to  separate  the  body  from  human 
nature,  quisquis  ergo  a  natura  humana  corpus  alienare 
uult,  desipit.^^^  This  union  of  soul  and  body  that  results 
in  man  is  a  personal  union.^^^  This  unity  of  person  it  is, 
that  distinguishes  Augustine's  doctrine  from  the  exag- 
gerated dualism  of  Plato  who  regarded  man  as  spirit 
joined  to  a  body  accidentally  and  guiding  it  after  the 
manner  of  the  charioteer  directing  his  chariot.  It  cannot 
be  denied  that  at  one  time,  about  the  year  388,  he  em- 
ployed a  formula  analogous  to  that  of  Plato,  when  he 
defined  man  as  anima  rationalis  mortali  atque  terreno 
utens  corpore,^^^  This  decidedly  Platonic  notion  of 
man  was  very  probably  due  to  his  then  recent  contact 
with  the  philosophical  writings  of  the  Neo-Platonists. 

95  De  Trin.  XV,  c.  vii,  ii. 

96  De  Trin,  III,  c.  ii,  8. 

97  Ibid. 

98  De  Civ.  Dei,  X,  c.  vi;  IX,  c.  ix. 

99  Haec  (corpora)  enim  non  ad  ornamentum  uel  adiutorium,  quod 
adhibetur  extrinsecus,  sed  ad  ipsam  naturam  hominis  pertinent.  De 
Civ.  Dei,  I,  c.  xiii. 

100  Ibid.  X,  c.  xxix. 

101  De  An.  et  ejus  Origine,  IV,  ii,  3. 

102  Ep.  CXXXVII,  iii. 

103  De  Moribus  Ecclesiae  Catholicae.    I,  c.  xxvii,  52. 


EXISTENCE  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  HUMAN  SOUL        45 

This  early  formula  was  cast  aside  in  later  years  for  the 
one  referred  to  at  the  outset  of  this  explanation,  Homo 
est  substantia  rationalis  constans  ex  anima  et  corpore.^^^ 
The  human  soul  exerts  dominion  over  the  whole  cor- 
poreal nature  that  it  animates.  The  question  now  arises 
as  to  the  manner  in  which  the  soul  acts  upon  the  body  in 
the  exercise  of  this  regimen.  Augustine,  referring  to  the 
prevailing  theory  of  localization  of  function  in  the  brain, 
states  that  there  are  three  compartments  or  ventricles  in 
the  brain :  one,  the  sense  centre,  is  situated  in  the  anterior 
portion;  another,  the  motor  area,  is  located  in  the  pos- 
terior portion;  while  the  third,  the  seat  of  Memory  is 
placed  between  the  anterior  and  posterior  ventricles. 
(Ideo  tres  tamquam  uentriculi  cerebri  demonstrantur : 
unus  anterior  ad  faciem,  a  quo  sensus  omnis;  alter  pos- 
terior ad  ceruicem,  a  quo  motus  omnis;  tertius  inter 
utrumque,  in  quo  memoriam  uigere  demonstrant.)^^^  It 
is  through  these  three  ventricles  of  the  brain  that  the  soul 
rules  the  body.  Augustine  takes  care  to  point  out  that 
the  soul  is  not  identical  with  these  parts  of  the  brain,  but 
that  it  only  uses  them  as  the  instruments  of  bodily  con- 
trol. (Sed  anima  in  istis  tamquam  in  organis  agit,  nihil 
horum  est  ipsa ;  sed  uiuificat  et  regit  omnia,  et  per  haec 
corpori  consulit  et  huic  uitae  in  qua  factus  est  homo  in 
animam  uiuam.)^"*^  The  question  naturally  suggests  it- 
self, how  can  the  soul  which  is  an  inextended,  spiritual 
substance  affect  these  ventricles  of  the  brain  which  are 
extended  and  material?  He  answers  this  difficulty  by 
postulating  a  kind  of  intermediary  substance,  the  nature 
of  which  is  analogous  to  light  or  air.  This  substance 
serves  as  a  medium  of  articulation  between  the  soul  and 
the  brain.  (Anima  ergo  quoniam  res  est  incorporea 
corpus,  quod  incorporeo  uicinum  est,  sicuti  est  ignis,  uel 
potius  lux  et  aer,  primitus  agit  et  per  haec  caetera,  quae 
crassiora  sunt  corporis.  .  .  .)^^^  Saint  Thomas  in  answer 
to  an  objection  founded  upon  this  theory  of  an  inter- 
mediary   substance,    agrees    with    Augustine    that    the 

104     De  CivTbei,  XV,  c.  vii,  ii. 

106  Ibid. 

107  De  Gen.  ad.  Litt.  VII,  15, 

in?^       Dp   n^n     aH   T  iff    VTT    1R 


46        EXISTENCE  AND  NATURE  OF  THE   HUMAN  SOUL 

grosser  parts  of  the  body  are  moved  by  the  finer  parts, 
and  that  the  first  instrument  of  this  motive  power  is  a 
kind  of  spirit.  (Summa  Th.  I,  q.  76,  a.  7,  ad  1  um.) 
The  human  soul,  therefore,  administers  the  body  proxi- 
I  mately  through  the  instrumentality  of  the  brain,  and  re- 
'  motely  through  a  medium  that  is  akin  to  spirit. 

From  this  analysis  and  explanation  of  the  definition 
which  is  found  in  De  Quantitate  Animae,  it  is  quite  evi- 
JL  dent  that  Augustine's  notion  of  the  human  soul  underwent 
considerable  development  during  the  years  subsequent  to 
the  time  it  was  formulated.  This  development,  it  is 
needless  to  remark,  must  be  carefully  considered  by  any 
one  who  would  form  a  correct  idea  of  Augustine's  con- 
cept of  the  human  soul.  This  definition  together  with  the 
one  found  in  De  Moribus  Ecclesiae  Catholicae  (p.  44), 
especially  the  latter,  are  unmistakably  Platonic  in  form, 
and  to  accept  either  the  one  or  the  other  as  final  would 
expose  one  to  the  danger  of  misunderstanding  and  mis- 
interpreting Augustine's  whole  philosophy  of  the  soul. 
By  collecting  the  various  elements  brought  out  in  the 
analysis  just  presented,  a  fairly  accurate  idea  may  be 
obtained  of  what  Augustine  considered  the  human  soul 
to  be.  Had  he  gathered  these  elements  together  in  the 
form  of  a  definition  one  might  expect  to  find  something 
like  the  following:  the  human  soul  is  a  living,  incor- 
poreal, spiritual,  rational  substance  which  is  vitally  and 
potentially  present  in  the  body  as  the  principle  of  all  its 
operations. 

To  what  has  been  said  heretofore  in  respect  to  the 
nature  of  the  human  soul,  the  following  few  pertinent 
observations  may  be  added.  The  soul  of  man,  although 
,  it  is  fashioned  in  the  image  and  likeness  of  God,  is  not 
^  a  part  of  God ;  ^^^  it  does  not  participate  the  Divine  Es- 
sence, as  the  Manicheans,  Priscillianists,  and  Origenists 
maintained.^"'-*  This  view  of  the  soul  was  positively  re- 
jected by  Augustine  as  blasphemous  and  heretical.^^*^  We 
know  that  the  soul  is  subject  to  change  and  is,  in  a  cer- 

108  Ep.  CLXVI,  c.  II. 

109  De  Civ.  Dei  XI,  xxii.     Cf.  De  Duabus  Animabus  contra  Mani- 
chaeos,  c.  I ;  Ad  Orosium,  contra  Priscillianistas  et  Origenistas,  c.  I. 

110  De  An.  et  ejus  Origine  II,  c.  ii,  iii. 


EXISTENCE  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  HUMAN  SOUL        47 

tain  sense,  corruptible;  but  God  is  in  every  respect  im- 
mutable and  incorruptible ;  the  soul,  therefore,  cannot  be 
a  part  of  God.  (Si  enim  hoc  esset,  omni  modo  incommu- 
tabilis  atque  incorruptibilis  esset.)  "^ 

The  human  soul  is  not  part  of  a  universal  soul.  It  is  a 
single,  individual  entity.  For  a  time  he  seems  to  have 
entertained  some  doubts  as  to  v^hether  there  is  a  universal 
soul  for  all  men  or  a  particular  soul  for  each  individual."^ 
This  viev^,  in  all  probability,  was  due  to  the  influence  of 
Neo-Platonism,  v^hich  was  then  dominant  in  his  intel- 
lectual life.  A  few  years  later,  about  395,  all  doubt  had 
evidently  disappeared  for  he  not  only  rejects  this  idea, 
but  even  insists  most  emphatically  on  the  individual  char^ 
acter  of  the  human  soul."^ 

We  have  seen  that  Augustine  was  a  zealous  follower  of 
the  Manicheans  for  a  period  of  about  nine  years.  (Intro- 
duction.) After  his  conversion  to  Christianity  he  devoted 
considerable  time  and  attention  to  the  refutation  of  the 
tenets  of  this  sect.  He  is  everywhere  vigorous  in  his  con- 
demnation of  the  doctrine  proposed  by  them  that  in  man 
there  are  two  souls — the  one  good,  emanating  from  the 
Good  Principle ;  the  other,  evil,  emanating  from  the  Evil 
Principle."* 

The  theory  of  a  World-soul  invented  by  Plato,  appears 
to  have  been  considered  by  him  at  least  as  a  possibility 
during  the  first  years  of  his  career."^  Later  on,  while  he 
does  not  positively  reject  it,  he  declares  that  it  is  hardly 
credible."^'  Finally,  in  the  Retractationes,  he  warns  his 
readers  against  rashly  embracing  such  a  doctrine  (I,  v). 
Although  he  shows  some  hesitancy  in  pronouncing  for  or 
against  a  World-soul,  he  does  not  hesitate  to  assert  that 
if  one  accepts  this  theory,  he  must  be  careful  to  guard 
against  confusing  or  identifying  such  a  World-soul  with 
God."^ 

Ill     Ep.  CLXVI,  ii,  3. 

113  De  Quan.  An.  c.  xxxii,  69. 

Iia  De  Lib.  Art.  II,  c.  ix,  27;  X,  28. 

114  De  Duabus  Animabus  contra  Manichaeos  (392);  Conf.  VIII, 
c.  X. 

115  De  Immor.  An.  c.  xv. 

116  De  Civ.  Dei  X,  xxix. 

117  De  Civ.  Dei  IV,  xii. 


48  THE   HUMAN   SOUL   IS   INCORPOREAL 

CHAPTER  IV. 
THE  HUMAN  SOUL  IS  INCORPOREAL. 


Three  main  lines  of  investigation  appear  in  Augustine's 
search  for  knowledge  of  the  human  soul.  The  first  of 
these  has  to  do  with  the  incorporeal  nature  of  the  soul  of 
man.  He  teaches  that  the  human  soul  is  not  a  body  but 
a  spirit.  This  is  a  point  on  which  his  doctrine  never 
varied.  He  was  always  foremost  among  those  who  de- 
fended the  spirituality  of  the  soul  against  the  attacks  of 
materialism.  The  second  main  problem  that  engaged  his 
attention  was  the  immortality  of  the  human  soul.  He 
was  convinced  at  all  times,  even  in  his  pre-Christian  days, 
that  the  soul  of  man  is  immortal  in  a  sense  proper  to 
itself.  Finally,  he  sought  for  a  solution  of  the  difficulty 
concerning  the  origin  of  the  soul  of  man,  particularly  that 
phase  of  the  question  which  refers  to  the  origin  of  the 
souls  of  the  descendants  of  the  first  man.  He  studied 
this  problem  for  over  thirty  years  but  never  succeeded 
in  solving  it  to  his  satisfaction.  These  three  main  lines 
of  investigation  will  be  traced  in  this  and  the  subsequent 
chapters. 

Saint  Augustine  maintained  against  the  materialistic 
philosophers  of  his  day  that  the  soul  of  man  is  an  incor- 
poreal, spiritual  substance.^^^  The  reason  why  the  ma- 
terialists hold  that  the  human  soul  is  a  body,  according 
to  Augustine,  is  because  they  are  so  completely  under  the 
dominion  of  the  imagination  that  they  are  unable  to 
think  of  any  substance  as  existing  of  which  they  cannot 
form  an  image.  In  the  opinion  of  these  men,  therefore, 
only  bodies  are  real  things,  and  what  is  not  corporeal  is 
nothing,  hence  they  conclude  that  the  soul  of  man  must 
be  a  corporeal  substance.^^^     The  crux  of  this  problem 

118  Nunc  tamen  de  anima.  quam  Deus  inspiravit  homini  snfflando  in 
ejus  faciem,  nihil  confirmo,  nisi  quia  ex  Deo  sic  est,  ut  non  sit  substantia 
Dei ;  et  sit  incorporea,  id  est,  non  sit  corpus,  sed  spirjtus.  De  Gen.  ad 
Litt.  VII,  28. 

119  Ep.  CLXVI,  c.  ii;  De  Trin.  X,  c.  vii;  De  Gen.  ad  Litt.  X,  24. 


THE   HUMAN   SOUL  IS   INCORPOREAL  49 

according  to  Augustine  depends  upon  the  meaning  one 
attaches  to  the  terms  corpus  and  substantia.  If  corpus 
is  used  to  designate  every  substance  or  essence,  or  to  put 
it  more  aptly,  that  which  is  in  some  manner  self -existent, 
then,  the  soul  is  a  body,  because  it  is  a  substance.^^^  If 
the  use  of  the  term  incorporea  is  restricted  to  that  nature 
which  is  absolutely  immutable  and  ubiquitous,  the  soul  is 
not  incorporeal  because  it  is  not  a  nature  of  this  kind.^^* 
If,  however,  the  term  corpus  is  employed  to  signify  a 
measurable  unity  which  is  extended  in  space,  so  that  one 
of  its  parts  is  greater  and  another  less,  and  the  whole  is 
greater  than  any  of  its  parts,  the  soul  is  not  a  body,  be- 
cause it  is  a  simple,  inextended  entity  having  neither 
length,  breadth  nor  thickness.^^"  That  Augustine  under- 
stood the  term  corpus  in  this  last-named  sense  is  evident 
from  his  definition  of  corpus:  quidquid  majoribus  et 
minoribus  suis  partibu^  majora  et  minora  spatia  locorum 
obtinentibus  constat.'^^^  By  substantia,  he  means  a  being 
capable  of  subsisting  in  and  by  itself ;  one  which  does  not 
require  a  subject  in  which  to  inhere.^ ^^  The  terms  corpus 
and  substantia,  therefore,  as  understood  by  Augustine  are 
not  convertible.  While  every  corpus  is  also  a  substantia, 
the  converse  of  this  is  not  true,  namely,  that  every  sub- 
stantia is  a  corpus. 

The  human  soul  is  not  a  corpus,  but  it  is  a  substantia — 
it  is  not  spatially  extended ;  it  has  no  measurable  dimen- 
sions ;  but  it  is  a  simple  substance  which  is  present  simul- 
taneously not  only  in  the  whole  body  but  also  in  each  of 
its  parts,  non  modo  universae  moli  corporis  sui  sed  etiam 
unicuique  particulae  illiu^  tota  simul  adest.^-^  When  the 
soul  is  spoken  of  as  a  "simple  substance,"  the  term 
"simple"  is  used  in  a  relative  not  an  absolute  sense. 
Strictly  speaking,  God  alone  is  simple,  because  He  alone 


120  Ep.  CLXVI,  c.  II. 

121  Ibid. 

122  Ibid.    Cf.  etiaiTi  De  Trin.  VI,  c.  vi ;  X,  c.  vii ;  De  Immor.  An,  c. 
xvi;  De  Gen.  ad.  Litt.  VII,  21;  De.  An.  et  ejus  Origine  IV,  c.  xii. 

123  De  An.  et  ejus  Origine  IV,  c.  xii,  17. 

124  Chap.  Ill,  p.  40. 

125  De  Immor.  An.  c.  xvi. 


50  THE   HUMAN   SOUL  IS   INCORPOREAL 

is  unchangeable;  in  Him  alone  there  is  perfect  identity 
of  essence  and  attribute,  quoniaw  quod  hahet,  hoc  est,^^'^ 
If  the  soul  is  a  simple  substance,  devoid  of  parts  and 
spatial  extension,  in  what  manner  may  it  be  said  to  be 
present  in  the  body  which  it  animates?  Augustine  for- 
mulates an  answer  to  this  question  somewhat  after  the 
manner  of  Plotinus,  the  leading  exponent  of  Neo-Platon- 
ism,  the  soul  is  present  in  the  body,  not  spatially,  but 
vitally  and  potentially,  non  spatio  loci  ac  temporis  sed  vi 
ac  potentia;  ^-^  or  as  he  expressed  the  same  idea  else- 
*  where,  the  soul  pervades  the  body  not  quantitatively  but 
by  a  certain  vital  intension.^^^  In  connection  with  this 
description  of  the  manner  in  which  the  soul  is  present  in 
the  body,  he  has  recourse  to  the  experimental  method  to 
confirm  his  theory.  If  you  touch  any  part  of  a  living  man 
with  a  sharply-pointed  instrument,  you  will  observe  that 
although  the  contact  is  made  only  at  one  tiny  spot  on 
the  entire  surface  of  the  body,  the  whole  soul  is  aware 
of  the  contact,  and  aware  of  it  as  taking  place  at  the 
particular  spot  that  is  touched.  In  like  manner,  if  you 
carry  the  experiment  a  little  farther  and  establish  two 
contacts  simultaneously  in  different  parts  of  the  body, 
the  whole  soul  is  aware  of  each  one  separately,  and  of 
both  at  the  same  time.  This  simple  experiment  demon- 
strates that  the  soul  is  not  diffused  through  the  body  after 
the  manner  of  a  material,  extended  substance  which  oc- 
cupies a  larger  or  smaller  portion  of  space  according  to 
its  dimensions.  If  this  were  the  case,  that  part  of  the 
soul  corresponding  to  the  part  of  the  body  affected  by 
the  instrument  would  experience  the  sensation  of  contact 
but  not  the  whole  soul.^^'^  Since  the  whole  soul  and  not 
merely  a  part  experiences  these  sensations,  it  must  be 
wholly  present  in  each  part  of  the  body  at  the  same  time, 
tota  singulis  partibu^  simul  adest,  quae  tota  simul  sentit 
in  singulis;  "^  and  since  it  pervades  the  body  in  this  in- 

126  De  Civ.  Dei,  XI,  c.  x. 

127  De  Quan.  An.  c.  xxxii. 

128  Ep.  CLXVI,  c.  II. 

129  Ep.  CLXVI,  c.  IL 

130  De  Immor.  An,  c.  xvi. 


THE   HUMAN  SOUL  IS   INCORPOREAL  51 

extended  manner,  it  must  be  an  incorporeal  substance.^^^ 
Some  of  the  arguments  presented  by  Saint  Augustine 
to  prove  the  incorporeal  nature  of  the  human  soul,  are 
neither  clear  nor  convincing.  This  is  true  in  particular 
of  several  arguments  which  are  found  in  Be  Quantitate 
Animae  and  De  Immortalitate  Animae.  As  there  is  no 
real  advantage  to  be  gained  from  a  restatement  of  these 
involved  and  subtle  reasonings  which  represent  the  primi- 
tive efforts  of  our  author  in  the  field  of  philosophical 
writing,  they  may  be  omitted  for  the  purpose  of  empha- 
sizing those  arguments  which  were  to  be  appropriated 
by  the  Christian  philosophers  of  the  succeeding  centuries. 
Augustine,  in  a  letter  which  was  written  about  the 
year  412  to  Volusian,  a  distinguished  Christian  layman, 
says  that  the  human  soul — if  it  is  not  deceived  as  to  its 
own  nature — understands  itself  to  be  incorporeal.  Nam 
si  anima  in  sua  natura  non  fallatur,  incorpoream  se  esse 
comprehendit.^^^  As  has  been  stated.  Consciousness  tes- 
tifies that  the  soul  exists.^^^  This  interior  vision  bears  )\ 
witness  also  to  the  substantial  nature  of  the  soul.^^*  We 
are  aware,  moreover,  that  we  live,  and  remember,  and 
understand,  and  will,  and  think,  and  know,  and  judge.^^^ 
An  examination  of  the  nature  of  these  operations  will 
reveal  the  nature  of  the  agent  which  is  their  principle — 
Agere  sequitur  esse.  The  phenomena  of  Memory  prove 
to  Augustine  that  the  soul  of  man  is  an  incorporeal,  spir- 
itual substance.  We  know  that  we  have  innumerable 
images  of  bodies  which  are  fashioned  by  the  act  of  think- 
ing and  stored  up  in  the  depths  of  Memory,  whence  they 
are  reproduced  in  some  mysterious  manner  when  we  wish 
to  recall  the  objects  that  they  represent.^^^  If  the  soul 
were  a  body,  it  would  be  able  neither  to  form  these  images 
nor  to  retain  them,  since  they  are  so  numerous  and  fre- 
quently representative  of  such  large  objects.^^^     There- 


131 

Ibid.   Cf.  etiam  De  Gen.  ad  Litt.  vii,  21. 

132 

Ep.  CXXXVII,  c.  iii,  11. 

133 

Chap.  Ill,  p.  35  ff. 

134 

Ibid. 

135 

Ibid. 

136 

De  An.  et  ejus  Origine,  IV,  c.  xvii. 

137 

Ibid. 

52  THE   HUMAN   SOUL   IS   INCORPOREAL 

fore,  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  soul  is  spiritual  and  not 
corporeal,  procul  dubio  tamen  spiritalis  est,  non  corpo- 
ralis.^^^  This  explanation  of  the  Memory-processes  of 
retention  and  reproduction  is  eschewed  by  the  modern 
psychologist  who  points  out,  and  rightly  so,  that  "Since 
image  means  a  conscious  representation,  the  retention  of 
images  is  but  a  metaphorical  expression."  ^^^  It  is  not 
correct,  therefore,  to  speak  of  images  as  if  they  were  ac- 
cumulated in  a  receptacle  of  some  kind  from  which  they 
are  drawn  forth  whenever  we  remember.  The  image  it- 
self is  not  retained  but  "the  disposition  or  aptitude"  to 
recall  it,  remains  after  the  image  has  disappeared.^^" 
Augustine  appears  to  have  held  that  Sense-Memory  as 
well  as  Intellectual  is  an  incorporeal  faculty.^*^  The  for- 
mer, he  reasons,  is  not  a  material  faculty  because  if  it 
were  it  could  not  contain  images  which  are  not  bodies 
but  only  the  likenesses  of  bodies.  The  latter  must  be 
incorporeal  since  it  retains  the  immaterial,  such  as 
thoughts  (ibi  reconditum  est  quidquid  etiam  cogita- 
mus)  ,^*2  the  explanations  of  the  liberal  arts,"^  the  princi- 
ples of  mathematics,^**  and  the  notions  of  such  affections 
of  the  soul  as  desire,  joy,  fear,  and  sorrow.^*^'  A  few 
words  of  explanation  may  throw  some  light  on  his  rather 
involved  theory  of  Memory.  He  distinguishes  three  kinds 
of  perception,  corporeal,  spiritual,  and  intellectual.  The 
first,  perceives  all  sensible  objects;  the  second,  perceives 
the  images  of  bodies  which  are  formed  by  the  mind  and 
retained  therein;  the  third,  is  immediate  perception  by 
the  simple  exertion  of  the  mind  without  any  bodily  co- 
operation.i*®  To  these  three  grades  of  perception  corre- 
spond three  kinds  of  Memory:  the  first,  stores  up  the 
images  which  originate  with  the  senses;  the  second,  con- 

138  Ibid. 

139  Dubray,  C.    Introductory  Philosophy,  p.  84,  New  York,  1913. 

140  Ibid. 

141  De  Gen.  ad  Litt.  vii,  c.  21 ;  De  Civ.  Dei,  VIII,  c.  v ;  De  Trin.  X, 
c.  viii. 

142  Conf.  X,  c.  viii. 

143  Ibid.  c.  ix. 

144  Ibid.  c.  xii. 

145  Ibid.  c.  ix. 

146  Ep.  CXX,  c.  ii. 


THE   HUMAN  SOUL  IS   INCORPOREAL  53 

tains  those  images  which  are  created  by  the  imaginative 
faculty;  the  third,  retains  those  immaterial  and  purely 
spiritual  ideas  which  originate  in  reason.^*^  It  would 
seem  from  this  that  he  did  not  always  distinguish  clearly 
between  Memory  and  Imagination.  He  leaves  no  room 
for  doubt,  however,  that  he  considers  at  least  some  opera- 
tions of  Memory  to  be  spiritual  in  character,  and  hence, 
concludes  logically  that  the  soul  of  which  Memory  is  a 
faculty  is  incorporeal  and  spiritual. 

The  incorporeal,  spiritual  nature  of  the  soul  can  be 
demonstrated  also  from  the  character  of  our  intellectual 
knowledge  and  operations.  Augustine,  in  imitation  of 
Plato,  argues  that  since  the  soul  of  man  is  capable  of 
perceiving  the  incorporeal,  it  must  itself  be  incorporeal, 
Oportet  animum  quo  videmus  ilia  incorporalia,  corporeum 
corpusve  non  esse."^  He  distinguishes  between  sense 
knowledge  and  intellectual  knowledge:  the  former  is  ac- 
quired through  the  instrumentality  of  the  senses;  the 
latter,  which  relates  to  immaterial  ideas,  is  obtained 
directly  through  the  mind  itself."^  In  his  refutation  of 
the  theory  of  knowledge  proposed  by  the  Stoics,  Epicu- 
reans and  Atomists,  in  particular  Democritus,  he  empha- 
sizes this  distinction  between  sense  and  intellectual 
knowldge.^'^^  He  shows  that,  besides  the  knowledge 
which  we  acquire  through  the  instrumentality  of  the 
bodily  faculties,  there  are  many  things  that  we  know, 
incorporaliter  atque  intelligibiliter^'''^  For  instance,  we 
know  that  philosophers  dispute  among  themselves  con- 
cerning the  meaning  of  Wisdom  and  Truth,  but,  it  is 
impossible  for  them  to  form  images  corresponding  to 
these  realities,  and,  yet  they  must  be  present  to  the  mind 
in  some  way  or  they  could  not  be  discussed.  They  know 
Wisdom  and  Truth,  therefore,  not,  indeed,  as  they  know 
those  things  with  which  they  come  into  contact  by  means 

147  Conf.  X ;  De  Vera  Relig.  X ;  Ep.  VI,  VII. 

148  De  Quan.  An.  c.  xiii. 

149  De  Trin.  IX,  c.  iii. 

150  Ep.  CXVIII,  c.  iv. 

151  Ibid. 


54  THE   HUMAN  SOUL  IS   INCORPOREAL 

of  images,  but  directly,  by  pure  thought.^^^  This  argu- 
ment is  interesting  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the  problem 
of  "Imageless  Thought"  is  receiving  some  attention  at  the 
present  time  in  the  field  of  Experimental  Psychology.  It 
is  a  curious  fact — and  one  well  worth  noting — that  this 
very  same  question,  as  to  whether  there  can  be  any 
thought  without  its  concomitant  image,  was  mooted  in 
Augustine's  day.  A  lengthy  discussion  of  this  problem 
is  to  be  found  in  his  correspondence  with  his  "beloved 
friend"  (dulcis  amicus  mens),  Nebridius.^^^  In  a  letter 
written  to  Augustine  about  the  year  389,  Nebridius  had 
stated  it  as  his  opinion  that  there  could  be  no  thought 
without  some  kind  of  an  image;  a  word-image  at  least 
must  be  present  in  every  act  of  thinking.^^*  Our  author 
disagrees  with  this  opinion  and  maintains  that  it  is  pos- 
sible for  us  to  think  about  certain  things  without  any 
concomitant  image.  We  are  able  to  think  of  Eternity, 
for  instance,  without  forming  any  image  of  it.^^^  He  em- 
phasizes this  imageless  character  of  some  of  our  thinking 
in  several  works  of  a  later  date.  We  know  that  we  have 
such  ideas  as  those  of  Faith,  Hope  and  Charity,^^*^  the 
idea  of  God,^"  or,  as  he  expresses  it  elsewhere,  the  notion 
of  a  being  divine  and  supremely  immutable  ^^^^ — all  of 
which  are  spiritual  and  hence  in  no  way  traceable  to  the 
activities  of  the  bodily  senses.  Ideas  of  this  kind  can  be 
apprehended  only  by  pure  reason.^^^  Since  the  soul  of 
man  is  capable  of  apprehending  the  purely  spiritual, 
Augustine  logically  infers  that  the  soul  must  be  an  in- 
corporeal, spiritual  substance.^ *^'" 

As  regards  the  higher  operations  of  the  soul,  he  teaches 
that  man  is  capable  of  remembering,  understanding, 
willing,  thinking,  knowing,  and  judging,  all  of  which 


152 

Ibid.   Cf :    De  Gen.  ad  Litt.  X,  24. 

153 

Conf.  IX,  c.  iii. 

154 

Ep.  VI. 

155 

Ep.  VII. 

156 

De  An.  et  ejus  Origine,  IV,  c,  xx. 

157 

Ibid.  c.  xiv. 

158 

Ep.  CXVIII,  c.  iii. 

159 

Ibid. 

160 

De  An.  et  ejus  Origine,  IV,  c.  xiv. 

> 


r 


THE   HUMAN   SOUL   IS   INCORPOREAL    /  55 

presuppose  an  incorporeal,  spiritual  principle.  Take, 
for  example,  the  act  of  judgment.  If  the  image  which 
one  calls  to  mind  to  aid  him  in  thinking  is  not  a  body, 
but  only  the  likeness  of  a  body,  then  that  faculty  by 
which  Jie  is  able  to  perceive  this  image  is  not  a  body,  and 
a  fortiori  the  faculty  which  judges  whether  the  image  is 
beautiful  or  ugly  is  not  a  body.  But  that  which  judges 
is  the  mind  of  man ;  it  is  a  faculty  which  pertains  to  the 
nature  of  the  rational  soul,  which  certainly  is  not  a  body, 
Haec  mens  hominis  et  rationalis  animae  natura  est,  quae 
utique  corpus  non  est.  In  refuting  the  Stoics  and  Epi- 
cureans who  attributed  the  faculty  of  judgment  to  the 
senses  (qui  posuerunt  iudicium  ueritatis  in  sensibus  cor- 
poris)y^^^  he  remarks,  how  can  these  philosophers  assert 
that  "none  are  beautiful  but  the  wise,"  since  neither 
"beauty"  nor  "wisdom"  can  be  perceived  by  the  senses.^^^ 
To  form  a  judgment  of  this  kind  one  must  compare  not 
image  with  image,  but  idea  with  idea.  If  the  faculty  of 
judging  images  is  incorporeal,  then  the  faculty  which  is 
able  to  judge  immaterial  ideas  must  also  be  incorporeal. 
But  this  faculty  belongs  to  the  rational  soul  of  man. 
Therefore  the  rational  soul  of  man  is  incorporeal.^^^' 
Finally,  the  strongest  and  most  convincing  proof  of  the 
incorporeal  nature  of  the  human  soul  is  based  upon  its 
capacity  to  reflect  upon  itself.  By  means  of  this  act  we 
not  only  know  that  we  have  a  soul,  but  we  can  also  know 
what  the  soul  is  by  a  study  of  our  own.^«*  In  this  opera- 
tion the  soul  does  not  form  an  image  of  itself,  so  that  it 
is,  as  it  were,  simultaneously  where  it  can  both  look  and 
be  looked  at,  but  it  beholds  itself  by  a  certain  process  of 
incorporeal  conversion  which  pertains  to  its  very  na- 
ture.^'''^     If  the  soul  were  a  material,  extended  entity, 

De  Civ.  Dei  VIII.  c.  v. 

161  Ibid.  c.  vii. 

162  Ibid. 

163  Ibid. 

164  Non  enim  tantum  sentimus  animum,  sed  etiam  scire  possumus 
quid  sit  animus  consideratione  nostri;  habemus  enim  animum  De  Trin. 
VIII,  c.  vi. 

165  Proinde  restat  ut  aliquid  pertinens  ad  ejus  naturam  sit  con- 
spectus ejus,  et  in  eam,  quando  se  cogitat,  non  quasi  per  loci  spatium 
sed  incorporea  conversione  revocetur.     De  Trin.  XIV,  c.  vi. 


56  THE   HUMAN  SOUL  IS  INCORPOREAL 

however,  it  would  not  be  able,  so  to  speak,  to  bend  itself 
completely  back  upon  itself  so  as  to  be  at  one  and  the 
same  time  both  the  subject  which  sees  and  the  object 
which  is  seen.^««  Since  the  soul  is  capable  of  this  opera- 
tion of  self-reflection  which  is  incorporeal  in  character 
it  must  itself  be  incorporeal.^^^ 

The  philosophical  doctrine  of  Spiritualism  as  it  is 
found  in  Christian  Philosophy  received  much  of  its  de- 
velopment from  Saint  Augustine.  While  it  is  very  true 
that  he  borrowed  freely  from  the  Pagan  as  well  as  the 
Christian  philosophers  who  had  gone  before  him,  yet  he 
deserves  not  a  little  credit  for  the  admirable  manner  in 
which  he  synthesized  the  best  elements  of  their  doctrine 
and  brought  them  to  a  higher  stage  of  development.  He 
was  the  channel  through  which  the  spiritualistic  findings 
of  the  past  were  transmitted  to  the  Christian  thinkers  of 
subsequent  times.  Those  who  came  after  him  in  the 
great  Scholastic  movement  took  up  the  arguments  which 
he  had  gathered  together  and  both  further  developed  and 
perfected  them.  Augustine's  doctrine  suffered  from  the 
lack  of  a  fixed  and  sufficiently  defined  and  expressive 
terminology.  This  terminology  was  contributed  by  the 
Schoolmen  and  was  a  distinctive  addition  to  the  Christian 
philosophy  of  the  soul.  The  place  which  this  problem 
occupies  in  Christian  philosophy  is  an  important  one, 
because  upon  it  rests  the  significant  question  of  the  im- 
mortality of  the  soul. 

166  Ibid. 

167  Ibid.    Cf.  De  Trin.  IX,  c.  iii. 


THE  IMMORTALITY  OF  THE   HUMAN   SOUL  57 

CHAPTER  V. 

THE  IMMORTALITY  OF  THE  HUMAN  SOUL. 

A  study  of  the  popular  and  cultural  traditions  of  all 
peoples  of  all  times  discloses  a  constant  and  universal 
conviction  among  men  that  the  human  being  is  destined 
to  survive  this  present  existence,  that  there  is  a  life 
after  death.  The  belief  in  an  undying  survival  is  as 
ancient  as  the  race.  We  discover  this  belief  among  the 
great  nations  of  antiquity  intimately  bound  up  with  re- 
ligious ideas,  customs,  rites  of  worship,  and  burial.  With 
the  rise  of  Philosophy  among  the  Greeks  the  problem  of 
human  immortality  enters  the  domain  of  rational  specu- 
lation, but  even  here  its  religious  aspect  is  never  entirely 
submerged.  "In  one  particular  instance  Greek  religion 
contributed  directly  to  Greek  philosophy  by  handing  over 
to  philosophy  the  doctrine  of  immortality, — a  doctrine 
which  in  every  stage  of  its  philosophical  development  has 
retained  the  marks  of  its  theological  origin."  ^^^  The 
doctrine  of  immortality  in  the  Christian  religion  is  a 
fundamental  tenet  resting  upon  both  revelation  and  rea- 
son. The  early  Christian  doctrine  of  immortality  is  well 
defined  in  the  w  '^-ijigs  of  Saint  Augustine. 

The  philosopher  is  interested  in  constructing  a  rational 
doctrine  of  immortality;  he  seeks  to  demonstrate  the 
immortality  of  the  human  soul  on  purely  rational  grounds. 
He  begins  his  study  of  the  problem  by  asking  himself  the 
question,  what  is  immortality  ?  Etymologically,  the  word 
"immortality"  signifies  deathlessness  or  the  state  of  not 
being  subject  to  death.  According  to  Augustine,  death 
is  the  cessation  of  life,  hence  that  is  immortal  which  will 
never  cease  to  live.^^^  By  the  immortality  of  the  human 
soul,  he  means  that  the  soul  of  man  will  never  cease  to 
have  some  kind  of  life.  (Quod  sit  immortalis  secundum 
quendam  uitae  modum,  quem  nullo  modo  potest  amit- 
ies Turner,  W.,  History  of  Philosophy,  p.  31,  Boston,  1903. 
169     De  Civ.  Dei,  XIII,  c.  ii. 


58  THE  IMMORTALITY  OF  THE   HUMAN   SOUL 

tere.)  ^^^  We  know  from  experience  that  the  body  of  man 
dies  when  it  is  separated  from  the  soul.^^^  Although  the 
death  of  the  body  ensues  when  the  two  cohering  essences 
are  rent  asunder,^^^  j^y^q  qq^\  ^q^s  not  die,  that  is  to  say,  it 
does  not,  at  least  in  a  certain  sense,  cease  to  live  and  feel. 
(Nam  ideo  dicitur  inmortalis,  quia  modo  quodam  quantu- 
locumque  non  desinit  uiuere  adque  sentire.)  ^^^  He  speaks 
of  the  immortality  of  the  soul  with  a  qualification  be- 
cause as  he  recalls  there  is  a  kind  of  death  which  the 
soul  experiences  when  it  is  deprived  of  happiness.^^* 
This  sort  of  death,  however,  does  not  affect  the  essence 
of  the  soul,  for  the  soul  even  when  it  is  most  miserable 
does  not  cease  to  live.^^^  The  human  soul  is  not  immortal 
in  the  same  sense  as  we  predicate  immortality  of  God. 
There  is  a  certain  kind  of  death  which  the  soul  of  man 
can  suffer,  but  God  is  above  all  death.  He  is  absolutely 
immortal.^^^  He  alone  possesses  immortality  stride  lo- 
quendo,  since  He  alone  is  immutable  in  his  essence  and 
^iU  177  rpjie  immortality  of  the  soul,  therefore,  according 
to  Augustine  means  that  the  soul  is  of  such  nature  that 
it  will  live  always ;  that  while  it  is  created  in  time  it  will 
not  perish  in  time ;  ^^^  that  it  is  not  absolutely  undying  as 
is  God,  but  it  is  immortal  in  a  manner  peculiar  to  itself."® 
His  earliest  discussion  of  the  immortality  of  the  soul 
is  found  in  the  simulated  dialogues  of  the  Soliloquia  and 
in  De  Immortalitate  Animae,  both  of  which  were  written 
about  the  year  387.  These  two  works  contain  several 
metaphysical  proofs  which  are  like  in  character  to  those 
formulated  by  Plato  and  developed  by  the  Platonist 
philosophers.  Three  of  these  proofs  are  deserving  of 
some  notice,   not  that  they  have  any  special  intrinsic 


170  De  Gen.  ad  Litt.  VII,  28. 

171  De  Civ.  Dei,  XIII,  c.  vi. 

172  Ibid.   c.  ii. 

173  De  Civ.  Dei,  XIII,  c.  ii. 

174  De  Trin.  XIV,  c.  iv. 

175  Ibid. 

176  Ep.  CLXVI.  c.  ii. 

177  Conf.  X,  c.  X. 

178  De  Civ.  Dei,  XI,  c.  iv. 

179  Ep.  CXUII,  7. 


THE  IMMORTALITY   OF  THE   HUMAN   SOUL  59 

value,  but  because  they  represent  the  earliest  efforts  of 
Augustine  to  construct  a  rational  doctrine  of  immortality. 
In  the  first  of  these  proofs  his  line  of  reasoning  is  as 
follows :   Truth  so  exists  in  the  soul  that  it  is  inseparable 
from  it,  but  Truth  is  immortal,  therefore,  the  soul  is 
immortal.    He  introduces  a  resume  of  a  very  involved  and 
long-drawn-out  discussion  of  this  argument  by  remind- 
ing himself  of  the  familiar  fact  that  one  thing  may  be 
said  to  be  in  another  in  a  two-fold  sense:  either  it  so 
exists  in  its  subject  as  to  be  separable  from  it;  or  it 
exists  in  its  subject  in  an  inseparable  manner.^^*^    With 
this  distinction  in  mind  he  argues :  if  that  which  exists  in 
its  subject  in  an  inseparable  manner  is  immortal,  the 
subject  also  must  be  immortal.     We  know  that  Science 
exists  in  the  soul  in  an  inseparable  manner,  but  Science 
is  Truth  and  Truth  is  immortal,  therefore,  the  soul  is 
immortal.^*^     He  concludes  the  exposition  of  this  proof, 
which  he  himself  considered  the  best  and  strongest  of  all 
the  metaphysical  proofs,  by  depicting  Reason  his  imag- 
inary disputant  as  exhorting  him  to  yield  to  this  argu- 
ment and  give  his  assent  to  Truth  when  she  insists  that 
she  is  indwelling  and  immortal,  and  that  therefore  the 
soul  is  immortal,  immortalis  est  igitur  anima:  jam  jam 
crede  rationibus  tuis,  crede  veritati;  clamat  et  in  te  esse 
habitare,  et  immortalem  esse,  nee  sibi  suam  sedem  qua- 
cumque  corporis  morte  posse  subduci.^^^ 

The  meditations  begun  in  the  Soliloquia  were  finished 
in  De  Immortalitate  Animae.  He  opens  the  latter  work 
with  an  argument  similar  to  the  one  just  stated;  the 
human  soul  contains  knowledge,  but  all  knowledge  per- 
tains to  some  science,  and  science  is  immortal,  therefore 
the  soul  is  immortal  (c.  i).^^^  This  argument  is  followed 
by  another  which  also  appealed  strongly  to  the  mind  of 
Augustine  at  the  time  it  was  formulated.  The  soul  of 
man  is  immortal  because  it  is  the  seat  of  Reason  which 
is  immortal.     Reason  is  another  of  those  things  which 

180  Solil.  II,  c.  xii. 

181  Ibid.  c.  xix,  33. 

182  Ibid. 

183  Cf.  Ep.  II,  ad  Nebridium. 


\ 


60  THE  IMMORTALITY  OF  THE   HUMAN   SOUL 

exists  in  the  soul  in  an  inseparable  manner,  but  Reason 
can  exist  only  in  a  living  subject,  and  since  it  must  exist 
always,  its  subject  must  be  immortal,  therefore  the  human 
soul  is  immortal,  quamobrem  si  anima  subjectum  est,  ut 
supra  diximus,  in  quo  ratio  inseparabliter,  ea  necessitate 
quoque  qua  in  subjecto  esse  monstratur,  nee  nisi  viva 
anima  potest  esse  anima,  nee  in  ea  ratio  potest  esse  sine 
vita,  et  immortalis  est  ratio;  immortalis  est  anima 
(c.  vi).  The  third  and  last  of  these  metaphysical  proofs 
worthy  of  mention  is  nothing  more  than  a  restatement 
of  one  of  Plato's  arguments.  The  soul  of  man  differs 
from  the  body  in  this,  that  it  is  life,  while  the  body  is 
merely  something  animated.  We  know  that  what  is 
merely  animated  may  be  deprived  of  life  by  separation 
from  its  life-giving  principle,  hence  it  is  that  the  death 
of  the  body  ensues  when  it  is  separated  from  the  soul. 
The  soul,  on  the  contrary,  cannot  suffer  death  because 
life  belongs  to  its  very  essence,  therefore,  the  soul  is 
immortal,  quidquid  enim  vita  desertum  mortuum  dicitur, 
id  ab  anima  desertum  intelligitur ;  haec  autem  vita,  quxie 
deserit  ea  quae  moriuntur,  quia  ipsa  est  animus  et  seip- 
sam  non  deserit:  non  moritur  animus  (c.  ix;  c.  xiv). 
This  same  line  of  argumentation  is  repeated  many  years 
later  in  De  Trinitate.  In  considering  the  various  opin- 
ions advanced  by  the  pagan  philosophers  respecting  the 
substance  of  the  soul,  he  observes  that  those  who  have 
held  that  the  soul  is  some  kind  of  incorporeal  life  have 
attempted  also,  each  one  according  to  his  ability,  to 
prove  that  it  is  immortal,  since  they  understood  that  life 
cannot  exist  without  life  (X,  c.  vii). 

It  is  exceedingly  difficult  to  follow  the  intricate  mazes^ 
of  speculation  in  which  these  alleged  proofs  of  immor- 
tality are  involved.  Augustine  himself  evidently  realized 
this  when  he  wrote  his  review  of  De  Immortalitate 
Animae  in  the  Retractationes,  for  he  remarks,  qui  primo 
ratiocinationum  contortione  at  que  breuitate  sic  obscurus 
est,  ut  fatiget,  cum  legitur,  etiam  intentionem  meam 
uixque  intelligatur  a  meipso  (I,  c.  v).  He  acknowledges, 
then,  some  forty  years  after  they  had  been  proposed,  that 


THE   IMMORTALITY   OF  THE   HUMAN   SOUL  61 

these  metaphysical  proofs  are  not  only  vague  and  con- 
fused, but  even  unintelligible.  Howevermuch  deserved 
this  severe  criticism  of  his  own  work  may  appear  at 
first  glance,  nevertheless  one  must  not  overlook  the  fact 
that  some  elements  of  real  value  are  to  be  found  in  this 
early  treatise  on  immortality. 

This  purely  speculative  line  of  reasoning  was  aban- 
doned by  Augustine  in  after  years  for  the  presentation 
and  development  of  what  may  be  termed  the  natural  evi- 
dences of  immortality.  What  is  by  far  the  best  and  most 
acceptable  of  all  the  arguments  proposed  by  him  in  favor 
of  the  immortality  of  the  human  soul  is  based  upon  man's 
natural  desire  to  continue  in  existence.  Every  man,  he 
writes,  is  aware  of  a  deep-seated,  ineradicable,  natural 
longing  for  being  and  life.  We  know,  moreover,  that 
this  desire  is  not  peculiar  to  ourselves,  but  that  it  is 
universal ;  it  is  one  of  those  fundamental  cravings  which 
belongs  to  our  common,  rational,  human  nature.^^*  We 
all  desire  to  live.  We  wish  not  to  be  annihilated.^^^  Our 
nature  shrinks  from  the  very  thought  of  annihilation.^^^ 
So  powerful  is  this  longing  for  existence  that  were  a 
man  who  is  actually  miserable  to  be  given  the  alternative 
of  continuing  in  a  state  of  misery  or  of  being  annihilated, 
he  would  choose  unhesitatingly  the  former.^^^  We  need 
not  seek  far  for  corroboration  of  this,  for  we  know  from 
personal  observation  the  horror  and  fear  men  have  of 
death  and  how  mightily  they  struggle  against  its  ap- 
proach, even  when  they  are  in  the  greatest  misery.i**^ 
This  instinct  of  self-preservation  that  we  find  in  man  is 
not  wanting  in  brute  creation.  Irrational  animals  from 
the  smallest  to  the  largest,  show  by  their  behavior  that 
they  possess  this  tendency  to  cling  to  being  and  to  life.^^^ 
Trees  and  plants,  too,  after  their  own  fashion  manifest 
something  similar  to  this  tendency  as  can  be  seen  from 

184  De  Trin.  XIII,  c.  iii. 

185  Ibid. 

186  De  Civ.  Dei  XI,  c.  xxvii. 

187  Ibid. 

188  Ibid. 

189  Ibid. 


62  THE   IMMORTALITY   OF  THE   HUMAN   SOUL 

the  way  in  which  their  roots  dig  down  deep  into  the  soil 
while  their  branches  stretch  skywards  towards  the  sun 
in  order  that  they  may  draw  from  these  sources  what  is 
necessary  for  the  continuance  of  life.^'"^  Even  inanimate 
matter  seems  somehow  or  other  to  assume  that  position 
in  which  it  can  exist  in  most  accordance  with  its  nature.^^^ 
In  the  case  of  inanimate  matter,  and  trees,  and  plants, 
this  natural  tendency,  of  course,  does  not  imply  conscious 
effort.  The  irrational  animal  on  the  other  hand  strives 
consciously  in  the  struggle  for  existence.  Finally,  in  the 
human  being  there  is  present  not  only  conscious  effort, 
but  also  the  rational  desire  to  survive.^"^  Man  desires 
not  merely  to  survive  his  present  existence,  but  he 
actually  desires  to  be  immortal.^^^^  This  desire  has  been 
implanted  in  man  by  the  supremely  immutable  Creator, 
therefore,  it  will  not  be  frustrated,  and  man  will  con- 
tinue to  exist  forever.^®* 

In  view  of  the  fact  that  there  are  those  who  reason  by 
analogy  from  the  accepted  principles  of  the  conservation 
of  matter  and  of  energy  to  the  indestructibility  of  the 
soul,  it  is  interesting  to  observe  that  a  trace  at  least  of 
this  analogy  seems  to  be  found  in  one  of  the  arguments 
for  immortality  advanced  by  Augustine.  Annihilation 
means  the  perfect  destruction  of  a  being  so  that  nothing 
of  it  remains,  or  to  express  the  same  idea  in  simpler 
terms,  it  implies  that  something  becomes  nothing.^'''' 
Every  loss  that  a  being  suffers  tends  towards  its  annihila- 
tion, but  it  does  not  follow  that  because  a  being  tends 
towards  annihilation  that  it  is  ever  actually  annihilated. 
We  know,  for  instance,  that  a  physical  body  can  be  dimin- 
ished and  hence  tend  towards  annihilation,  but  although 
it  may  be  infinitely  reduced,  that  is  to  say,  broken  up  into 
the  smallest  conceivable  particles,  it  is  not  thereby  anni- 
hilated.   If  this  be  true  of  the  body  of  man  which  is  a 


190 

Ibid. 

191 

Ibid. 

192 

Ibid. 

193 

De  Trin.  XIII,  c.  viii. 

194 

Ibid. 

195 

De  Immor.  An.  c.  vii. 

THE  IMMORTALITY  OF  THE   HUMAN  SOUL  63 

physical  something  how  much  truer  must  it  be  of  his 
soul  which  has  a  nature  so  far  superior  to  the  body.^®® 
It  would  be  presuming  too  much,  perhaps,  to  lay  any 
particular  stress  on  the  possible  relation  of  this  argu- 
ment to  the  line  of  reasoning  followed  by  some  modern 
thinkers.  It  is  offered  here  merely  for  what  it  may  be 
worth  as  an  item  of  historical  interest. 

Side  by  side  with  the  development  of  the  argument 
based  on  the  natural  desire  for  existence,  we  find  another 
drawn  from  man's  natural  desire  for  happiness.  Augus- 
tine says  that  there  is  no  doubt  among  those  who  are 
able  to  reason  in  any  manner  whatsoever  that  all  men 
wish  to  be  happy,  omnium  certa  sententia  est,  qui  ra- 
tione  quoquo  modo  uti  possunt,  beatos  esse  omnes  homines 
uelle.^^'^  Each  man  recognizes  in  himself  this  longing  for 
happiness.  He  knows,  furthermore,  that  this  desire  is 
not  proper  to  himself  as  an  individual,  but  that  it  is 
shared  also  by  every  other  human  being.^^^  While  all 
men  are  aware  of  this  desire  to  be  happy,  all  are  not 
agreed  as  to  how  it  is  to  be  fulfilled.  This  is  evident 
from  the  fact  that  some  men  seek  happiness  in  those 
things  which  pertain  to  the  appetites  of  the  flesh ;  others 
search  for  it  in  the  pleasures  of  the  mind;  while  some 
few  look  for  it  in  both  of  these.^^'*  For  his  part  Augus- 
tine agrees  with  the  Platonists  that  this  desire  for  happi- 
ness can  be  fully  realized  only  in  the  possession  of  the 
Supreme  Good.^*^*^  The  Supreme  Good,  however,  is  God, 
and  He  is  unattainable  in  this  mortal  state,  therefore,  if 
man  is  to  be  happy  he  must  survive  his  present  existence. 
This  survival,  moreover,  must  be  permanent  for  if  it 
were  not  man  would  not  be  happy,  since  he  would  always 
live  in  fear  of  losing  that  which  he  possessed  and  en- 
joyed.^^^  It  follows  from  this  that  since  man  desires  to 
be  happy,  he  desires  also  to  be  immortal  for  happiness 


196 

Ibid,  c.  vii-viii. 

197 

De  Civ.  Dei  X,  c.  i. 

198 

De  Trin.  XIII,  c.  iii. 

199 

Ibid.  c.  iv. 

200 

De  Civ.  Dei,  X,  c.  i. 

201 

Ibid. 

64  THE   IMMORTALITY   OF   THE   HUMAN   SOUL 

cannot  be  without  immortality,  cum  ergo  beati  esse 
omnes  homines  velint,  si  vere  volunt,  profecto  et  esse 
immo7'tales  volunt;  aliter  enim  beati  esse  non  possent.^^^ 
This  two-fold  desire  for  happiness  and  immortality  has 
been  implanted  in  the  nature  of  man  by  the  Creator, 
therefore,  it  will  not  be  frustrated.^^^ 

Augustine  maintained  that  there  are  very  few  men 
who  have  the  ability  and  the  necessary  leisure  and  learn- 
ing to  discover  the  immortality  of  the  soul  by  the  unaided 
light  of  human  reason.^^*  Philosophers  who  have  at- 
tempted to  solve  this  problem  by  reason  alone  may  have 
succeeded  in  establishing  the  fact  of  survival,  but  they 
have  failed  to  grasp  the  idea  of  permanence  of  personal 
identity.^^^  Plato,  for  example,  taught  that  the  soul  sur- 
vives the  death  of  the  body,  but  it  is  most  certain  that 
he  held  also  that  the  souls  of  men  return  in  the  bodies  of 
beasts.^^^  This  same  opinion  was  cherished  by  Plotinus, 
the  ablest  interpreter  of  Plato.^*^^  Porphyry,  however, 
the  pupil  of  Plotinus,  rejected  this  view  and  substituted 
for  it  the  theory  that  human  souls  return,  not  indeed  in 
the  bodies  of  beasts,  but  in  human  bodies.^^^  Augustine 
praises  Porphyry  not  only  for  improving  upon  the  theory 
of  his  Master  but  also  for  teaching  that  the  soul  after 
passing  through  a  certain  cycle  of  reincarnations,  finally 
enjoys  immortal  happiness  in  the  possession  of  God.^^" 
Although  the  theory  of  Porphyry  is  more  reasonable  than 
that  of  the  other  Platonists,  it  is  by  no  means  satisfac- 
tory since  it  provides  only  for  the  immortality  of  the  soul 
and  not  for  the  immortality  of  the  whole  man,^^^  From 
these  considerations  it  is  clear  that  even  the  best  equipped 
intellects,  if  left  to  themselves,  are  unable  to  solve  the 


202  De  Trin.  XIII,  c.  viii. 

203  Ibid. 

204  De  Trin.  XIII,  c.  ix. 

205  Ibid. 

206  Nam  Platonem  animas  hominum  post  mortem  reuolui  usque  ad 
corpora  bestiarum  scripsisse  certissimum  est.    De  Civ.  Dei  X,  c.  xxx. 

207  Ibid. 

208  Ibid. 

209  Ibid. 

210  De  Trin.  XIII,  c.  ix. 


THE   IMMORTALITY   OF  THE    HUMAN   SOUL  65 

problem  of  immortality.^^^  This  whole  question  of  im- 
mortality rests  ultimately  on  faith,  "it  is  faith  that 
promises  not  by  human  argumentation,  but  by  divine 
authority  that  the  whole  man, — who,  indeed,  consists  of 
soul  and  body — will  be  immortal  and  therefore  truly 
blessed."  ^^^  One  reason  why  the  Son  of  God  became 
man  was  that  He  might  build  up  this  hope  of  immor- 
tality in  the  hearts  of  men.  He  assumed  our  mortality 
in  order  that  we  might  one  day  partake  of  that  immor- 
tality which  He  alone  can  give.^^^ 

Augustine's  doctrine  of  immortality  has  some  real 
merit.  This  fact  is  sometimes  overlooked  by  those  who 
summarily  dismiss  this  portion  of  his  philosophy  of  the 
soul  with  a  passing  mention  of  the  Platonic  proofs  stated 
in  De  Immortalitate  Animae.^^^  Others  writers  there  are 
who  seem  to  be  of  the  opinion  that  there  is  nothing  worth 
while  in  Augustine's  doctrine  of  immortality,  for  they 
pass  it  by  without  even  so  much  as  a  mention.^^^  There 
is  a  tendency  in  other  quarters  to  lay  particular  stress  on 
the  Platonic  proofs  of  his  earlier  years  while  the  argu- 
ments set  forth  in  De  Trinitate  and  De  Civitate  Dei  are 
given  but  scant  attention.  Nourrisson,  for  instance,  in 
his  Critique  of  Augustine's  philosophy  points  out  in  a 
single  sentence  that  our  author  saw  a  strong  presumption 
for  immortality  in  man's  natural  desire  for  being,  while 
he  devotes  some  pages  to  the  discussion  of  the  proofs 
found  in  De  Immortalitate  Animae.^^^ 

Any  one  who  essays  to  present  the  doctrine  of  immor- 
tality as  it  is  developed  in  the  writings  of  Augustine  can- 
not afford  to  disregard  those  proofs  to  which  he  devoted 

211  Ibid. 

212  Fides  autem  ista  totum  hominem  immortalem  futurum,  qui 
utique  constat  ex  anitna  et  corpore ;  ct  ob  hoc  vere  beatum,  non  argu- 
mentatione  huinana,  sed  divina  auctoritate  promittit,  De  Trin.  XIII, 
c.  ix. 

213  Ibid. 

214  Turner,  W.  History  of  Philosophy,  p.  232,  Boston,  1903; 
Stoeckl,  A.  Geschichte  der  Christlichen  Philosophic  zur  Zeit  der 
Kirchenvater,  p.  303,  304  Mayence,  1891.  Ueberweg-Heinze  II,  p. 
134-135. 

215  Cath.  Ency.  II,  art:  Augustine,  p.  84;  Immortality,  VII,  p.  687. 

216  Op.  cit.  II,  p.  316-317.      . 


66  THE  IMMORTALITY  OF  THE   HUMAN   SOUL 

special  attention  during  the  best  years  of  his  career.  He 
cannot  fairly  state  this  doctrine  until  he  has  investigated 
at  least  the  principal  arguments  which  are  advanced  in 
the  two  great  dissertations,  De  Trinitate  and  De  Civitate 
Dei,  The  argument  based  on  man's  natural  craving  for 
immortality  as  presented  by  Saint  Augustine  is  deserving 
of  some  serious  consideration.  This  argument  in  one 
form  Of  another  has  always  made  a  strong  and  sometimes 
a  convincing  appeal  to  thoughtful  men.^^^  It  was  prob- 
ably through  Augustine  that  this  argument  found  its  way 
into  scholastic  philosophy  where  in  the  hands  of  Saint 
Thomas  it  was  developed  into  a  strong  rational  support 
of  the  Christian  doctrine  of  Immortality. 

217     Catholic    University    Bulletin,    April,    1900:     The   Argument   of 
Saint  Thomas  for  Immortality,  E.  A.  Pace. 


THE  ORIGIN   OF  THE   HUMAN   SOUL  67 

CHAPTER  VI. 
THE  ORIGIN  OF  THE  HUMAN  SOUL. 

The  problem  of  the  origin  of  the  human  soul  as  it  is 
found  in  the  writings  of  Saint  Augustine  presents  a  two- 
fold aspect.  There  is  first  of  all  the  fundamental  ques- 
tion regarding  origin  itself.  He  believes  that  the  human 
soul  comes  from  God  by  way  of  creation.  (Propriam 
quamdam  habitationem  animae  ac  patriam  Deum  ipsum 
credo  esse  a  quo  creata  est.)^^^  Then  there  is  the  ques- 
tion of  the  time  and  manner  of  creation,  which  involves 
two  distinct  problems — how  and  when  did  the  first  human 
soul  originate?  How  can  the  origin  of  subsequent  souls 
be  explained? 

Augustine  teaches  very  clearly  that  neither  the  soul  of 
the  first  man  nor  the  souls  of  his  descendants  have  been 
created  by  God  in  the  sense  that  they  have  been  engen- 
dered from  His  own  substance ;  the  human  soul  is  not  to 
be  considered  as  emanating  from  the  Creator  so  that  in 
its  essence  it  is  divine.-^^  The  Emanation  Theory  had 
been  advanced  and  supported  by  the  Neo-Platonists, 
Gnostics,  Stoics,  Manicheans,  and  Priscillianists  of 
Spain."o  Augustine  admits  that  he  subscribed  to  this 
pantheistic  theory  during  his  Manichean  days,  because, 
as  he  frankly  acknowledges,  he  was  incapable  at  the  time 
of  differentiating  between  the  Divine  Substance  and  that 
of  the  soul."^  When  he  had  arrived  at  last  at  a  clearer 
understanding  of  the  nature  of  the  Supreme  Being,  he 
understood  that  it  was  impossible  for  a  mutable  substance 
like  the  human  soul  to  be  identical  with  the  absolutely 
unchangeable  substance  of  God.^-^  In  connection  with 
this  theory,   it  must  be  noted  also  that  he  explicitly 

218  De  Quail.  An.  c.  i,  2. 

219  De  Gen.  ad  Litt.  VII,    3.  4;    Epistolae    CXL,   c.  iii,  CXLIII,  7, 
CLXVI,  c.  ii,  CXC,  c.  i;  De  An.  et  ejus  Origine  II,  c.  iii. 

220  Ep.  CLXV,  c.  i. 

221  Conf.  IV,  c.  xvi.  VII,  c.  i. 

222  Ep.  CLXVI,  c.  ii;  De  Civ.  Dei  VIII,  c.  v;  XI,  c.  xxiii. 


^ 


68  THE  ORIGIN  OF  THE   HUMAN   SOUL 

warns  us  against  entertaining  the  idea  that  the  soul  of 
man  was  begotten  from  the  substance  of  God  as  was  His 
Divine  Son,  or  that  it  came  by  way  of  procession  as  did 
the  Holy  Spirit  so  that  in  its  nature  and  substance  it  is 
identical  with  the  Deity,  non  de  substantia  dei  genitus 
nee  de  substantia  dei  procedens,  sed  f actus  a  deo.^-^ 

The  Evolutionary  Theory  of  soul  which  came  into 
prominence  during  the  latter  half  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury was  not  unknown  to  Augustine.  Among  the  things 
which  he  holds  most  firmly  regarding  the  origin  of  the 
human  soul  is  this,  that  no  body,  nor  any  irrational  soul 
can  be  so  transformed  as  to  become  a  human  soul,  nee 
corpus  nee  ani7nam  inrationalem  nee  substantiam,  qua 
deus  est,  conuerti  et  fieri  animam  humanam.^^*  It  the 
human  soul  is  in  some  manner  drawn  from  the  irrational 
soul  of  a  brute,  one  may  reasonably  inquire  whence  comes 
this  irrational  soul?  If  the  reply  is  given  that  it  is 
fashioned  from  corporeal  matter,  then,  it  follows  log- 
ically, that  the  human  soul  is  corporeal,  a  conclusion 
which  is  contrary  not  only  to  known  facts  but  also  to  the 
explicit  teachings  of  the  Catholic  Faith.^^s 

If  God  did  not  form  the  first  human  soul  from  his  own 
substance  or  from  any  corporeal  matter  or  irrational  soul, 
it  remains  that  either  He  fashioned  it  from  some  already 
existing  spiritual  substance,  or  that  He  created  it  from 
nothing.22^     After  a  lengthy  discussion  of  different  inter- 

223  De  Gen.  ad  Utt.  VII,  28.  Cf.  De  An.  et  ejus  Origine  II,  c.  iii; 
De  Actis  cum  Felice  Manichaeo  II,  c.  xx. 

224  De  Gen.  ad  Utt.  X,  4.    Cf.  Ibid,  VI,  15. 

225  Si  autem  anima  inrationalis  materies  est  quodammodo,  de  qua  fit 
anima  rationalis,  id  est  humana,  rursus  quaeritur,  etiam  ipsa  inra- 
tionalis unde  fiat,  quia  et  ipsam  non  facit  nisi  creator  omnium 
naturarum.  an  ilia  de  materie  corporali?  cur  non  ergo  et  ista?  Nisi 
forte  quod  uelut  gradatim  fieri  conceditur  conpendio  posse  deum 
facere  quisquam  negabit.  Proinde  quaelibet  adhibeatur  interpositio,  si 
corpus  est  materies  animae  inrationalis  et  anima  inrationalis  est 
materies  animae  rationalis,  procul  dubio  corpus  est  materies  animae 
rationalis,  quod  neminem  umquam  scio  ausum  esse  sentire,  nisi  qui  et 
ipsam  animam  nonnisi  in  genere  alicuius  corporis  ponit.  Deinde 
cauendum  est,  ne  quaedam  translatio  animae  fieri  a  pecore  in  hominem 
posse  credatur — quod  ueritati  fideique  catholicae  omnino  contrarium 
est — si  concesserimus  inrationalem  animam  ueluti  materiem  subiacere, 
unde  rationalis  aninia  fiat.    De  Gen.  ad  Litt.    VII,  9. 

226  De  Gen.  ad  Utt.  X,  4. 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THE   HUMAN   SOUL  69 

pretations  of  several  passages  in  the  Holy  Scriptures 
bearing  on  this  question,  Augustine  expresses  his  pref- 
erence for  the  view  that  the  soul_of  the  first  man  was 
created  ex  nihilo.^^'^  The  soul  of  the  first  woman  also 
was  created  from  nothing.  Since  the  first  woman  was 
not  an  offspring  of  the  first  man  by  natural  generation 
but  was  made  in  a  different  manner  from  other  human 
beings  her  soul  was  not  from  the  first  man  but  was 
created  ex  nihilo  by  God.^^^ 

Concerning  the  time  of  origin  of  the  first  soul  he 
teaches  that  the  soul  is  not  eternal  and  that  it  did  not 
previously  exist  in  the  sense  expounded  by  Plato  and 
Origen.  The  statement  of  Ueberweg  that  he  maintained 
that  ''only  God  and  the  souls  of  angels  and  men  are 
eternal"  is  evidently  incorrect."^  For  Augustine  ex- 
pressly declares  that  though  he  is  ignorant  of  the  ages 
that  may  have  passed  before  the  human  race  was  created 
he  is  certain  that  nothing  created  is  co-eternal  with  the 
Creator.^^*^  The  statement  in  question,  moreover,  does 
not  harmonize  with  another  which  is  found  in  the  same 
paragraph  in  which  it  is  declared  that  Augustine  taught 
that  the  soul  had  no  existence  previous  to  its  union  with 
the  body.  This  declaration  likewise  is  not  entirely  accu- 
rate. Although  human  reason  may  not  be  able  to  com- 
prehend how  the  soul  can  be  immortal  without  being  at 
the  same  time  eternal.  Faith,  founded  upon  Divine  Au- 
thority, teaches  that  the  soul  is  not  co-eternal  with^  God 
but  has  been  created  by  Him.^^^ 

The  doctrine  of  Preexistence  as  advocated  by  Pytha- 
goras, Plato,  the  Platonists,  and  Origen, ^^2  is  condemned 

227  Ibid,  6,  7,  8,  9. 

228  Ibid.  10. 

229  Grundriss  der  Geschichte  der  Philosophic,  II,  p.  119-120,  Ber- 
lin, 1905. 

2:50  Quae  saecula  praeterierint  antequam  genus  institueretur 
humanum,  me  fateor  ignorare :  non  tamen  dubito  nihil  omnino  crea- 
turae  Creatori  esse  coaeternum.     De  Civ.  Dei,  XII,  c.  xvii. 

231  Quur  ergo  non  potius  diuinitati  credimus  de  his  rebus,  quas 
humano  ingenio  peruestigare  non  possumus,  quae  animam  quoque 
ipsam  non  Deo  coaeternam,  sed  creatam  dicit  esse,  quae  non  erat?  De 
Civ.  Dei,  X,  c.  xxxi. 

232  Ep.  ClyXV.  c.  i.    Concerning  Origen,  cf.  De  Civ.  Dei,  XI,  c.  xxiii. 


70  THE  ORIGIN  OF  THE   HUMAN   SOUL 

by  the  Bishop  of  Hippo  in  the  name  of  Reason  and  in 
conformity  with  the  express  anathema  of  the  Church.^^a 
This  theory  which  maintained  that  the  soul  is  united  to 
the  body  in  the  present  life  in  consequence  of  faults  com- 
mitted in  some  previous  state  of  existence  is  opposed 
chiefly  on  the  grounds  that  it  is  entirely  incompatible 
with  the  Divine  Goodness,  for  if  this  were  true,  Creation 
would  be  a  punishment  and  not  a  blessing.^^* 

Augustine  did  not  reach  any  definite  conclusion  as  to 
the  time  when  the  first  soul  was  created.  There  are  two 
possibilities  in  the  case:  either  it  was  created  in  the  be- 
ginning when  "He  that  liveth  forever  created  all  things 
together ;"  ^^-^  or  it  was  created  on  the  sixth  day  at  the 
moment  of  its  union  with  the  body.^^*^  Of  these  two 
opinions,  he  holds  the  former  to  be  credibilius  et  toler- 
abilius.^^'^  As  to  whether  the  soul,  if  it  were  created  in 
the  beginning  entered  the  body  on  the  sixth  day  through 
direct  Divine  intervention  or  in  some  spontaneous  man- 
ner he  was  unable  to  decide.^^^ 

The  feature  of  this  problem  which  caused  the  greatest 
mental  anxiety  to  Augustine  concerns  the  origin  of  the 
souls  of  the  descendants  of  the  first  man.  This  question 
engaged  his  attention  at  frequent  intervals  during  his 
career.  We  discover  its  beginning  in  De  Libero  Arbitrio 
(in,  c.  xx-xxi),  written  about  395.  He  devotes  consid- 
erable attention  to  it  in  De  Genesi  ad  Litteram  (VII,  X), 
(401-415),  and  Epistolae  CXLIII  (412),  CLXIV  (414), 
CLXVI  (415),  CXC  vel  CLVII  (418).  He  composed  four 
books  on  the  subject  entitled,  De  Anima  et  ejus  Origine, 
about  420.  The  problem  was  unsolved  when  he  wrote  the 
Retractationes  (I,  c.  i)  about  427.  Finally,  in  his  last 
work  Opits  imperfectum  contra  Julianum  written  some- 
time during  430,  he  acknowledges  his  inability  to  arrive 
at  a  decision  in  this  matter. 

233  De  An.  et  ejus  Origine,  III,  c.  vii. 

234  Ep.  CLXVI,  c.  ix ;  De  Civ.  Dei  XII,  c.  xxvi. 

235  Ecclus.  XVIII,  1. 

236  De  Civ.  Dei.  XII,  c.  xxiii. 

237  De  Gen.  ad  Litt.  VII,  24,  X,  2. 

238  De  Gen.  ad  Litt.  VII,  25-27.  (A  complete  statement  of  this  en- 
tire problem  is  to  be  found  in  De  Gen.  ad  Litt.  VI,  VII,  24-28;  X.) 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THE   HUMAN   SOUL  71 

As  in  the  preceding  discussion  he  entertained  no  doubt 
about  the  ultimate  origin  of  these  souls — he  believed  that 
they  are  created  by  God,^^^  but  he  hesitated  to  embrace 
any  definite  opinion  concerning  their  proximate  origin. 
Four  theories  present  themselves  to  his  mind  as  possible 
solutions  of  this  question:  (1)  each  soul  may  be  produced 
by  a  special  creative  act  of  God  at  the  time  of  its  union 
with  the  body;  (2)  all  souls  being  created  apart  from 
their  bodies  are  either  infused  into  them  by  God,  (3)  or 
enter  them  by  some  inherent,  natural  force;  (4)  each 
soul  may  be  derived  from  the  first  soul  through  the  gen- 
erative act  of  the  parents.^*^  These  four  theories  are 
reducible  to  two  which  are  generally  designated  Creation- 
ism  and  Traducianism.  The  ablest  advocate  of  Creation- 
ism  in  the  time  of  Augustine  was  the  eminent  biblical 
scholar,  St.  Jerome.  He  supported  the  view  that  every 
soul  that  comes  into  being  is  produced  by  a  special  crea- 
tive act  of  God.  Augustine  wrote  a  letter  about  the  year 
415  in  which  he  gives  a  complete  statement  of  the  Crea- 
tionist theory  as  he  understood  it.  (Ep.  CLXVI.)  This 
letter  was  forwarded  to  Jerome,  who  at  the  time  resided 
near  Bethlehem,  but  he  never  answered  it.  Upon  the 
death  of  the  latter,  Augustine  published  the  letter  as  an 
apology  for  his  hesitancy  in  pronouncing  in  favor  of 
any  one  of  the  four  theories.  As  regards  the  opinion  held 
by  Jerome,  he  writes  that  he  is  willing  to  adopt  it  if  he 
can  be  convinced  that  it  is  true  and  in  perfect  harmony 
with  all  the  teachings  of  the  Church.^*^  There  are  some 
objections  proposed  by  others  against  this  view  in  which 
he  sees  no  difficulty,  but  he  has  his  own  objections  which 
he  is  unable  to  solve.^*^  The  one  unanswerable  and  out- 
standing difficulty  in  this  manner  of  accounting  for  the 
origin  of  the  souls  of  the  descendants  of  the  first  man, 
according  to  his  way  of  thinking,  is  this,  how  is  this 
theory  of  special  creation  reconcilable  with  the  doctrine 

239  De  Gen.  ad;  Litt.  X.  3. 

240  De  Lib.  Arb.  Ill,  c.  xxi,  59;  De  Gen.  ad  Litt.  X;  Epistolae 
CXLIII,  CLXVI,  c.  iii;  De  An.  et  ejus  Origine,  I— IV. 

241  Ep.  CLXVI,  c.  viii. 
240    Ibid.  c.  V. 


72  THE  ORIGIN  OF  THE   HUMAN  SOUL 

of  the  Church  on  original  sin;  how  does  it  explain  the 
transmission  of  original  sin  and  at  the  same  time  save 
the  goodness  and  justice  of  God?  243  if  the  soul  of  an 
infant  is  created  at  the  time  of  its  union  with  the  body, 
how  does  he  inherit  Adam's  sin  so  that  he  requires  the 
redemption  of  Christ?  ^^^  In  the  event  that  one  replies 
that  the  sin  is  contracted  by  the  mere  fact  that  the  soul 
is  united  to  bodily  members  which  are  derived  from  an- 
other, how  is  it  compatible  with  Divine  Justice  that  the 
infant  be  condemned  to  eternal  punishment  in  case  he 
should  die  without  baptism,  since  it  does  not  lie  within 
his  power  to  procure  this  Sacrament  by  his  own  ef- 
forts ?  ^^''  If  this  opinion  is  the  correct  one,  how  are  we 
to  account  for  the  penal  sufferings  of  this  life  which 
children  undergo  without  any  evil  of  their  own  as  the 
cause  ?  ^"^^  Finally,  if  one  accepts  this  theory  how  does 
he  explain  the  great  diversity  of  talents  in  different  souls, 
and  how  does  he  explain  the  unfortunate  condition  of 
those  who  come  into  the  world  absolutely  devoid  of 
reason  ?  ^^^  Augustine  had  hoped  that  Jerome  would  be 
able  to  answer  these  objections  in  a  satisfactory  manner, 
but  since  his  communication  remained  unanswered,  he 
always  hesitated  to  adopt  the  Special  Creation  theory. 
He  found  himself  face  to  face  with  the  same  difficulties 
when  he  examined  the  other  two  Creationist  explanations, 
namely,  that  souls  already  existing  elsewhere  are  infused 
into  bodies  by  God,  or  find  their  way  to  union  with  bodies 
through  some  natural  process.^^^  If  one  is  inclined  to 
favor  either  one  of  the  latter  two  opinions  he  must  guard 
against  preexistence  as  understood  by  the  Platonists.^*^ 
The  remaining  plausible  explanation  is  Traducianism. 
In  general  Traducianism  maintains  that  the  soul  of  man 
is  transmitted  to  the  offspring  in  the  generative  act  of 
the  parents.    When  this  term  is  employed  in  a  specific 

243  Ep.  CLXVI,  c.  iii-iv. 

244  Ibid. 

245  Ibid. 

246  Ibid,  c.  vi. 

247  Ibid.  vi. 

248  Ep.  CLXVI,  c.  ix ;  Ep.  CXLHI,  9 ;  De  Gen.  ad  Litt.  VII,  24-26. 

249  Ep.  CLXVI,  c.  ix;  Ep.  CLXIV,  c.  vii. 


THE  ORIGIN   OF  THE   HUMAN   SOUL  73 

sense  it  implies  that  the  soul  is  propagated  by  means  of 
a  material  germ.  This  is  sometimes  referred  to  as  Cor- 
poreal or  Materialistic  Traducianism.  This  theory  which 
was  defended  by  Tertullian  was  absolutely  condemned  by 
our  author  as  militating  against  the  incorporeal  nature 
of  the  human  soul,  admoneo  sane,  quantum  ualleam,  si 
quos  ista  praeoccupauit  opinio,  ut  animas  credant  ex 
parentibus  propagari,  quantum  possunt  se  ipsos  con- 
siderent  et  interim  sapiant  corpora  non  esse  animas 
suas.^^^^  The  other  aspect  of  Traducianism  which  holds 
that  subsequent  souls  descend  from  the  soul  of  the  first 
man  through  the  parents,  is  frequently  designated  Gen- 
erationism.^^^^  While  Augustine's  whole  attitude  towards 
the  problem  of  the  origin  of  the  soul  of  the  descendants 
of  the  first  man  was  one  of  doubt  and  hesitancy,  he  seems 
to  have  been  inclined  to  favor  the  theory  of  Generation- 
ism.  The  principal  reasons  he  assigns  for  viewing  this 
opinion  with  greater  favor  than  the  rest  are  these:  it 
explains  the  transmission  of  original  sin,  (Si  una  anima 
facta  est,  ex  qua  omnium  hominum  animae  trahuntur 
nascentium,  quis  potest  dicere  non  se  pecasse,  cum  primus 
ille  peccabit?)  ;  ^'-  it  safeguards  the  goodness  and  the 
justice  of  God  by  furnishing  an  adequate  cause  for  the 
penal  sufferings  of  infants  both  here  and  hereafter ;  ^^^ 
finally,  this  explanation  seems  to  be  more  consonant  with 
the  teachings  of  the  orthodox  faith  than  the  others.^^* 
In  giving  his  preference  to  Generationism  Augustine  does 
not  overlook  the  fact  that  this  theory  presents  a  special 
difficulty  insofar  as  the  soul  of  Jesus  Christ  is  concerned. 
If  one  adopts  this  theory  he  must  hold  either  that  the 
soul  of  Christ,  by  way  of  exception,  was  not  derived  in 
the  same  manner  as  are  the  souls  of  other  human  beings, 
but  came  into  existence  through  an  act  of  special  crea- 
tion ;  or  if  it  was  derived  in  the  same  way  as  the  souls  of 

250  De  Gen.  ad  Litt.  X,  24. 

251  Cf.  Cath.  Ency.  vol.  XV,  p.  14,  art:   Traducianism,  C.  A.  Dubray. 

252  De  Lib.  Arb.  Ill,  c.  xx. 

253  Ep.  CLXVI,  c.  iv,  vi. 

254  Ep.  CXC,  c.  i,  vi ;  Ep.  CCII,  bis,  c.  vi. 


74  THE  ORIGIN  OF  THE   HUMAN  SOUL 

other  men,  one  must  believe  that  when  He  assumed  it, 
He  SO  purified  it  that  He  came  into  the  world  sinless.^^^ 
The  question  concerning  the  origin  of  the  souls  of  the 
descendants  of  the  first  man,  as  was  remarked  at  the 
outset  of  this  discussion,  caused  Augustine  considerable 
trouble  and  anxiety  over  a  long  period  of  years,  and 
although  he  pursued  his  investigations  with  an  admirable 
and  praiseworthy  tenacity  of  purpose,  he  was  never  able 
to  decide  definitely  in  favor  of  any  one  theory  to  the  ex- 
clusion of  the  rest.  Whenever  he  refers  to  this  problem 
he  is  always  careful  to  to  warn  his  readers  of  his  own 
hesitancy  in  adopting  any  particular  theory.  A  single 
reference  taken  from  Epistola  CXC  which  was  written 
about  the  year  418  covers  this  point  in  all  the  works  pub- 
lished previous  to  that  time :  De  qua  re  antequam  aliquid 
admoneam  sinceritatem  tuam,  scire  te  uolo  in  tarn  multis 
opusculis  meis  numquam  me  fuisse  ausum  de  hac  quaes- 
tione  definitam  proferre  sententiam  et  inpudenter  referre 
in  litteras  ad  alios  informandos,  quod  apud  me  non  fuerit 
explicatum,  (2)  When  his  indecision  was  made  the  ob- 
ject of  attack  by  those  who  tried  to  force  him  to  commit 
himself  to  a  definite  view,  he  calmly  informed  them  that 
if  they  could  produce  unquestionable  evidence  in  support 
of  any  one  of  these  theories  from  the  Canonical  Books  of 
Scripture,  or  if  they  could  adduce  valid  arguments 
founded  upon  evidently  true  premises,  he  was  ready  and 
even  anxious  to  embrace  an  opinion  so  well  established. 
If  on  the  contrary,  no  such  evidence  or  argumentation 
can  be  produced,  he  feels  perfectly  justified  in  maintain- 
ing a  non-committal  attitude  of  mind.^^^  Although  he 
sought  untiringly  in  his  own  splendid  intellect  and  in 
both  past  and  contemporary  philosophy  and  theology  for 
some  solution  of  this  problem  which  would  harmonize 
with  the  orthodox  doctrine  of  original  sin,  he  was  forced 
to  acknowledge  in  the  end  of  his  days  that  so  far  as  he 
is  concerned  the  origin  of  the  soul  of  the  descendants  of 


255  Ep.  CLXIV.  c.  vii. 

256  Ep.  CXUII,  11. 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THE   HUMAN   SOUL  75 

the  first  man  is  a  profound  mystery.^"  One  cannot  re- 
frain from  expressing  his  admiration  at  the  high  quality 
of  a  mind  that  could  frankly  confess  that  he  did  not  know 
how  to  solve  this  difficulty,  and  furthermore  was  not 
ashamed  to  admit  that  he  did  not  know.^"'^  This  honest 
and  open  recognition  of  his  intellectual  limitations  tends 
only  to  bring  out  in  clearer  perspective  the  rare  quality 
of  Augustine's  genius.  The  great  care  and  sustained 
effort  devoted  to  this  problem',  combined  with  that  critical 
attitude  of  mind  so  indispensable  in  the  searcher  after 
truth,  manifest  to  us  how  deservedly  Augustine  merits 
the  title  of  "Philosopher,"  and  lends  an  added  sanction 
to  the  unanimous  verdict  of  the  ages  which  ranks  him 
among  the  few  really  great  thinkers  of  all  times. 


Saint  Augustine  fixed  the  Christian  concept  of  the 
human  soul  and  contributed  largely  to  its  development. 
He  collected  and  condensed  the  principal  ideas  and  argu- 
ments which  he  found  in  Pagan  philosophy,  and  inter- 
preted and  developed  these  in  the  light  of  the  teachings 
of  Christianity.  Profound  philosopher  and  able  psychol- 
ogist though  he  was,  his  primary  interest  in  problems 
touching  the  human  soul  was  neither  philosophical  nor 
psychological,  but  rather  theological  in  character.  Jesus 
Christ  had  directed  attention  to  the  mutual  relations  that 
exist  between  God  and  man,  and  it  was  ever  with  these 
relations  uppermost  in  his  mind  that  Saint  Augustine 
studied  the  human  soul. 

His  most  noteworthy  contribution  to  the  Christian 
philosophy  of  the  human  soul  was  his  development  of  the 
proofs  for  spirituality.  He  was  probably  the  first  Chris- 
tian thinker  to  understand  clearly  the  distinction  be- 
tween matter  and  spirit,  body  and  substance.    He  stands 

257  Opus  Imperfectum  contra  Julianum  II,  c.  LXVIII, 

258  Quapropter  dico  etiam  ego  de  anima  mea :  nescio,  quomodo 
uenerit  in  corpus  meum — neque  enim  ego  illam  mihi  donaui — ;  scit  ille 
qui  donauit.  utrum  illam  de  patre  meo  traxerit  an  sicut  homini  prime 
nouam  crauerit.  sciam  etiam  ego,  si  ipse  docuerit,  quandocumque 
uoluerit ;  nunc  autem  nescio  nee  me  pudet  ut  istum  f  ateri  nescire  quod 
nescio.    De  An.  et  ejus  Origine,  I,  xv,  25. 


76  THE  ORIGIN  OF  THE   HUMAN  SOUL 

out  conspicuously  among  the  philosophers  of  his  time  as 
the  fearless  and  uncompromising  champion  of  the  doc- 
trine that  the  soul  of  man  is  not  a  body  but  a  simple, 
spiritual  substance.  The  arguments  which  he  advanced 
to  maintain  his  position  constitute  a  permanent  bulwark 
of  defense  against  the  ever-recurring  attacks  of  mate- 
rialism. His  appeal  to  the  authority  of  consciousness  in 
the  elaboration  of  this  doctrine,  and  his  insistence  on 
the  scientific  value  of  the  data  obtainable  by  introspection, 
has  merited  for  him  an  estimable  place  among  those  who 
have  aided  in  the  advance  of  psychological  method.  The 
philosophical  doctrine  of  spirituality  outlined  by  the 
Bishop  of  Hippo  is  the  equal  of  any  which  has  been  at- 
tempted since  his  day,  and,  perhaps,  it  is  not  an  exag- 
geration to  say,  that  so  far  as  this  aspect  of  Christian 
philosophy  is  concerned  he  was  the  richest  contributor 
in  the  long  history  of  Christian  thought. 

As  regards  the  doctrine  of  immortality,  he  was  evi- 
dently under  the  influence  of  Plato  when  he  proposed  the 
so-called  metaphysical  proofs  of  the  souFs  immortality  at 
the  beginning  of  his  Christian  career.  His  development 
of  the  argument  based  on  the  universal  desire  for  being 
and  immortality  however,  was  his  own,  and  as  a  distinct 
contribution  to  this  doctrine  must  not  be  overlooked. 

His  protracted  investigation  of  the  question  concerning 
the  origin  of  the  human  soul  resulted  in  his  arriving  at 
a  clearer  and  better  understanding  of  the  souFs  nature. 
While  he  never  pronounced  in  favor  of  any  one  particular 
theory  of  origin  to  the  exclusion  of  the  rest,  he  seems 
to  have  been  inclined  to  favor  Generationism  as  the  theory 
best  adapted  to  his  defense  of  the  orthodox  doctrine  of 
original  sin  against  the  Pelagians.  As  is  well  known, 
this  theory  has  long  since  been  supplanted  in  Christian 
philosophical  and  theological  circles  by  the  Special  Crea- 
tion theory  as  advocated  by  Saint  Jerome  in  Augustine's 
day  and  many  centuries  later  by  Saint  Thomas  Aquinas. 

A  knowledge  of  the  Concept  of  the  human  soul  as 
developed  by  Saint  Augustine  is  indispensable  to  the 
proper  understanding  of  the  whole  trend  of  psychological 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  THE   HUMAN  SOUL  77 

thought  from  his  day  down  to  and  including  the  thirteenth 
century.  Every  Christian  thinker  worthy  of  note  who 
appeared  during  this  period  was  more  or  less  under  the 
influence  of  the  great  Patristic  philosopher.  Albertus 
Magnus  and  Saint  Thomas  Aquinas,  who  graced  the 
Golden  Age  of  Scholasticism,  were  undoubtedly  more 
directly  and  powerfully  dominated  by  the  philosophy  of 
Aristotle,  but  they  were  also  influenced  in  no  inconsid- 
erable degree  by  Saint  Augustine.  The  Angelic  Doctor 
not  only  appeals  frequently  to  the  authority  of  the 
African  Bishop,  but  also  repeats  many  of  the  arguments 
which  had  been  formulated  by  him.  In  the  hands  of  this 
Master  Scholastic  of  the  thirteenth  century  the  Christian 
concept  of  the  human  soul  was  perfected  and  woven  into 
that  "perennial  philosophy"  which  has  been  the  rich 
heritage  of  subsequent  centuries. 


78  GENERAL  WORKS 

GENERAL  WORKS. 
PATROLOGIES. 

Alzog,  Patrologie,  trans.  French,  Belet,  p.  504-557,  Paris, 

1877. 
Bardenhewer,  0.,  Patrologie,  p.  416-477,  2  ed.  Freiburg 

im  Breisgau,  1901 ;  trans.  English,  by  Thomas  Sha- 

han,  p.  473-508,  Freiburg  im  Breisgau  and  St.  Louis, 

Mo.,  1908. 
Farrar,  Lives  of  the  Fathers  II,  p.  298-460,  London,  1889. 
Fessler-Jungmann,  Institutiones  patrologiae  II,  p.  250- 

404,  Innsbruck,  1890-1896. 
SCHAFF,  Ph.,  Select  Library  of  the  Nicene  and  Post- 

Nicene  Fathers  of  the  Christian  Church  (Sec.  I), 

vol.  VII,  New  York,  1902. 
SCHMiD,  B.,  Manual  of  Patrology,  trans.  4  ed.  St.  Louis, 

Mo.,  1917  (p.  243-257). 
TiXERONT,  J.,  A  Handbook  of  Patrology,  trans.  4  ed.  p. 

259-261,  St.  Louis,  Mo.,  1920. 

DICTIONARIES. 

Vacant  et  Mangenot,  Dictionnaire  de  Theologie  Catho- 

lique,  t.  I,  2,  col.  2268-2561. 
Wetzer  und  Welte,  Kirchenlexikon,  t.  I,  col.  1669-1678, 

2  ed.  Freiburg  im  Breisgau,  1882-1903. 
Baldwin,  J.  M.,  Dictionary  of  Philosophy  and  Psychology, 

New  York  and  London,  1901-1905. 
Dictionnaire  des  Sciences  Philosophiques,  I,  p.  249,  Paris, 

1844. 
EiSLER,   R.,   Worterbuch  der  Philosophischen  Begriffe, 

Berlin,  1910. 
SCHAFF,  P.,  Encyclopedia  of  Religious  Knowledge,  t.  I, 

p.  173,  Edinburgh,  1883. 
Hastings,  J.,  Encyclopedia  of  Religion  and  Ethics,  vol. 

IX,  1917;  vol.  X,  1919,  New  York. 
Catholic  Encyclopedia,  New  York. 


GENERAL  WORKS  79 

Paulys,  Real-Encyclopaedie  der  Cldssischen  Altertum- 
swissensschaft.  vol.  II,  col.  2263-2367,  Stuttgart, 
1896. 

HISTORIES. 

DUSCHESNE,  L.,  Historie  ancienne  de  Veglise,  Paris,  1908, 
trans.  4  ed.  New  York,  1912-1915. 

Robertson,  J.  C,  History  of  the  Christian  Church,  Lon- 
don, 1875-1907. 

Rainy,  R.,  The  Ancient  Catholic  Church,  Edinburgh, 
1902. 

Leclerq,  H.,  UAfrique  Chretienne,  2  ed.  Paris,  1904. 

Mil  man,  H.  H.,  History  of  Latin  Christianity,  vol.  I, 
London,  1854. 

HISTORIES  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

Benn,  a.  W.,  History  of  Ancient  Philosophy,  New  York, 

1912. 
Blakey,  R.,  History  of  the  Philosophy  of  Mind,  London, 

1850. 
Brucker,  J.,  Historia  Critica  philosophiae,  t.  Ill,  p.  485- 

507,  Lipsiae,  1766. 
DeWulf-Coffey,  History  of  Medieval  Philosophy y  3  ed. 

New  York,  1909. 
Enfield,  W.,  History  of  Philosophy,  London,  1819. 
Erdmann,  J.  E.,  History  of  Philosophy,  trans.  3  ed.  by 

W.  S.  Hough,  London  and  New  York,  1890. 
Gonzalez-Pascal,   Histoire   de   la   Philosophic,    Paris, 

1890. 
Janet  et  Seailles,  Histoire  de  la  Philosophic,  Paris, 

1887. 
RiTTER,    H.,    Geschichte    der    Christlichen    Philosophic, 

French  trans,  by  Trullard,  II,  Paris,  1843. 
Schuyler,  A.,  A  Critical  History  of  Philosophical  Theo- 
ries, Boston,  1913. 
Stoeckl,  a.,  Geschichte  der  Christlichen  Philosophic,  zur 

Zeit  der  Kirchenvater,  Mainz,  1891. 


80  GENERAL   WORKS 

Grundriss  der  Geschichte  der  Philosophie,  Mainz,  1911. 

Turner,  W.,  History  of  Philosophy,  Boston,  1903. 

Ueberweg-Heinze,  Grundriss  der  Geschichte  der  Philo- 
sophie, 9  ed.  Berlin,  1905. 

Weber,  A.,  History  of  Philosophy,  trans,  by  Thilly,  New 
York,  1896. 

WiNDELBAND,  W.,  History  of  Ancient  Philosophy,  trans, 
by  H.  Cushman,  New  York,  1899. 

BIOGRAPHIES. 

Acta  Sanctorum,  t.  VI,  p.  213-460,  Paris,  1866. 

Les  Bollandistes,  Vies  des  Saints,  Paris,  1888. 

Weiskotten,  H.  T.,  Sancti  Augustini  vita  scripta  a  Pos- 
sidio  episcopo,  edited  with  revised  text,  introduction, 
notes  and  an  English  version,  Princeton  University 
Press,  1919. 

BoHRiNGER,  F.  &  P.,  Aurelius  Augustinus  Bischof  von 
Hippo,  Stuttgart,  1877-1878. 

PouJOULAT,  Histoire  de  St,  Augu^tin,  sa  vie,  ses  ouvres, 
son  siecle,  influence  de  son  genie,  7  ed.  Paris,  1886. 

WOLFSGRUBER,  C,  Augu^tinus,  Paderborn,  1898. 

Martin,  J.,  St,  Augustin,  Paris,  1901. 

Bertrand,  L.,  S.  Augustin,  Paris,  1913. 

NAVILLE,  H.  A.,  St.  Augustin,  Geneva,  1872. 

WORTER,  F.,  Die  Geistentwicklung  des  hi.  Aurelius  Au- 
gustinus bis  zu  seiner  Taufe,  Paderborn,  1892. 

Flottes,  Etudes  sur  St.  Augustin,  son  genie,  son  ame,  sa 
philosophie,  Montpellier,  1861. 

Hatzfeld,  a.,  St.  Augustin,  6  ed.  Paris,  1901. 

Cunningham,  W.,  St.  Austin  and  his  place  in  the  history 
of  Christian  thought,  London,  1886. 

McCabe,  J.,  Saint  Augustine  and  his  Age,  London,  1902. 

BiNDEMANN,  C.,  Der  heilige  Augustinus,  vol.  1,  Berlin, 
1844;  vol.  2,  Leipsig,  1856;  vol.  3,  Greifswald,  1869. 

MORIARTY,  P.,  The  Life  of  St.  Augustine,  Bishop,  Con- 
fessor and  Doctor  of  the  Church,  Philadelphia,  1873. 

Newmann,  J.  Card.,  Historical  Sketches,  vol.  2,  New 
York,  1906. 


GENERAL  WORKS  81 


SPECIAL  WORKS. 

GiBB,  J.,  and  Montgomery,  W.,  The  Confessions  of 
Augicstine,  Cambridge  University  Press,  1908. 

DOMBART,  B.,  Sancti  Aureli  Augustini  Episcopi  De  Civi- 
tate  Dei,  libri  XXII,  tertium  recognovit,  Leipsig, 
1905. 

Cunningham,  J.  C,  Letters  of  Saint  Augicstine,  Edin- 
burgh, 1872. 

DODS,  Marcus,  On  the  Trinity,  Edinburgh,  1873. 
The  City  of  God,  2  vols.,  Edinburgh,  1872. 

Watts,  William,  St,  Augustine's  Confessions,  1631,  The 
Loeb  Classical  Library,  1912. 

MISCELLANEOUS  WORKS. 

Hewitt,  A.  F.,  Problems  of  the  Age  with  studies  in  St, 

Augustine,  New  York,  1868. 
Grandgeorge,  L.,  Saint  Augustin  et  le  neoplatonisme, 

Paris,  1896. 
WiNDLE,  B.,  The  Church  and  Science,  London,  1917. 
Mercier,  D.,  Cours  de  Philosophic,  Louvain,  1892. 

A  Manual  of  Modern  Scholastic  Philosophy,  trans,  T. 

L.  and  S.  A.  Parker,  London,  1916. 
The  Origins  of  Contemporary  Psychology,  trans.  W.  H. 

Michell,  New  York,  1918. 
NOURRISSON,  J.  F.,  La  Philosophic  de  Saint  Augustin, 

Paris,  1865. 
Allies,  M.  H.,  Leaves  from  St.  Augustine,  London,  1886. 
OSMUN,  G.  W.,  Augustine:  the  thinker,  Cincinnati  and 

New  York,  1906. 
Montgomery,  W.,  St.  Augustine,  Aspects  of  his  life  and 

thought.  New  York,  1914. 
Martin,  L.,  La  doctrine  spirituelle  de  St,  Augustin,  Paris, 

1901. 
Ferraz,  M.,  De  la  psychologic  de  Saint  Augustin,  Paris, 

1862. 


82  GENERAL  WORKS 

Werner,  K.,  Die  Augitstinische  psychologie  in  ihrer  miU 
telalterlich  scholastischen  Einkleidung  und  Gestal- 
tung,  Vienna,  1882. 

Fechner,  G.  T.,  Ueber  die  Seelenfrage,  Leipsig,  1861. 

VON  Schubert,  G.  H.,  Die  Geschichte  der  Seele,  5  ed. 
Stuttgart,  1877. 

RODIER,  G.,  Aristote  Traite  de  Uame,  Paris,  1900. 

PiAT,  C.,  La  Personne  Humaine,  Paris,  1897. 

Driscoll,  J.  T.,  A  Treatise  on  the  Human  Soul,  New 
York,  1898. 

COSTE,  A.,  Dieu  et  Uame,  12  ed.  Paris,  1903. 

CocoNNiER,  Uame  humaine,  Paris,  1890. 

Faroe,  Le  cerveau,  Vame  et  les  facultes,  Paris,  1888. 

MCDOUGALL,  W.,  Body  and  Mind,  London,  1911. 

Rand,  B.,  The  Classical  Psychologists,  Boston,  1912. 

Rhode,  E.,  Psyche,  Leipsig,  1906. 

SiEBECK,  H.,  Geschichte  der  Psychologie,  Gotha,  1884. 

DUBRAY,  C.  A.,  Introductory  Philosophy,  New  York,  1913. 

HiCKEY,  J.,  Summula  Philosophiae  Scholasticae,  4  ed. 
Dublin,  1915. 

James,  William,  Psychology,  New  York,  1892. 

Perrier,  J.,  The  Revival  of  Scholastic  Philosophy  in  the 
Nineteenth  Century,  New  York,  1909. 

DeWulf,  M.,  Scholasticism  Old  and  New,  trans.  P.  Cof- 
fey, Dublin,  1910. 

Shallo,  M.,  Scholastic  Philosophy,  Philadelphia,  1915. 

Brownson,  H.  F.,  The  Works  of  Orestes,  A.  Brownson, 
vol.  I,  Detroit,  1882. 

Thomas  Aquinas, 

Summa  Theologica,  Prima  Pars. 

Quaestiones  Disputatae. 

Commentaria  in  Tres  lihros  Aristotelis  De  Anima. 

Summa  Contra  Gentiles, 

ADDITIONAL  WORKS  OF  AUGUSTINE 
CONSULTED. 

De  Vera  Religione  (De  Vera  ReL), 

De  Praedestinatione  Sanctorum  (De  Praed.  Sanct), 


GENERAL  WORKS  83 

De  Agone  Christiano. 

De  Genesi  contra  Manichaeos  (De  Gen.  contra  Manich.), 

De  Genesi  ad  Litteram  imperfecttis  liber  (De  Gen,  ad 

Litt,  imper  liber)* 
De  Beata  Vita, 

De  Moribiis  Ecclesiae  Catholicae  (De  Mor,  Eccl.  Oath.), 
De  Duabus   Animabus   contra   Manichaeos    (De   Duab, 

Anim,  contra  Manich.), 
De  Actis   cum  Felice   Manichaeo    (De   Actis   cum  Fel. 

Manich.), 
Ad  Orosium  contra  Priscillianistas  et  Origenistas, 


M  VITA 


VITA. 


William  Patrick  0* Connor  was  born  in  Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin,  on  October  18,  1886.  His  elementary  training 
was  received  in  St.  John's  Cathedral  School  of  his  native 
city.  He  studied  the  Classics,  Philosophy,  and  Theology 
at  St.  Francis  Seminary  near  Milwaukee.  He  was  or- 
dained to  the  priesthood  on  March  11,  1912,  and  assigned 
as  Assistant  to  the  Pastor  of  St.  Rose  of  Lima  Church, 
Milwaukee.  In  the  year  1915,  he  attended  Marquette 
University,  Milwaukee,  where  he  studied  Rational  Psy- 
chology under  the  direction  of  Dr.  G.  Deglmann,  S.  J. 
He  received  the  A.  B.  degree  in  June,  1916.  The  follow- 
ing September  he  entered  the  Catholic  University  of 
America  where  he  followed  courses  in  Metaphysics  and 
History  of  Philosophy  under  Dr.  W.  Turner,  General, 
Experimental  and  Abnormal  Psychology  under  Dr.  T.  V. 
Moore,  C.  S.  P.,  and  Biology  (Animal  and  Plant),  under 
Dr.  J.  Parker.  On  June  29,  1917,  he  was  commissioned 
First  Lieutenant  in  the  Wisconsin  National  Guard,  and 
on  August  3  of  the  same  year  he  was  assigned  as  Chap- 
lain to  the  First  Regiment,  Wisconsin  Cavalry.  When 
this  organization  became  the  120th  Field  Artillery  of  the 
57th  Brigade,  Thirty-second  Division,  he  was  reassigned 
as  Chaplain.  He  served  with  this  organization  in  Amer- 
ica, England,  and  France,  participating  in  four  major 
operations  of  the  French  and  American  Armies.  On 
November  19,  1918,  he  was  advanced  to  the  position  of 
Senior  Chaplain,  Thirty-second  Division,  A.  E.  F.,  with 
the  Army  of  Occupation  in  Germany.  In  March,  1919, 
he  was  promoted  to  the  rank  of  Captain,  Chaplain  Corps, 
A.  E.  F.  On  the  mustering  out  of  the  Thirty-second 
Division,  he  resigned  his  commission  and  returned  to 
Milwaukee,  where  he  spent  the  following  three  months 
as  Assistant  to  the  Pastor  of  St.  Rose  of  Lima  Church. 
In  September  of  the  same  year  he  reentered  the  Catholic 
University  of  America,  following  courses  in  Philosophy 
of  Mind,   Social   Psychology,   Philosophy  of  Evolution, 


VITA  85 

and  Genetic  Psychology  under  Dr.  E.  A.  Pace,  and 
Philosophy  of  Saint  Thomas  under  Dr.  H.  I.  Smith,  O.  P. 
He  is  particularly  indebted  to  Dr.  E.  A.  Pace  and  Dr. 
J.  Fox  for  valuable  assistance  rendered  in  the  prepara- 
tion and  execution  of  this  dissertation. 


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